American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy
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THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
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The United States is the world’s undisputed military and economic superpower. It has a more formidable global presence than ever, maintaining approximately 700 military installations abroad in 2003 and spending as much on defense in 2004 as the next 20 nations combined. This amount of spending is still only 4% of its gross domestic product (GDP). The U.S. share of total world product is approximately 30% today, up from 20% in the 1980s. The American stock markets account for approximately 36% of global market value. Seventy-five percent of all Nobel laureates in the sciences, economics, and medicine do research and live in the United States.

While the United States is alone among nations in the magnitude of its power, its destiny is more deeply intertwined with that of other nations than ever before. Globalization is speeding the flow of information, people, ideas, and goods around the globe, creating enormous opportunities and also new challenges. Among these challenges have been the September 11 attacks and their aftermath, the war in Iraq, the failure of the Cancun WTO meetings, and international criticism and perception of U.S. foreign policies as unilateral and misguided. This, in turn, has led to an emerging debate in the United States and internationally over the U.S. role in the world and how best to achieve global security and prosperity.

The key questions in this debate are not the usual stuff of policy discourse. Rather, they go to core concepts about the nature of the world order, the rights and responsibilities of nation-states, and the role of unprecedented American power. In an era defined by the urgent challenges of globalization, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and weakened international institutions, this debate will continue and grow long into the future.

One of the major factors shaping the debate will be understanding the evolving “cognitive framework” of the American public and leadership as they look at the world and evaluate how the international system and the U.S. role in it have been transformed by recent events. Do Americans perceive the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction as requiring fundamentally new responses, including preventive war and regime change? Do unilateral means have new appeal and multilateral approaches less credibility? Under what circumstances and through what processes do international intervention and the use of force against sovereign states acquire legitimacy? What claims should developing countries have on the global economy and through what means can they be addressed? Should American power be used to spread democratic values and institutions? More generally, how should American power be used in an era of U.S. primacy in world affairs?

In order to shed light on American attitudes towards these critical issues, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations has chosen to conduct a special 2004 biennial study of U.S. public and leader opinion on
international issues. The decision to conduct this study, the ninth in the Council’s traditionally quadrennial series, is due to both the significant role foreign policy issues are playing in American political life and the 2004 presidential election and the unique opportunity to collaborate with partners in Mexico and South Korea on simultaneous, parallel surveys focused on key similarities and differences between Americans, Mexicans, and South Koreans on the rules of international behavior as well as key bilateral concerns. The findings for these surveys are contained in four separate reports: one on the U.S. results, one on the Mexico results, and one each on the comparisons between Americans and Mexicans and Americans and South Koreans.

More than half the questions in the U.S. survey are new and focused on the “rules of the game.” But a number of questions from previous CCFR studies were also used, allowing us to measure changes in American public and leader thinking about the rules of the game and other matters. Special attention was given to tracking and analyzing the similarities and differences in opinion between the American public and a sample of American foreign policy leaders. Although sometimes the differences in opinion between the public and leaders reflect gaps in awareness or information, they also represent deeper divergences in outlook that point to potential policy problems.

Acknowledgments

The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) would like to express its great appreciation to the many organizations and individuals who helped make this project possible. Funding for the U.S. study and for the Council’s collaborative studies with the Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales (COMEXI) and the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) in Mexico and with the East Asia Institute in South Korea came from several sources. The Chicago Council is particularly grateful for the early and generous funding provided by Council board members Lester Crown, CCFR chairman, John Manley, CCFR vice chairman, and Richard A. Behrenhausen, who as president of the Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation made a critical commitment to the study. We would also like to acknowledge the major support provided by the Ford Foundation that enabled us to include the survey of leaders and to disseminate the findings at a conference in Washington, D.C. The Korea Foundation provided assistance that made the U.S.–South Korea study possible. Finally, James Denny provided welcome support that was valuable in getting started.

The continued success of the CCFR public opinion study is due to the remarkable collaboration of its team. This year’s CCFR team included Catherine Hug, president of Hug Communications; Steven Kull, director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland; Benjamin I. Page, Gordon Scott Fulcher Professor of Decision Making in the Department of Political Science at Northwestern University; and Robert Y. Shapiro, professor in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University. Special recognition is due to Christopher Whitney, director of studies at The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, who as project director and editor-in-chief for this report played the central role in developing and implementing the 2004 survey. We also want to thank Jennie Taylor, project coordinator for the CCFR study team, for her invaluable contributions to making this project a success. Oscar Torres-Reyna of Columbia University played a key role in the data analysis for this report. Clay Ramsay and Evan Lewis of PIPA also provided much appreciated support.

The Chicago Council also wishes to express its deepest thanks and appreciation to the members of the COMEXI, CIDE, and EAI teams. Ambassador Andrés Rozental provided great leadership in conceptualizing and developing the collaborative U.S.–Mexico study. Additionally, Susan Minushkin, Guadalupe González González, Antonio Ortiz Mena López Negrete, and Ana González of CIDE all played key roles in the project. Similarly, we would like to acknowledge and express appreciation to Kim Byung-Kook, director of the Center for Foreign Affairs and Security at the East Asia Institute, for his commitment to making the U.S.–South Korea report a success. Additionally, we
would like to thank all the members of the South Korea study team: Kim Tae Hyun, director of the Center for Foreign Affairs and Security at the East Asia Institute and professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Chung-Ang University; Lee Nae Young, director of the Center for Research on Political and Social Public Opinion at the East Asia Institute and professor in the Department of Political Science, Korea University; Kim Sung Han, professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security; and Namkung Gon, professor in the Department of Political Science, Ewha Womans University. They all contributed substantial time and effort to make this binational partnership a success.

The Chicago Council wishes to thank Knowledge Networks for all the assistance they have provided to the study. In particular we would like to recognize Mike Dennis and Stefan Subias for their hard work throughout the project.

The data from this survey will be placed on deposit with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, the Roper Center for Public Opinion in Storrs, Connecticut, and NORC (National Opinion Research Center) at the University of Chicago. It will be available to scholars and other interested professionals. The report will also be available on the Internet at www.ccf.org.

—Marshall M. Bouton
Study Chair and President,
The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
The Global U.S. Position

Three years after the September 11 attacks of 2001, terrorism and other security threats still loom large in the public’s mind. However, there is a lowered sense of threat overall compared to 2002, and the domestic concern of protecting American jobs is now the most commonly cited goal of U.S. foreign policy. Support for foreign policy goals overall is down, as are the numbers of Americans who want to increase spending on homeland security and defense. There is lower support for stationing U.S. troops abroad, particularly in Middle Eastern or Islamic countries. Yet Americans are still committed to playing an engaged role in the world and support taking action when clearly threatened, especially against terrorism. They do not want to play a dominant role, supporting diplomatic and multilateral approaches to international problems in even greater numbers than in 2002.

- International terrorism, chemical and biological weapons, and unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers remain the most commonly cited critical threats, but the percentages who view them as critical have dropped significantly since 2002. Virtually all other threats asked about are also down substantially, with majorities no longer considering critical the threats of Islamic fundamentalism, the development of China as a world power, and military conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
- Similarly, while the rank of U.S. foreign policy goals has remained largely constant, there is an overall drop among virtually all goals in the numbers believing they are very important. The major exception is for protecting the jobs of American workers, which now ranks first, followed by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and combating international terrorism. These latter two goals rank highest among leaders.
- While the American public and leaders favor having bases overseas, support for stationing troops in specific countries—especially those in the Middle East—has dropped substantially since 2002.
- Yet strong majorities of the American public and leaders still believe the United States should take an active part in world affairs. Despite majority support among the American public for taking active steps to ensure no other country becomes a superpower, Americans strongly believe that the United States should work together with other nations to solve international problems. Additionally, large majorities of the public and leaders reject the idea that the United States has the responsibility to play the role of world policeman and think the most
important lesson of September 11 is that the United States needs to work more closely with other countries to fight terrorism.

• Americans are still willing to use force in a variety of contexts when critical interests are threatened, especially in responding to terrorism. Many diplomatic means to combat terrorism, such as helping countries to develop their economies and trying suspected terrorists in the International Criminal Court, score as high as military options, and a plurality believes more emphasis should be placed on diplomatic and economic methods compared to military ones in the fight against terrorism.

International Norms and the Use of Force

Following September 11, there has been substantial discussion regarding the international norms governing the use of force and whether they need to become less restrictive to respond to the new threat posed by terrorists and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The American public and leaders strongly endorse the traditional constraints on the use of force by individual states and resist new ideas for making them looser. They also indicate readiness to give wide-ranging powers to states acting collectively through the United Nations to address various potential threats.

• Majorities of the public and leaders do not support states taking unilateral action to prevent other states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, but do support this action if it has UN Security Council approval. They also both reject preventive unilateral war, but endorse a country’s right to go to war on its own if there is strong evidence of an imminent threat. Strong majorities of the public and leaders also believe the United States would need UN Security Council approval before using military force to destroy North Korea’s nuclear capability.

• The public and leaders strongly endorse the UN having the right to authorize the use of force to stop a country from supporting terrorist groups. Although a majority of the public says a country should have this right without UN approval, a clear majority only supports the right of the United States to overthrow a government supporting terrorist groups when the threat is imminent.

• Both the public and leaders strongly endorse either a state acting on its own or the UN Security Council having the right to authorize force against genocide and favor using U.S. troops for this purpose. A majority of the public and leaders agree that the UN, but not an individual state, has the right to intervene to restore a democratic government that has been overthrown. The public even more forcefully rejects the use of U.S. troops to install democratic governments in states where dictators rule.

• There is strong endorsement by both the public and leaders of the right of a country to defend another country that has been attacked even without UN approval. However, support for this measure increases with UN authorization. While the public opposes using U.S. troops to defend South Korea from a North Korean attack, a majority favors the U.S. contributing forces to a UN-sponsored effort to defend South Korea.

• The American public and leaders support the use of nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear attack and reject using torture to extract information from suspected terrorists.

Multilateralism and International Institutions

Some have argued that in a globalized world it is necessary for countries to participate in a rules-based international system that constrains decision making by the United States and other individual countries so that consensus can be reached on critical issues. Others argue that the United States, as the world’s most powerful nation, should not accept these constraints. The survey results indicate there is substantial U.S. public and leader support for collective decision making and for strengthening international organizations. Both the public and leaders also support U.S. participation in a wide range of international treaties and agreements.
• Strong majorities agree that the United States should be more willing to make decisions within the UN even if this means the United States will have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice. Significantly, a clear majority of the public favors changing UN Security Council rules so that no single member could veto a decision favored by all other members.

• Strong majorities of both the public and leaders say decisions in international economic organizations should always be made by a majority of members without the possibility of a U.S. veto and favor U.S. compliance with unfavorable WTO rulings. The public also roundly endorses giving the World Health Organization the authority to intervene in a country in response to a world health crisis even if the country disagrees.

• Similarly, the public and leaders favor U.S. participation in the nuclear test ban treaty, the treaty banning the use of land mines, the Kyoto agreement to reduce global warming, and the International Criminal Court (ICC). They additionally support the trial of international terrorists in the ICC and the United States making a general commitment to accept World Court decisions.

• American public and leaders have a positive feeling toward the UN, believe it should have a stronger role than the United States in helping Iraqis write a new constitution and build a democratic government, support U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping activities, and favor strengthening the organization through creating a standing UN peacekeeping force and giving the UN the power to regulate the international arms trade. A plurality of the public supports giving the UN the power to fund its activities by taxing the international sale of arms or oil; a plurality of leaders oppose this.

• Both the public and leaders believe the United States should withdraw its forces from Iraq if a clear majority of the Iraqi people want this. Opinions are divided, however, on a more general withdrawal of military forces from the Middle East, with the public believing the United States should withdraw if a majority of people there want it to do so. A small majority of leaders disagree. Despite this, both public and leaders think that foreign governments both should and do have more influence on U.S. foreign policy than the opinion of people around the world, with leaders generally less concerned than the public about the opinion of either.

International Norms and Economic Relations

There is currently a debate on the equity of the international trading system and the degree to which trade should be free. Related to this are questions about the structure and role of the World Trade Organization and the growth of regional trade agreements. The survey findings indicate Americans want to pursue free trade provided displaced American workers are assisted and the environment is protected. They strongly support an international trading system regulated through multilateral institutions and requiring compliance with decisions that have majority support.

• A large majority of leaders and a smaller majority of the public think globalization is mostly good for the United States. The public, however, clearly sees positives and negatives in international trade, with the U.S. economy and American consumers considered winners, while job security and job creation in the United States suffer.

• Majorities of the public think bilateral trade with Japan, the countries of the EU, and Canada is fair, and economic competition from Europe scores very low as a critical threat. A majority of both the public and leaders believe that rich countries aren’t playing fair in trade negotiations with poor countries, even though a small majority of the public thinks the United States practices fair trade with poor countries. There is, however, concern about developing countries, with a notable number of the public citing competition from low-wage countries as a critical threat, a majority seeing China as practicing unfair trade, and a large majority believing that outsourcing is mostly bad. Leaders see out-
sourcing as mostly good and are much less concerned about protecting American jobs.

• Americans support lowering trade barriers such as tariffs, but want government programs to help displaced workers. Overwhelming majorities of the public and leaders also favor including minimum standards for working conditions and the protection of the environment in international trade agreements.

• While Americans support giving subsidies to small farmers, this support is predicated on need. Only very small percentages of the public and leaders favor regular annual subsidies. Large majorities of both the public and leaders oppose subsidies for large farming businesses.

• Americans favor aid to help needy countries develop their economies as a measure to fight terrorism and to achieve numerous humanitarian goals. Leaders are even more emphatic in their support of these measures. Leaders also favor undertaking a multibillion dollar reconstruction and democratization effort in the Middle East, which a majority of the public opposes.

• There is support for extending free trade agreements, with both the public and leaders endorsing U.S. participation in a proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas. The American public, however, has mixed feelings about NAFTA, seeing it as benefiting Mexico more than the United States and providing fewer advantages than international trade overall. Leaders look at NAFTA far more favorably.

• The public opposes increasing legal immigration levels and also opposes unilateral reform measures such as giving undocumented workers temporary worker status. Yet they are willing to endorse a bilateral agreement with Mexico that would increase legal immigration levels in the United States in exchange for Mexican efforts to reduce illegal immigration and drug trafficking. Leaders support keeping immigration at its current level or increasing it. They support temporary worker status for the undocumented and favor the bilateral agreement with Mexico.

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**U.S. Leaders and the Public: Policy Attitudes and Perceptions**

When comparing the attitudes of public and leaders on a range of policies and positions taken by the present or previous U.S. administrations, a fairly broad consensus between the public and leaders emerges, with both public and leaders supporting some and opposing others. In another interesting comparison in which leaders were asked to predict public opinion on a number of policies and positions that were asked in this survey, there are striking misperceptions among the leaders about public attitudes on those questions.

• Both the public and leaders strongly endorse policies ranging from maintaining rules against torture and complying with unfavorable WTO rulings, to using U.S. troops for peacekeeping in Afghanistan and maintaining a military presence in South Korea.

• Both the public and leaders disagree with other policies or positions. Strong majorities want the United States to participate in a range of international treaties, favor strengthening international trade agreements to require the protection of workers and the environment, oppose increasing defense spending, and reject countries going to war on their own to prevent another country from acquiring nuclear weapons.

• The public does not support some policies that the leaders do support: using U.S. troops if North Korea invades South Korea, keeping legal immigration levels the same (public wants to decrease), and expanding economic aid to other countries (public also wants to decrease).

• Leaders do not realize that the public favors participation in the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto agreement on global warming, and UN international peacekeeping forces. They are also not aware that the public favors accepting collective decisions within the UN and unfavorable WTO rulings as well as giving the UN the authority to tax such things as the international sale of arms and oil.
In 2002, nearly a year after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Americans were more focused than ever on world affairs, felt a heightened sense of threat and vulnerability, especially from international terrorism, and were more willing to take action around the world to reduce that vulnerability than in the past.

Two years later, after having taken substantial international actions against perceived threats, most obviously against the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Americans are taking a more restrained stance internationally. Fewer Americans show high levels of concern about critical threats. Fewer see various foreign policy goals as extremely important. There is a declining readiness to expand spending on international priorities, and there is declining support for stationing troops in many countries. Overwhelming majorities believe the United States does not have the responsibility to play the role of world policeman and believe it is playing that role more than it should be.

However, this does not mean that Americans are disengaging from the international sphere. There is still strong support for an active U.S. role in the world, and Americans remain willing to take certain military actions on their own against highly critical and imminent threats such as terrorism. They do not, however, want to play the dominant role in international affairs. In most cases they want the United States to act multilaterally, gaining the approval of allies and the United Nations. They prefer diplomatic efforts to military ones and show stronger support for working together with other countries.

**Lowered sense of threat**

The threats to their vital interests that most Americans consider critical remain much the same as in 2002 (see Figure 1-1). International terrorism, chemical and biological weapons, and unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers occupy the top three spots in that order, just as they did in 2002. Strikingly, however, the percentages who view these as critical threats have dropped dramatically, by 10, 16, and 19 percentage points, respectively.

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1In 2004 the CCFR public survey was conducted for the first time primarily by Internet. The poll was fielded by Knowledge Networks (KN) using its nationwide panel, which is randomly selected from the entire adult population and subsequently provided Internet access. A special telephone survey designed to be directly comparable to the telephone survey of 2002 was conducted on several questions to confirm comparability. In addition, in 2002 a special KN Internet survey was conducted on several questions. This has allowed the Council to assess mode differences and make direct comparisons on a number of questions using the same mode. Based on a combination of extensive bimodal research and the research literature on mode effects, we are quite confident that none of the trendline changes reported here are attributable to mode variations. Unless otherwise noted, all 2004 figures for the public listed in this report are from the primary Internet survey, while change figures cited from 2002 to 2004 for the public are from comparable modes (i.e. telephone to telephone or Internet to Internet). This generally provides a more conservative estimate of change than the comparison between 2002 telephone and 2004 Internet findings. The mode for collecting leader data has not changed, so all 2004 figures are directly comparable to past CCFR leader figures. For a full explanation of the survey methodology and mode effects, see the Notes on Methodology section at the end of this report.
Virtually all other threats asked about are also down substantially. Majorities no longer consider critical the threats of military conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors (39%), the development of China as a world power (33%), and perhaps most surprisingly, Islamic fundamentalism (38%). Only two other threats are still considered critical by majorities of Americans, though they are also down: AIDS, the Ebola virus, and other potential epidemics (58%) and large numbers of immigrants coming into the United States (52%), down 13 and 9 points, respectively.

An explanation for these declines could be that Americans are discounting the gravity of these threats after three years without another direct terrorist attack on American soil, or may have become skeptical of alarms about them, including the now questionable imminent danger of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Other explanations may be that some Americans feel that U.S. policies and actions have lessened the danger, or people may simply have become more adjusted to living with the threats.

The fundamental foreign policy goals that Americans want to pursue have remained remarkably constant through three decades of CCFR surveys conducted both before and after the end of the Cold War. What is most striking in the 2004 survey is the overall drop among virtually all goals in the numbers believing they are very important. This drop on goals parallels the drop in the numbers of people who consider various threats to be critical (see Figure 1-2).

The goals of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and combating international terrorism are still among the top goals on the list, as they were in 2002, considered very important by 73% and 71% of the public, respectively. However, these figures have dropped by 13 and 12 percentage points, respectively, in two years.

All other goals have also dropped anywhere from 8 to 19 percentage points among the public, with the
exception of protecting the jobs of American workers (78%), which now places first even above preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and combating terrorism, and of securing adequate supplies of energy (69%), which ranks only slighting below combating terrorism. These two have dropped only 3 and 1 percentage points, respectively. Just two others goals are considered very important by majorities: stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States (63%) and controlling and reducing illegal immigration (59%).

Eight other goals are not rated as very important by majorities in 2004, five of which were rated as very important by majorities in 2002: maintaining superior military power worldwide (now 50%), improving the global environment (47%), combating world hunger (43%), strengthening the United Nations (38%), and protecting the interests of American business abroad (32%). The three others, which traditionally receive the smallest numbers saying they are very important goals, are again at the bottom, this time at historically low levels: protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression (18%), helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations (18%), and helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations (14%). In fact, seven of the eight goals that did not receive majorities as very important goals receive the lowest percentages ever recorded on those items (the other tied for lowest), with six of them asked in surveys going back to 1974.

![Figure 1-2](image-url)

**FOREIGN POLICY GOALS**

Percentage who say the following should be a “very important” goal of U.S. foreign policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
<th>Change since 2002*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protecting the jobs of American workers</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparing the spread of nuclear weapons</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combating international terrorism</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securing adequate supplies of energy</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S.</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling and reducing illegal immigration</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining superior military power worldwide</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving the global environment</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combating world hunger</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>+18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the United Nations</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting the interests of American business abroad</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>+12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Change figures for the public based on 2002 to 2004 Internet data.
By contrast, the number of leaders rating many of these foreign policy goals as very important has increased since 2002, pointing to some striking shifts. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and combating international terrorism remain the top two priorities in 2004 by far, as they were in 2002, with 87% (down 2 points) and 84% (down 3 points), respectively, saying these goals are very important goals.

However, on the other four goals that majorities of leaders consider very important, those majorities are up markedly from 2002. Combating world hunger is up 8 points to 67%, and securing adequate supplies of energy is up 6 points to 57%. Improving the global environment is up a sharp 18 points to 61%. Most striking of all, however, is the 22 point increase in the goal of helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations, now considered a very important goal by 64% of leaders, the first time this item has received a majority from leaders since 1982.

Possibly, leaders have become more acutely aware of both the security and economic problems associated with the gap between developed and developing nations. Additionally, pressure from developing countries about the fairness of trade in the recent round of trade talks in the World Trade Organization may also be sharpening the focus on this goal.

Another notable shift among leaders is the increase in support for strengthening the United Nations as a very important goal of foreign policy. Forty percent of leaders now consider this important, up 12 percentage points. Accompanying this increase is a decrease in support for the goal of maintaining superior power worldwide as a very important goal. This has dropped 15 points to only 37%, the first time it has received less than a majority since it was first asked in 1994.

**Moderated desire to spend more on foreign policy**

Another measure of engagement is how much Americans are willing to spend on foreign policy-related items. While few Americans want to cut spending on international programs in 2004, desires to expand spending have dropped somewhat since 2002 (see Figure 1-3). The percentage of Americans that want to expand spending on homeland security (51%) has dropped 5 points, with 37% saying keep it the same and 11% wanting to cut back. The percentage that want to expand spending on gathering intelligence information about foreign countries (43%) has dropped 10 points, with 44% saying keep it the same and 11% wanting to cut it back. The percentage that want to expand defense spending (29%) has dropped 7 points, with 44% saying keep it the same and 25% wanting to cut back. Nevertheless, while the number who want to expand spending has declined in all three cases, on balance, the tendency of opinion is to expand spending on homeland security and on intelligence gathering, while keeping the recently expanded and quite large defense budget at about its current level.

As has been true for 30 years in these surveys, hardly any Americans want to expand military or economic aid to other nations, and strong majorities want to cut back. Sixty-five percent of the public want to cut back military aid, with 28% wanting to keep it the same and only 5% preferring to increase it. Sixty-four percent want to cut back economic aid, with 26% saying keep it the same and 8% saying expand it. Support for cuts in economic aid, however, are likely related to the fact that Americans grossly overestimate the amount of money spent on such aid, as was confirmed in the 2002 Council study.

By contrast, the highest proportions of the public favor the expansion of purely domestic programs. Seventy-nine percent of Americans favor expanding health care; 69% favor expanding aid to education; and 65% favor expanding Social Security. This has long been found in CCFR surveys.

Leaders show a decline in support for expanding spending on homeland security, defense, and intelligence gathering. The 2002 majority (53%) for expanding spending on homeland security has dropped 14 points to 39% in 2004, with 42% wanting to keep it the same and 15% wanting to cut it back. The number

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The 2004 telephone survey showed a majority supporting expansion of spending on gathering intelligence information about other countries (56%).
of leaders wanting to expand defense spending has dropped 15 points from 30% to 15%, with 48% wanting to keep it the same. Today, there are more leaders who want to cut it back (35%) than want to expand it (15%), the opposite of which was true in 2002 (30% expand and 24% cut back). While the number wanting to expand spending on gathering intelligence information about foreign countries has also gone down (5 points), a majority still favors expansion (58%).

On economic aid, the trend among leaders is also to expand spending. Sixty-one percent of leaders (61%) want to expand economic aid to other nations. This number is up 3 points since 2002 and a dramatic 23 points since 1998, the last survey before the terrorist attacks of 9/11. As we saw with the dramatic increase of leaders supporting the goal of helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations, the high support for expanding economic aid may be related to leader preferences for using economic measures to combat terrorism.

For leaders, as with the public, health care, and education are also first on list for expanded spending, with 70% and 74%, respectively, wanting to do so. Social Security ranks much lower (30% expand).

Support for bases abroad down

A majority of Americans favor the U.S. having military bases overseas in general, but support for stationing troops in various specific countries has dropped significantly since 2002 (see Figure 1-4). Fifty-four percent say that the number of military bases the United States has...
However, more Americans now say the United States should have fewer bases (31%) than say we should have more bases (11%). In 2002 more Americans said the United States should have more bases than said it should have fewer, with a majority saying keep the number the same.

While majorities still favor having long-term military bases only in such well-established locations as South Korea (62%); Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (58%); Germany (57%); and Japan (52%), the percentages are significantly down from 2002.

There is no majority support for bases in any of the other countries asked about. This includes four countries that had majority support in 2002, of which three have slipped to pluralities (Saudi Arabia, now 50%, Afghanistan, 47%, and Turkey, 46%), and one, Pakistan, has a majority opposed (52%). A 50% plurality opposes bases in Iraq (a new item in 2004) and 59% now oppose bases in Uzbekistan (compared to a divided response in 2002). Interestingly, all of the countries for which there is no majority support for bases are in some way connected to problems in the Middle East or the war on terrorism.

Leaders take much the same view as the public concerning bases, with majorities favoring bases in South Korea, Japan, Germany, and Turkey, but opposing bases nearly everywhere else. Since 2002, leaders’ support for every single base location has dropped, especially for Saudi Arabia—where leaders may be more aware than the general public of the post-Iraq war U.S. withdrawal—Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkey (drops of 25, 20, 14, and 14 percentage points, respectively).

When it comes to troop levels the picture is similar. When told at the time of the survey that the United States had about 37,000 troops in South Korea, a majority of the public (52%) said that was too many, with only 7% saying it was too few. Told that officials in Washington had proposed cutting the number of U.S. troops in South Korea by about one-third, 53% felt it would have no significant effect either way on South Korea’s security. Only 29% said it would be somewhat bad or very bad for South Korea’s security.

Caution in troubled areas

The decline in support for many bases, especially in trouble spots like the Middle East and states linked to terrorist activity, points to a sense of caution among Americans about involvement in such areas. Views on the Middle East are particularly striking in this regard. With attention focused on this region because of the war with Iraq, the war on terrorism, violence between Israel and Palestinians, and other problems making headlines, Americans show a wariness about the region.

Some of this shows up on the feeling thermometer (see Figure 1-5). On a scale of 0 to 100, where 50 is a neutral feeling, Saudi Arabia and the Muslim people receive cool ratings (37 and 39 degrees, respectively).
Americans appear ready to leave the Middle East if they are not wanted. Fifty-nine percent of the public say that the United States should remove its military presence from the Middle East if a majority of people in the Middle East want it to. Seventy-two percent of the public say that if a clear majority of the Iraqi people want the United States to withdraw its forces from Iraq, it should do so (see Figure 1-6).

A majority of leaders (68%) agree that the United States should withdraw its forces from Iraq if a clear majority of the Iraqi people desire this. However, only 35% agree that the United States should remove its military presence from the Middle East if a majority of people in the Middle East want it to do so.

The public does not think the United States should put greater pressure on countries in the Middle East like Saudi Arabia and Egypt to become more democratic. Fifty-seven percent say the United States should not apply such pressure, with 35% saying it should.

The public is also not interested in a Marshall Plan-like undertaking in the region, which some have argued would help stabilize it. Sixty-eight percent of Americans say they oppose an investment in the Middle East similar to the one made after World War II in which the United States spent billions of dollars to reconstruct and democratize Europe (see Figure 4-8).

Leaders, however, take the opposite view. In line with the increased emphasis they place on improving the standard of living of less developed countries as a foreign policy goal and their strong support for economic aid to other countries, 64% of leaders say they support making a major investment to reconstruct and democratize the Middle East.

**An engaged but not dominant U.S. role**

These findings do not mean that Americans are disengaging from the world. Approximately two-thirds of the American public (67%) and nearly all leaders (97%) say the United States should take an active part in world affairs rather than stay out of world affairs, down only slightly from two years ago when CCFR found the highest level it has recorded.
Dropping in numbers are those Americans who are concerned about maintaining the superiority of U.S. power. Fifty percent of the public (down 17 points from 2002) say that maintaining superior military power worldwide is a very important goal of U.S. foreign policy, with 41% saying this is somewhat important. Only 37% of leaders say this goal is very important, down 15 points from 2002 and the first time this goal has not garnered a majority from leaders since it was first asked in 1994. Despite this, a slim majority of the public is committed to remaining unchallenged, with 52% of the public saying that the United States should make active efforts to ensure that no other country becomes a superpower and 41% disagreeing.

Americans are clear, however, that they do not want the United States to use its power play a dominant role in the world. Just 8% of Americans say that as the sole remaining superpower, the United States should continue to be the preeminent world leader in solving international problems. Most (78%) say instead that the United States should do its share in efforts to solve international problems together with other countries, with only 10% saying it should withdraw from most efforts to solve international problems.

**U.S. ROLE AS WORLD POLICEMAN**

*Percentage who say the following.*

The United States has the responsibility to play the role of world policeman, that is, to fight violations of international law and aggression wherever they occur.

- **Public:**
  - No: 76%
  - Yes: 20%

The U.S. is playing the role of world policeman more than it should be.

- **Public:**
  - No: 18%
  - Yes: 80%

**THE MORE IMPORTANT LESSON OF SEPTEMBER 11**

Percentage who choose each statement as closest to their view.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The U.S. needs to work more closely with other countries to fight terrorism</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The U.S. needs to act on its own more to fight terrorism</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Willingness to take action against terrorism**

While Americans don’t want to play a dominant role in the world, they are willing to take action when they believe they are threatened. Among the most critical of those threats, of course, is terrorism. Of all the various circumstances that might justify the use of force by the United States, the use of force to combat terrorism receives the highest levels of support. More than three-quarters of the public favor U.S. air strikes against ter-
tormist and other training camps (83%) and attacks by ground troops against terrorist camps and other facilities (76%) (see Figure 1-9). Lower percentages but still strong majorities also favor toppling unfriendly regimes that support terrorist groups threatening the United States and the assassination of individual terrorist leaders (67% and 68%, respectively). Support for these four military actions against terrorism, however, has dropped somewhat since 2002, paralleling the decline in the level of concern about the threat of terrorism.

Leaders also support military action against terrorism with one major exception. Only 38% of leaders, down a dramatic 23 points from 61% in 2002, favor toppling unfriendly regimes that support terrorist groups threatening the United States. More in line with the public, 83% of leaders favor U.S. air strikes against terrorist training camps, 74% favor attacks by U.S. ground troops against terrorist training camps, and 52% favor assassinating terrorist leaders.

As will be discussed further in Chapter 2, support for action against the terrorist threat does not mean that Americans feel it is open season for the unilateral use of force against terrorism. In the case of overthrowing a government that is providing substantial support to a...
terrorist group that might pose a threat, 58% say that the United States can overthrow that government only when it has strong evidence that the terrorist group poses an imminent threat, as opposed to posing a threat at some point in the future. The perceived imminence of the terrorist threat, as implied by the September 11 attacks and the U.S. war on terrorism, is clearly driving high support for the use of force against clearly identified and specific threats.

**Strong preference for diplomatic and other approaches to solve conflicts**

While Americans are willing to use force when clearly threatened, they show strong support for diplomatic and other nonmilitary actions to solve conflicts. Diplomatic measures to combat terrorism score numbers as high as military options. Indeed, the measure of working through the UN to strengthen international laws against terrorism and to make sure UN members enforce them receives the highest percentage among both the public and leaders (87% public and 94% leaders) of all measures against terrorism asked about, including all military measures (see Figure 1-9). Large majorities of the public (82%) and leaders (80%) favor the trial of suspected terrorists in the International Criminal Court. These numbers have held steady since 2002 for the public and are even up a bit for leaders, compared to the modest decline in numbers for military measures among the public. Sixty-four percent of the public and an overwhelming 94% of leaders support helping poor countries develop their economies as a measure to combat terrorism, though this is down significantly for the public.

When asked directly whether the U.S. government in the future (compared with what it has been doing) should put more emphasis on military methods, on diplomatic and economic methods, or whether it has the balance about right in the effort to fight terrorism, 45% of Americans say more emphasis should be placed on military methods, on diplomatic and economic methods, or whether it has the balance about right in the effort to fight terrorism, 45% of Americans say more emphasis should be placed on diplomatic and economic methods, while 26% say the balance is about right and 23% choose military methods. A large majority of leaders (73%) say the government should put more emphasis on diplomatic and economic methods (see Figure 1-10).

Accompanying the strong preference for multilateral and diplomatic approaches is resistance to new international rules and norms that would allow the United States to use force more freely. In addition, they show unequivocal support for empowering international institutions to make collective decisions and are willing to comply with those decisions. These issues will be the focus of Chapter 2, 3, and 4.
The post-September 11 world has raised new questions about the international norms governing the use of force. Historically, international law has been fairly restrictive, for the most part only allowing the use of force as an act of self-defense in response to an actual attack, preemptively in response to an unambiguously imminent attack, or to help protect another state against such an attack. But since September 11 new questions have been posed, with some voices calling for a broader range of circumstances in which it is legitimate to use force, expanding the traditional definition and boundaries of preemption or, indeed, moving toward preventive uses of force, which have been eschewed in international law.

**The questions of using force**

**THE RIGHTS OF STATES**

The potential for terrorist attacks has become more salient and their destructive potential greater with the dissemination of advanced technologies, especially weapons of mass destruction. This has raised key questions about what rights states have, acting individually or collectively, to use military force to address such threats. In particular it raises the question of whether states have the right to overthrow a government that may be allowing a terrorist group to operate on its soil or if it is simply providing significant support to the terrorist group.

The proliferation of technology for creating weapons of mass destruction has also posed new questions. Related specifically to nuclear weapons, most countries have signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) that prohibits non-nuclear states from acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet this treaty is still voluntary. International law does not prevent states from deciding to acquire nuclear weapons should they elect not to be part of the treaty—and, indeed, in recent years India, Pakistan, and probably North Korea have done just that. Some have argued that states, by virtue of their national sovereignty, have the right to develop whatever capacity they deem necessary for their self defense, including acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and no other state or group of states has the right to interfere with that. Others argue that if a country is in the process of acquiring weapons of mass destruction—especially nuclear weapons—another state that believes it is threatened by this emerging capability has the right to use force preventively to stop the country from acquiring it.

**THE RIGHTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS**

Beyond the question of what rights individual states have to act against other states in various circumstances,
including the right to act preventively against perceived threats, is the question of what rights the UN has to authorize action. The UN Charter provides the UN Security Council with the authority to use force whenever it deems it necessary for preserving international peace, but does not spell out any principles under which such a determination can be made. Some argue that in the case of a country newly acquiring weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, only the UN Security Council—not states on their own—should have the right to authorize military action if it determines that this new capability endangers international peace. This would represent a departure from the purely voluntary character of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Yet one more controversy revolves around nuclear weapons. Many have argued that there should be a clear firewall against any use of nuclear weapons except for retaliatory purposes because of the tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons and the possibility that any first use could quickly escalate into a catastrophic war. Others argue that in the post-Cold War context, the potential for escalation to all-out nuclear war between nuclear powers has been lessened and that nuclear weapons may have a utility for certain limited, tactical purposes such as taking out deep underground bunkers where terrorist groups may be holed up. Small nuclear weapons have been proposed for such purposes.

THE USE OF TORTURE

Another question that has arisen in the context of the war on terrorism is whether the United States or any country needs to be restrained by the international conventions against torture. Some have argued that in the current environment such international laws should be regarded as out of date and no longer applicable.

INTERVENTION IN THE CASE OF GENOCIDE OR OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES

While international norms generally impose limits on the use of force, there is also the question of whether states should be expected to intervene militarily under certain circumstances. Most countries have signed the Convention on Genocide which calls for intervention in a country committing genocide. But do Americans feel that that the United States should intervene in a case of genocide or if a government is in some other way committing large-scale violations of human rights? A related question is whether states should intervene to restore a democratic government when it has been overthrown. Also, while international law has clearly allowed for states to help defend each other against attack, do Americans feel obliged to do so?

Adhering to traditional norms and empowering the UN

As we shall see, a recurring theme in the answers to these questions among both the American public and leaders is the readiness to give wide-ranging powers to states acting collectively through the United Nations to address various potential threats, coupled with an affirmation of the traditional constraints on the possible actions of individual states and a resistance to new ideas for making them looser. The public and leaders hew closely to the established view that individual states do not have the right to take military action against another state preventively, but only as an act of self defense in response to an actual attack, preemptively in response to an imminent attack, or to help defend another state that is being attacked.

This view is not altered even in the case of a state acquiring weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. The case of a state supporting terrorists groups creates a new wrinkle, in that majorities do say that states have the right to attack governments that are supporting terrorist groups. However, on closer
examination it is clear that this would only be the case if the terrorist group posed an imminent threat, thus being an elaboration of, rather than a deviation from, the existing norm.

The UN Security Council is seen as having the right to authorize military action in many circumstances, representing an affirmation and clarification of already existing powers granted by the UN Charter. A new finding, however, is support for the UN Security Council having the right to authorize force to prevent countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. This is striking given that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is explicitly voluntary.

Other norms are also confirmed. The public and leaders hew to the traditional view that nuclear weapons should never be used in the absence of a nuclear attack and reject the position that torture should be used to extract information from terrorists. Roundly rejected is the view that, in the wake of September 11, the United States should avoid being enmeshed in international agreements that constrain the United States in general and especially in the fight against terrorism. The post-holocaust norm, codified in the Convention against Genocide that requires states to prevent genocide even without UN approval, is strongly affirmed as is the readiness to act on it. The proposal that countries without UN approval may act to restore democratic governments is rejected. The traditional norm allowing states to defend other states from attack is also affirmed, though the public shows less willingness to do so unilaterally in specific cases than do leaders.

**Preventive action against a state seeking weapons of mass destruction**

A striking and unprecedented finding of this study is that there is not a clear majority of the public and leaders who support states taking action on their own to prevent other states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and specifically nuclear weapons, but a majority does support it if this action is deemed appropriate by the United Nations Security Council.

**MAJORITY SUPPORT FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION AUTHORIZED BY THE UNITED NATIONS**

Seventy percent of the public and 62% of the leaders think that the UN Security Council should have the right to authorize the use of military force to prevent a country that does not have nuclear weapons from acquiring them (see Figure 2-1).

This is consistent with the power of the UN Security Council under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter to authorize military force to prevent any development deemed to threaten international peace. Nonetheless, this does suggest a significant development in the international regime to prevent nuclear proliferation. No international law prohibits countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is entirely voluntary and specifies that signatories can withdraw with six months notice, and the UN Security Council has never taken any action to prevent a country from acquiring nuclear weapons.

It is important to note that this finding does not necessarily mean that the public thinks the NPT should now be regarded as international law. Saying that the UN Security Council should have the right to authorize force to prevent a country from acquiring nuclear weapons does not necessarily mean that the UN should always authorize it. Nevertheless, it is still significant that such a large majority of Americans endorse the right of the UN Security Council to effectively authorize preventive military action against a country when a nuclear capability is in question.

**NO MAJORITY SUPPORT FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION BY STATES**

While a majority of Americans are supportive of preventive action if the UN authorizes it, there is not a clear majority in favor of such action by states acting on their own. Basically, the public has not been persuaded by the argument that because of the unique dangers of nuclear weapons, the United States should not be bound by the traditional stricture of acting against a country only when it poses a clear, imminent threat.
The rejection of preventive action by states is most clear on a question that distinguishes between preventive and preemptive action, the more traditional position that Americans do support. When presented four options on the circumstances under which countries should have the right to “go to war” with another country that may pose a threat, only 17% choose the preventive option, saying that countries on their own should have the right to go to war if they have strong evidence that the other country is acquiring weapons of mass destruction that could be used against them at some point in the future. A majority (53%) choose the preemptive option, saying that countries should have the right to go to war on their own if they strong evi-

**Figure 2-1**
dence that they are in imminent danger of being attacked by the other country, with 24% saying only if the other country attacks them first and 4% saying never (see Figure 2-2).

Leaders responded similarly on this question, but with even more rejecting the preventive option. Only 10% endorse the idea that a country has the right to attack without an imminent threat, 61% say that a country only has the right with an imminent threat, 25% say the other country must attack first, and 2% say never.

When asked simply whether a country should have the right to “use military force” to prevent a country from acquiring nuclear weapons without UN approval, a bare plurality, but not a clear majority (50%), says that it should, while 44% said that it should not (the remaining 6% were not sure or declined to answer). Leaders were more definitive, with 59% saying that a country should not have that right and 34% saying it should.

Importantly, the term used in this last question was “using military force,” a term that has generally been found to elicit higher levels of support than one that implies fully going to war or overthrowing a government. Apparently, some respondents assume that using military force might mean some more limited action such as a punitive bombing of limited targets, which more would support.

These findings on support for preventive actions only with UN approval are consistent with the findings in the 2002 CCFR survey when respondents were asked whether they would support invading Iraq—an action prominently justified by the assumption that Iraq was seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Sixty-five percent of respondents said the United States should only invade Iraq with UN approval and the support of its allies. Indeed, the idea that the UN has the right to prevent a state from acquiring nuclear weapons may well have been strengthened by seeing the UN explicitly engaging in the effort—such as through the inspection process—to prevent Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons.

In addition, a key case study of these principles in the 2004 survey is the question of how the United States should deal with North Korea’s effort to acquire nuclear weapons. When the public is asked whether it would be necessary to first get approval from the UN Security Council if the United States were to consider using military force to destroy North Korea’s nuclear capability, 68% say that it would be necessary, and 25% say it would not be. Similarly, 64% of the leaders say it would be necessary, and 31% say it would not be (see Figure 2-3).

Public respondents were also asked whether they would support or oppose the United States using military force to destroy North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability under various conditions if North Korea continued to develop nuclear weapons. In half the cases it
was specified that the UN Security Council approved of the action and in half it was specified that it did not. Overall, with UN approval, support averaged 66%, while without it, support averaged 48%.

**Using force against a state supporting terrorists**

Another major post-September 11 debate is under what circumstances states have the right to use military force to combat terrorist threats, including the question of whether states have the right to use military force against a government that is supporting terrorist groups. Once again, there is substantial consensus that states do have such a right when they have UN approval. An overwhelming 81% of the public and 73% of the leaders agree that UN should have the right to authorize the use of military force to stop a country from supporting terrorists groups.

**SUPPORT FOR PREEMPTIVE USE OF FORCE AGAINST TERRORISM**

Without UN approval, there is still majority support for stopping a country from supporting terrorists groups, although the size of the majority is lower. Sixty-one per-
statements by its leaders of their intent to continue attacking the United States and its interests around the world.

It is, therefore, not surprising that Americans favor many measures for combating terrorism, even if it is not specified whether action would be taken unilaterally, multilaterally, or with or without UN approval. Sixty-seven percent of Americans say they favor toppling unfriendly regimes that support terrorist groups threatening the United States as a measure to combat terrorism. More limited uses of force to combat terrorism garner much higher levels of support. Fully 83% of Americans favor U.S. air strikes against terrorist training camps and other facilities, and 76% favor attacks by U.S. ground troops against terrorist training camps and other facilities. Even the assassination of individual terrorist leaders is favored by more than two-thirds of the public (see Figure 1-10).

The line between preventive and preemptive measures against terrorism is inherently fuzzy, given the diffuse and hidden nature of the threat and the highly dispersed and largely unknown network of likely perpetrators. The question of what constitutes legitimate action by a state against this threat is not easily answered. Our findings indicate, however, that Americans do care about the legitimacy of U.S. actions in the eyes of others, especially the United Nations.

Use of nuclear weapons

A widely endorsed international norm is that no nation should be the first to use nuclear weapons. While the United States has never committed to not being the first to use nuclear weapons, its doctrine has preserved the option of first use only for extreme circumstances when faced with an advancing army with superior conventional capabilities as was a possibility during the Cold War. However, in the post-9/11 world, some have argued that the United States should feel freer to use nuclear weapons for preventive or preemptive purposes.

The idea of modifying the acceptable uses of nuclear weapons does not appear to be resonating with the public. Presented three options for the use of nuclear weapons, only 19% endorsed the view that in certain circumstances, the United States should use nuclear weapons even if it has not suffered a nuclear attack. Rather, the majority (57%) takes the more tradi-
tional view that the United States should only use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack, and another 22% take the even stronger view that the U.S. should never use nuclear weapons under any circumstances (see Figure 2-5).

The leaders do not differ from the public. Only 16% endorse the use of nuclear weapons in certain circumstances even if the United States has not suffered a nuclear attack. Fifty-seven percent say nuclear weapons should only be used in response to a nuclear attack, and 25% say the weapons should never be used.

The use of torture

The United States has signed a number of international conventions that unambiguously prohibit the use of torture under virtually all circumstances, even in the context of a wartime situation in which a detainee may have critical intelligence that may be useful in prosecuting the war. Some have argued that in the context of the war on terrorism, these norms need to be reinterpreted more liberally so that in the event it is judged to be militarily necessary, some forms of torture may be used.

A clear majority of the public rejects this thought. Simply asked whether as a means of combating international terrorism they favor using torture to extract information from suspected terrorists, only 29% of respondents say they do, while 66% are opposed.

Also, it does not appear that if the public heard more of the debate surrounding this issue they would be more sympathetic to the argument for changing the norms. In a more elaborate question, respondents were told that most countries have agreed to rules that prohibit torturing prisoners to extract information and then were asked to evaluate two arguments for and against modifying these norms. Just 27% endorse the argument that terrorists pose such an extreme threat that governments should now be allowed to use torture if it may gain information that saves innocent lives. Rather, 70% endorse the view that rules against torture should be maintained because torture is morally wrong and weakening these rules may lead to the torture of U.S. soldiers who are held prisoner abroad (see Figure 2-6).

Leaders are even more emphatic in rejecting torture. As a method for combating terrorism, 88% oppose using torture to extract information. Presented the same arguments as above on the issue, only 8% endorse the argument in favor of liberalizing the norm, while 85% endorse the argument affirming it.

Using force against a state conducting genocide

A key question in the modern world is whether states have the right to intervene in the internal affairs of a state that is conducting severe human rights violations such as genocide. Since the holocaust there has been a strong norm calling for states to take action to prevent genocide, as codified in the Convention against Genocide. The failure of the international community to act in Rwanda has prompted widespread soul searching, and the intervention in Kosovo, even without UN Security Council approval, was legitimated on the basis that it was an effort to stop genocide. Currently, there is growing concern about the genocide occurring in the Darfur region of Sudan.

Among the public and leaders there is a remarkably strong agreement that states should have the right use military force to prevent severe human rights violation
such as genocide, even without UN approval. Seventy percent of the public and the same percentage of leaders say that states should have the right to intervene (see Figure 2-1). Support is even stronger for the UN Security Council having the right to authorize force against genocide, with 85% of the public and 94% of leaders agreeing. In addition to support for their right to use force against genocide, Americans are also willing to actually use U.S. troops for this purpose. Seventy-five percent of the public and 86% of the leaders favor using U.S. troops to stop a government from committing genocide and killing large numbers of its own people (see Figure 2-7).

Using force to restore a democratic government

In 1994 the United States and other countries, with UN approval, threatened to intervene in Haiti to restore a democratically-elected government. Some have called for military action to put in place the democratically elected National League for Democracy party in Burma. At present there is no such case in which there is a broad demand for such intervention, but were a significant democratically elected government to be overthrown, there would doubt be a reevaluation of the option of military intervention.
On this question, a majority of the public and leaders agree that the UN, but not individual states, should have the right to intervene. Sixty percent of the public and the same percentage of leaders agree that the UN should have the right to authorize military action to restore a democratic government that has been overthrown. However, without UN approval, only 40% of the public think that states should have the right to intervene and 53% think they should not. Leaders are even more opposed, with just 32% saying that states should have such a right and 58% saying they should not (see Figure 2-1).

When it comes to the issue of installing democratic governments where dictators rule, Americans are opposed. Asked whether they favor or oppose using U.S. troops to do this, only 30% of the public respond favorably, while 63% are opposed (see Figure 2-7). This is particularly interesting in light of the Iraq war, given that some have sought to justify the intervention there on the basis that it would lead to the establishment of a democratic government.

Defending a country that has been attacked

Not surprisingly, strong majorities believe that states should have the right, with or without UN approval, to defend another country that has been attacked. The right and even the obligation to do so is the cornerstone of military alliances and the collective security system enshrined in the UN Charter. Seventy-seven percent of the public and 85% of leaders agree that the UN has the right to authorize such action, and 59% of the public and 71% of leaders agree that states have such a right to use force without UN approval (see Figure 2-1).

The more interesting question is whether the public actually supports taking such action in defense of an ally beyond its belief that it has the right to do so. Consistent with the relatively low priority most Americans give the foreign policy goal of protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression (only 18% of Americans say that should be a very important goal of U.S. foreign policy), a majority of Americans oppose the use of U.S. troops to defend another country that has been attacked in all three scenarios asked about, although in two cases by a very slim margin. Sixty-one percent of Americans oppose using troops if China invades Taiwan (33% favor), 52% oppose using troops if Arab forces invade Israel (43% favor), and 51% oppose using U.S. troops if North Korea invades South Korea (43% favor) (see Figure 2-7).

In the case of South Korea, a majority has never favored using U.S. troops to defend South Korea against an attack by North Korea since the question was first asked in 1990. However, the percentage who do favor this has gone up in 2004 and is now higher than in any previous survey, perhaps because of heightened attention to possible threats from North Korea. In addition, when put in the context of a multilateral operation, a large majority favors defending South Korea. Asked if they favor or oppose the U.S. contributing military forces, together with other countries, to a UN-sponsored effort to reverse the aggression if North Korea attacks South Korea, 64% say they favor it, and just 31% are opposed. This again points to the strong preference Americans have for acting multilaterally that is seen throughout this study.

Leaders, on the other hand, are unambiguous in their support for defending South Korea. A very large majority supports using U.S. troops as part of a UN-sponsored operation if North Korea invades South Korea (93%) and still support it even if UN sponsorship is not specified (82%). This difference with the public may be due in part to leaders having more knowledge of the commitments that the United States has made to defend South Korea.

An interesting case is that of coming to the aid of Pakistan in the event of a radical Islamic revolution there. While this does not involve an attack from the outside by another country, it is an attack from within by a large number of its own people. In this case, 51% of the American public and leaders favor using U.S. troops even without specifying multilateral action if the government of Pakistan requests our help against a radical Islamic revolution.
Other uses of force

Other examples of military intervention commonly accepted by the international community that draw strong support from Americas are using force for humanitarian purposes and for peacekeeping. Seventy-two percent of Americans favor using U.S. troops to deal with humanitarian crises (not asked of leaders), and majorities favor using U.S. troops to be part of an international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan (60%), an international peacekeeping force to enforce a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians (52%), and a U.N.-sponsored force to help keep peace between India and Pakistan (51%). Even more leaders than members of the public favor participation in peacekeeping operations, with 92%, 81%, and 75% favoring participation in each of these cases, respectively (see Figure 2-7).

Two other circumstances in which Americans support the use of U.S. troops are to ensure the oil supply (54% in favor, with 42% opposed) and to fight drug lords in Colombia (51% to 45%). These are in line with the relative importance that majorities of Americans give to the foreign policy goals of securing adequate supplies of energy (69% very important) and stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States (63% very important). But among leaders, who put a lower priority on the energy and drug goals, these uses of force are favored by only 36% and 27%, respectively.
As Chapter 2 has shown, despite their vast power and resources, Americans do not want to be a lone player in world affairs. They recognize and favor adhering to norms of international behavior and prefer to take action multilaterally, with the approval and support of others. As willing players in the game of cooperation and consensus-building among nations, they wish to share burdens and responsibilities as well as reap the rewards of joint efforts.

Nevertheless, participation in a rules-based international system places constraints upon the United States, limiting its ability to act according to its own will. Some in the United States have argued that such constraints are unacceptable, while others say that as the world becomes more interdependent, the necessity for countries to work together and accept common decisions to solve problems becomes ever more important. The debate over where to draw the line between national and international control is long-standing and contentious. In this chapter we will look at American attitudes on cooperation in the international sphere and the question of how powerful and binding in general international institutions and agreements should be. How do Americans now think global decisions should be made and what should be the role of international institutions and agreements in this context?

Support for collective decision making through international institutions

One of the most striking findings of this study is the degree of willingness Americans show for collective decision making in the international sphere. Despite the arguments that the United States should not be bound by the restrictions of international institutions and the opinions of others, Americans seem to be taking the opposite view. Both the public and leaders (66% and 78%, respectively) agree that when dealing with international problems, the United States should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations, even if this means that the United States will have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice (see Figure 3-1).

This support for empowering the UN with decision-making authority extends fully to ending the veto power of any individual member in the UN Security Council. When asked whether the UN Security Council rules should be changed so that no member, not even the United States, could veto a decision if it was supported by all other members, a clear majority of the American public (59%) favor this (44% somewhat and 15% strongly), with 36% opposed (23% somewhat and 13% strongly). Abolition of the veto power would, of course, represent a major change in the workings of the Security Council.
The World Court is part of the United Nations system and was created largely through American efforts to rule on disputes between or among nation-states. President Reagan withdrew U.S. acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction out of fear of an adverse court ruling involving Nicaragua. Nevertheless, a majority of the public (57%) and plurality of leaders (48%) think the United States should make the general commitment to accept the decisions of the World Court rather than decide on a case-by-case basis whether it will accept the court’s decision. Thirty-five percent of the public and 42% of the leaders think the United States should not make such a commitment.

The willingness to accept collective decisions extends beyond the United Nations to many other international institutions and agreements. Sixty-eight percent of Americans think that when the United States is part of international economic organizations like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization, decisions should always be made by a majority of members rather than the United States being able to veto such a decision (27% say the United States should be able to veto such decisions). Sixty-nine percent of the public and 85% of the leaders say that if the World Trade Organization rules against the United States on a complaint filed by another country, the United States should comply with that decision (see Figure 4-4).

With the increase in infectious diseases, the question arises of whether the international community has the right to intervene if a country is acting in a way that threatens the international community. Seventy-eight percent of the public favors giving the World Health Organization the authority to intervene in a country to respond to a crisis threatening world health, even if that country disagrees.

Americans also show support for the International Criminal Court. Seventy-six percent of the public and 70% of leaders favor American participation in the agreement permitting the International Criminal Court (ICC) to try individuals for war crimes, genocide, and other crimes against humanity if their own countries won’t try them. In addition, fully 82% of the public and
80% of leaders support putting international terrorists on trial in the ICC. It should also be noted that in 2002, when CCFR posed a more extensive set of arguments on this question, including the argument that the court might be used against U.S. servicemen, a strong majority was still supportive.

**Empowering the United Nations**

Beyond the support for joint decision making, Americans show a willingness to further empower the United Nations. Americans have an overall positive view of the organization, giving it a warm 57 degrees on the feeling thermometer (on a scale of 0 to 100, where 50 is neutral). When asked specifically about steps that could be taken to strengthen the UN—all of which would represent a radical departure from the status quo—three-quarters of Americans (74%) say they favor having a standing UN peacekeeping force selected, trained, and commanded by the United Nations. Sixty-seven percent of leaders also favor this. Fifty-seven percent of the public and 55% of leaders favor giving the UN the power to regulate the international arms trade. While the public (49% favoring, 45% opposing) and leaders (46% favoring, 49% opposing) are more divided on giving the UN the power to fund its activities by taxing such things as the international sale of arms or oil, it is striking that a plurality of the public would even support this radical step (see Figure 3-2).

When it comes to the use of force, as we saw in Chapter 2, Americans are more comfortable allowing the UN, rather than countries on their own, to make decisions about using force in certain circumstances. Support for the UN having the right to authorize the use of military force in each of five situations (to prevent a country that does not have nuclear weapons from acquiring them, to prevent severe human rights violations such as genocide, to stop a country from supporting terrorist groups, to restore by force a democratic government that has been overthrown, and to defend a country that has been attacked) is 15 to 20 points higher than for a country without UN approval having the right to use force in each of the same situations. And on two of those items (to prevent a country that does not have nuclear weapons from acquiring them and to restore by force a democratic government that has been overthrown), majorities say the UN has the right to authorize force, but a country does not without UN approval (see Figure 2-1). As we also saw in Chapter 2, a majority of the public only approves of using troops to defend South Korea against an attack by North Korea when it is a UN-sponsored effort.

**SPECIFIC STEPS FOR STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS**

*Percentage who favor or oppose the following specific steps that could be taken to strengthen the United Nations.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Having a standing UN peacekeeping force selected, trained, and commanded by the United Nations</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giving the UN the power to regulate the international arms trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Giving the UN the power to fund its activities by taxing such things as the international sale of arms or oil</td>
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*Figure 3-2*
Further, Americans strongly support UN peacekeeping operations. Generally speaking, 78% of Americans think the United States should take part in a UN international peacekeeping force in a troubled part of the world if asked. On more specific peacekeeping operations, 52% would support being part of an international peacekeeping force to enforce a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, and 51% would support being part of a UN-sponsored force to help keep peace between India and Pakistan.

Leaders show even stronger support for UN peacekeeping operations. Eighty-four percent (up five points since 2002) say the United States should take part in these operations generally, with 81% favoring participation to keep peace between Israel and the Palestinians, and 75% between India and Pakistan.

Support for giving the UN a greater role can also be seen in the case of the current situation in Iraq. Large majorities of both the public (71%) and leaders (75%) agree that the United Nations rather than the United States should “take the lead” in helping the Iraqis to write a new constitution and build a new democratic government in their country.

**Attitudes toward other organizations**

Despite the findings that Americans support giving many international organizations greater powers, overall feelings toward them are mixed. This is probably related to feelings about their performance as distinguished from the desirability of their function. Measured on the feeling thermometer (see Figure 3-3), feelings are warmest for the World Health Organization (60°) and the UN, as mentioned (57°). Organizations concerned with contentious international economic and development issues are given more neutral or even slightly cool feelings. Hovering right around or just below the neutral point are the World Court (50°), the European Union (49°), the World Trade Organization (48°), and the World Bank (46°). At the low end is the International Monetary Fund (44°). The debates and protests in recent years over actions taken by the IMF, WTO, and the World Bank, with regard to unfair or exploitative economic policies have evidently harmed the images of these organizations.

**Supporting international agreements**

In addition to favoring the empowerment of many international institutions, Americans also favor U.S. participation in international treaties and agreements (see Figure 3-4). Support is greatest for U.S. participation in the treaty banning nuclear weapon test explosions (87% among the public and 85% among leaders). It is next highest for the treaty banning the use of land mines, with 80% of both the public and leaders in favor of participating. Regarding the Kyoto agreement to reduce global warming, 71% of the public supports U.S. participation, as do 72% of leaders. As mentioned earlier, the public and leaders also favor participation in the agreement permitting the ICC to try individuals for war crimes, genocide, and other crimes against humanity if their own countries won’t try them.
Seeking consensus among nations

Supporting the findings that Americans favor giving greater authority and responsibility to specific international decision making structures are other findings indicating that Americans want to be in accord with others and seek consensus among nations. When asked how much the United States should take into account that a majority of countries have signed an international agreement when considering whether to sign it, 71% of the public respond “a lot” (33%) or “some” (38%); only 26% say “just a little” (11%) or “not at all” (15%).

The support of allies is especially important for Americans. In the case of using military force to destroy North Korea’s nuclear capability, 74% of Americans believe it is necessary to get the approval of U.S. allies before taking such action. Fifty-eight percent believe it would be necessary to get the approval of the South Korean government before taking action.

Americans also believe that public opinion in other countries, not just government policy, is important. As noted in Chapter 1, 72% of the public and 68% of leaders say that the United States should withdraw its forces from Iraq if a clear majority of the Iraqi people want this. Even in the case of the U.S. military presence in the Middle East, 59% of the public think the United States should remove its military from the Middle East if a majority of the people there want it to do so (see Figure 1-6). Leaders, however, differ sharply in the importance they attach to the opinions of people in the Middle East: 52% say the United States should not remove its presence if the majority of the people are against it, versus 35% who say it should.

Even though Americans believe public opinion is important, they agree that the U.S. government, in making a decision, should give more consideration to the majority of governments around the world than the majority of people. Fifty-five percent of the public think the U.S. government, in making a decision, should give more consideration to the majority of governments around the world than the majority of people. Fifty-five percent of the public think the U.S. government, in making a decision, should give more consideration to the majority of governments around the world than the majority of people.

This is reflected in the amount of influence Americans think people around the world have compared to governments. On a scale of 0 to 10 in which 0 is not at all influential and 10 is extremely influential, the average amount of influence that the public thinks the majority of people around the world have on U.S.
foreign policy is 4.2, compared to 5.7 for the majority of governments. When asked on the same scale how much influence the majority of governments and people around the world should have on U.S foreign policy, the public gives the majority of people a 5.7 and the majority of governments a 6.1. American leaders don’t believe the opinion of the majority of people should have as much influence, giving the people an average 4.7 in terms of how much influence they should have, compared to 5.7 for the majority of governments (see Figure 3-5). Interestingly, Americans believe they themselves should have the most influence on foreign policy, giving “the American public” a score of 7.3, slightly more than they gave the president (7.2) and the Congress (7.2).

**Spreading democracy**

Promoting democracy and self-determination worldwide has been a guiding principle—in the abstract, if not an actual force—in American foreign policy and in the United Nations as well as other international organiza-

**DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

**IRAQ**

Percentage who think that before the U.S. withdraws from Iraq it is or is not necessary to have a democratically elected government.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
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<tr>
<td>Is not necessary</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Is necessary</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>46</td>
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**MIDDLE EAST**

Percentage of the public who think the U.S. should or should not put greater pressure on countries in the Middle East, like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to become more democratic.

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should not</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Should</td>
<td>35</td>
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</table>
In addition to their unwillingness to use American troops to install democratic governments where dictators rule, a majority of Americans also believe that a country does not have the right to use military force without UN approval to restore by force a democratic government that has been overthrown. Fifty-three percent of the public say a country does not have this right, with 40% saying it does. Among leaders, 58% say a country does not have this right, and 32% say it does. However, a strong majority (60%) of both the public and leaders think that the UN Security Council should have the right to authorize the use of military force to restore a democratic government that has been overthrown.

In the case of Iraq, in which the action to overthrow a dictator and install democracy has already been undertaken, a majority of Americans support sticking with the goal. Sixty-two percent of the public think that before the United States withdraws troops from Iraq, it is necessary to have a democratically elected government there, with 33% saying it is not necessary. Leaders are more split on this issue: a plurality of 49% say it is not necessary to have a democratically elected government Iraq before withdrawing, with 46% saying it is necessary (see Figure 3-6).

As noted earlier, Americans do not favor even rather mild democratization efforts in the Middle East. Fifty-seven percent of the public do not think that the U.S. should put “greater pressure” on countries in the Middle East, like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to become more democratic (see Figure 3-6). Further, 68% of the public oppose spending billions of dollars to reconstruct and democratize the Middle East, as the United States did in Europe after World War II, with only 24% in favor of such an investment (see Figure 4-8). Leaders, however, take the opposite view. Sixty-four percent favor this kind of Marshall Plan for the Middle East, and only 30% oppose it.

All of these findings point again to the idea that Americans feel that the responsibilities and costs of many international actions are too great for it to shoulder alone and are looking for ways to share these burdens. More than ever, they are turning to other nations and to international institutions to help share the load through collective decision making and collective action.
The effects of globalization and the growth of international trade have led many to question the equity of the international trading system and the degree to which trade should be free. The income and development gaps between developing and developed countries have grown wider. While freer trade may stimulate general economic growth, it also puts at risk or displaces certain specific economic sectors and workers threatened by foreign competition. While there has been a strong international push in recent years to continue lowering trade barriers on the principle that the general benefits of free trade outweigh its costs, there has also been a growing demand that those who might suffer disproportionately from freer trade be protected and that benefits in general be more equitably distributed.

Many developed nations have continued to restrict access to their markets through the use of both tariff and nontariff barriers, while pushing for market-opening initiatives in developing countries that make these markets more receptive to imports. Especially contentious is the issue of farm subsidies. There are questions, in turn, about the advantage developing nations have because of lower environmental and labor standards (including lower wages), which significantly reduce the costs of production and services and undercut markets in developed countries. What obligation does each side have to address these imbalances in trade negotiations and reduce their unfair advantages and practices? Then there is the question of whether developed nations, with an inherent advantage in international trade because of their advanced economies, have an obligation to help the developing world improve their economic situation in order to achieve greater economic equity.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established to deal with these questions, yet itself is the focus of controversy. When the process of trade liberalization began in 1947 with the establishment of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the goal was to develop a multilateral framework for governing commercial policies such as tariffs, quotas, and exchange rates. GATT lacked an institutional foundation, a rigorous enforcement mechanism, and a mandate to establish rules that affected domestic economic policies. It was only with the creation of the WTO in 1995 that most international trade came to be regulated by a membership organization empowered to police international commerce among member states, resolve international trade disputes, and serve as the principal forum for market opening initiatives.

However, questions have arisen over fairness within the organization and the degree to which inequities have been institutionalized. Beyond the inequities is the question of the WTO’s decision-making structure and how much power it should have to establish and enforce policies that directly affect the domestic policies of nations. Currently, decisions are reached by consensus.
among all members. Should WTO decisions be made and enforced by a majority of members over the objections of others?

Negotiations during the current Doha Round, launched in 2001, have been contentious, as witnessed by the failure of the Cancun Ministerial meetings in September 2003, where the United States, the European Union, and Japan clashed with a group of developing nations over issues of fair play on everything from agenda setting to agricultural subsidies and other issues. However, a recent breakthrough in the summer of 2004 on a deal to slash farm and export subsidies and lower remaining tariff barriers may push negotiations back on schedule to conclude by the end of 2004.

The stakes in these negotiations are high. The World Bank has estimated that a successful Doha Round could fuel economic growth globally and lift 500 million people out of poverty. The success or failure of the talks will send a strong message about how committed the world’s nations are to working toward freer trade in general and to doing so through international institutions like the WTO in particular.

The role of regional trade agreements and of migration are also important issues in the debate over trade and the frameworks for pursuing it. Regional trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), have increased in number in recent years as countries look for alternatives to the WTO for pursuing freer trade. As with international agreements, however, there has been concern about whether the economic benefits of these agreements outweigh their costs in terms of jobs lost to foreign competition. The problem is not only of jobs moving to other low-wage countries, but of migration—of cheaper labor coming to take jobs at home. Many believe that labor mobility issues will play an increasingly prominent role in future trade agreements, regionally and internationally, affecting countries’ immigration policies.

Pursuing free trade with conditions

Our survey results indicate that Americans generally want to pursue free trade. Strikingly, they support the empowerment of international economic institutions to make decisions by majority and are willing to comply with those decisions. Nevertheless, Americans also believe strongly that the effects of free trade must be mitigated. This especially relates to domestic concerns about job loss and about the environment. Support for lowering trade barriers is conditioned by many Americans to the government having programs for displaced workers. Likewise, they believe that international trade agreements should have labor and environmental protections included. They think that the developed world is not playing fair in trade negotiations with poor countries, and show some support for helping these countries develop to level the playing field, though this is a low priority. They do support aid for humanitarian purposes but want to control the level of this spending.

While there is support for a new, regional free trade agreement, more Americans think NAFTA is better for Mexico than for the United States. While they think NAFTA is good for consumers, they think it is bad for job creation and job security in the United States. The concern Americans have regarding job competition from low-wage countries in turn makes them less receptive to measures to increase legal immigration levels in the United States.

Globalization and trade in principle

Overall, majorities of the American public (64%) and leaders (87%) believe that globalization, especially the increasing connections of our economy with others...
around the world is mostly good for the United States (see Figure 4-1). This number is up from each of the previous two surveys in which it was asked. In terms of trade specifically, 57% think international trade is good for the U.S. economy. Even more say international trade is good for consumers like themselves (73%), for their own standard of living (65%), and for American companies (59%) (see Figure 4-2).

Americans demonstrate a high degree of comfort with the United States’ economic relations with its trading partners in the developed world. Only 14% of Americans consider economic competition from Europe a critical threat to the United States, with 20% considering it not an important threat (63% say important but not critical). Sixty percent think the countries of the European Union practice fair trade with the United States, compared to only 32% who thought so in 1994. Similarly, Japan, whose economy was once viewed as a fundamental threat to America, is perceived by 52% of the public as practicing fair trade, up a dramatic 35 points compared to 1994 when only 17% believed this. A strong majority (74%) believes Canada practices fair trade, while a plurality of 49% say so for South Korea (Figure 4-3).

Large majorities also believe that the United States practices fair trade with these countries. Eighty-one percent say so for Canada, 76% for the countries of the European Union, 76% for Japan, and 69% for South Korea.

Support for the trading system and institutions

Americans demonstrate strong support for an international trading system that is regulated through multilateral institutions and requires compliance with collective decisions. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 69% of the American public and 85% of leaders say that the United States should, as a general rule, comply with World Trade Organization (WTO) decisions even when they go against the United States, with only 24% of the public and 9% of leaders opposed. Similarly, a strong majority (68%) of the public feel that decisions in international economic organizations like the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund should always be made by a majority, while only 27% believe that the United States should be able to veto a majority decision (see Figure 4-4). These findings are a strong vote of confidence in the international trading system generally and the desire to work together with other countries to make decisions and regulate trade through multilateral institutions.

Concerns about inequities

Concurrent with their general support for international trade, Americans show concern about its inequities.
Sixty-five percent of the public disagree (23% strongly and 42% somewhat) with the statement that rich countries are playing fair in trade negotiations with poor countries, and only 30% strongly or somewhat agree. Leaders disagree even more strongly with the statement, with 38% strongly disagreeing and 28% somewhat disagreeing that rich countries are playing fair in negotiations (66% disagreeing overall). Interestingly, a slim majority (51%) of the public think that the United States practices fair trade with poor countries.

Americans also see losers in the United States. Sixty-four percent think international trade is bad for the job security of American workers, and 56% say it is bad for creating jobs in the United States (see Figure 4-2). Linked to this is concern among some Americans about economic competition from low-wage countries, which may be believed to be taking jobs from Americans. Thirty-five percent of the public consider this competition to be a critical threat. This is one of only two threats (out of 13 total) that did not decline from 2002 to 2004 but actually increased a few points. China, whose economic ascent and cheap labor market have created global apprehension, is seen by a majority of the public (51%) as practicing unfair trade with the United States (see Figure 4-3).

The current focal point of these concerns about competition is the outsourcing of jobs to other countries where wages are lower. Seventy-two percent of the American public think outsourcing is mostly a bad thing because American workers lose their jobs to people in other countries (see Figure 4-5). Only 22% say instead that outsourcing is mostly a good thing because it results in lower prices in the United States, which help stimulate the economy and create new jobs. Indeed, this view is in line with the great priority Americans place on protecting American workers. Seventy-eight percent believe that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States to protect the jobs of American workers. Only 22% say that it is mostly a good thing. Leaders, on the other hand, for whom the goal of protecting the jobs of American workers is much lower (41% very important), do not share the public’s view of outsourcing as bad. Instead, 56% say that it is mostly a good thing.
Mitigating the effects of trade

Americans show strong support for a variety of measures to mitigate the effects of trade, both in terms of its effect on workers and the environment. Furthermore, when measures such as helping displaced workers are assured, the opposition to the growth of trade drops dramatically. When provided three options about their attitudes towards lowering trade barriers such as tariffs, a plurality of 48% say they favor agreements to lower trade barriers provided the government has programs to help workers who lose their jobs, and only 10% favor agreements to lower trade barriers without government programs to help displaced workers. Thirty-four percent oppose agreements to lower trade barriers.

A key idea that has been proposed for mitigating the effects of trade is to require countries that are part of trade agreements to maintain minimum standards for working conditions. This makes it more difficult for developing countries to undercut U.S. workers and also prevents factory owners in developing countries from operating abusive “sweatshops.” Overwhelming majorities of the public (93%) and leaders (86%) say that countries that are part of international trade agreements should be required to maintain minimum standards for working conditions (see Figure 4-6).

Another effort to mitigate the effects of trade is to require countries that are part of trade agreements to maintain minimum standards for the protection of the environment. Without such standards, countries with low environmental standards may be able to woo companies away from countries with higher standards. Not surprisingly, then, overwhelming majorities of the public (91%) and of leaders (86%) say that countries that are part of international trade agreements should be required to maintain minimum standards for protection of the environment (see Figure 4-6). Again, this high response likely results both from the desire to achieve a level playing field in trade as well as the more general desire to protect the environment.

**Achieving equity in trade**

Especially contentious in the debate over the equity of trade is the issue of farm subsidies, estimated by the World Bank to total $350 billion globally. Farm subsidies in developed countries give their farmers the capacity to undercut the prices of farmers in the developing world. The failure of the Cancun Ministerial meetings of the WTO Doha Round in September 2003, where the United States, the European Union, and Japan clashed with a group of developing nations over several issues, was due in part to lack of agreement on the reduction of agricultural subsidies.

Abstractly, Americans support farm subsidies. Asked whether farm subsidies should be expanded, cut back, or kept the same, 46% say they want to keep them about the same, 27% want to expand farm subsidies, and 24% want to cut them back. However, this support is for the protection of small farmers, not large farming businesses to whom more than 80% of U.S. subsidies actually go.

When asked separately whether they favor the U.S. government giving subsidies to small farmers who farm less than 500 acres, 71% of the public (down 6% from when PIPA asked this question in January 2004) and 50% of leaders say they favor giving subsidies to small farmers.
farmers. Only 27% of the public and 9% of leaders favor subsidies for large farming businesses (see Figure 4-7).

Furthermore, despite the fact that nearly all subsidies are given on a regular annual basis, most support for subsidies among Americans is predicated on need.

When those who favor subsidies for small farmers are asked whether subsidies should be given only in bad years or on a regular annual basis, only 31% of the entire public sample and 18% of the entire leader sample say they favor subsidies on a regular annual basis, compared to 41% of the public and 34% of the leaders who favor only extending this support in bad years.

With large farming businesses, only 9% of the public and 3% of leaders favor it on a regular basis.

Thus, though a majority of the public supports having some farm subsidies, the vast majority of the actual subsidies given—to large farming businesses on a regular annual basis—are only supported by a small minority.

**Trade as a strategic tool**

While Americans generally adhere to a free trade principle, they also see trade as a political lever. Large proportions of Americans favor engaging in trade with major U.S. trading partners Mexico (76%) and China (63%) despite concern about jobs and, in the case of China, human rights. But when it comes to nations that are widely seen as enemies of the United States, a majority of Americans apparently consider the withholding of trade to be an appropriate political tactic. Fifty-four percent of the public oppose engaging in trade with Iran (40% favor it), and 63% oppose engaging in trade with North Korea (31% favor it). However, a bare plurality favor trade with Cuba, with 48% in favor and 46% opposed.

Leaders are less inclined to withhold trade generally to unfriendly countries. Large majorities favor trading with Cuba (80%) and Iran (69%), and a bare majority even favors trade with North Korea (50% in favor to 45% opposed).

**Responsibility for development aid**

On the question of whether the developed world has a responsibility to help poorer countries develop their economies, American attitudes are complex. In principle, large majorities are in favor. Seventy percent say
they favor foreign aid to help needy countries develop their economies. Sixty-four percent also say they support helping poor countries develop their economies as a measure to combat international terrorism.

However, this does not appear to be a high priority. Only 18% cite improving the standard of living in less developed countries as a very important U.S. foreign policy goal, down 10 percentage points from 2002 (see Figure 1-2).

There is little apparent appetite, as mentioned previously, for a large-scale, Marshall Plan-style effort in the Middle East, despite the public’s apparent support for helping poor countries develop their economies as a measure to combat international terrorism. Asked whether they favor such making an investment in the Middle East similar to the billions of dollars spent to reconstruct and democratize Europe after World War II, 68% are opposed, and only 24% favor it (see Figure 4-8).

Americans also say they want to cut government spending on economic aid in general. When asked whether economic aid to other nations should be expanded, cut back, or kept about the same, 64% want to cut it back, 26% indicate they want to keep it the same, and just 8% want to expand it. This desire to cut economic aid has been true in all Council surveys for the past 30 years. Yet, the 2002 Council study found that Americans grossly overestimate the amount of money spent on such aid. The median estimate Americans gave in 2002 for the percentage of the federal budget that goes to foreign aid was 20%, more than 20 times the actual level of just under 1% of the budget. The median response to a separate question on what percentage of the federal budget should go to foreign aid was 10%, representing more than 10 times what the United States spent on foreign economic aid in 2002.

Despite this ambiguity, the American public is clearly supportive of foreign aid focused on humanitarian goals. Eighty-two percent favor food and medical assistance to people in needy countries. Eighty percent favor assistance with the prevention and treatment of AIDS in poor countries. Seventy percent favor aid for birth control in poor countries to help reduce population growth, and 76% favor aid for women’s education in poor countries to help reduce population growth. Interestingly, though, the goal of combating world hunger is cited by only 43% of the public as a very important foreign policy goal (see Figure 1-2), a historic low for Chicago Council polls that date back to 1974 and down 11 percentage points from 2002.

American leaders, on the other hand, are unmistakably willing to make a commitment to a broad and extensive foreign aid program. In fact, there is clear shift among leaders toward helping poorer countries develop their economies since 9/11, likely due to a combination of strategic, economic, and altruistic considerations. Sixty-four percent of the leaders believe that improving the standard of living of less developed countries should be a very important U.S. foreign policy goal, up a striking 22 percentage points from 42% in 2002 and up 28 points from 36% in 1998, the last survey before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Ninety-four percent of leaders favor helping poor countries develop their economies as a measure to combat international terrorism. Likewise, 64% of leaders support making a multibillion dollar reconstruction and democratization effort in the Middle East, 44 percentage points higher than the 24% of the public who support this proposal. On a more altruistic level, 67% of leaders, matching a historic CCFR high set in 1978, believe combating world hunger should be a very important U.S. foreign policy goal. This is nine percentage points higher than the 59% who said this in 2002 and 26 percentage points higher than the 41% who gave this response in 1994.
Regional trade agreements

Regional trade agreements are another way countries look to expand free trade. The question for regional trade is similar to that for international trade: Do the benefits of such agreements, as measured through increased exports and cheaper prices for consumers, exceed the costs, primarily in terms of lost jobs. Overall, Americans appear to believe that the benefits do exceed the costs. Fifty-nine percent of the public and 74% of leaders support the United States entering into a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas that would include most of the countries in North, Central, and South America.

This support for regional free trade is striking given the mixed feelings about the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), established ten years ago to create a free trade zone between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. PIPA asked in January 2004 whether Americans thought NAFTA had been good or bad for the United States. A plurality of 47% responded that it had been good, while 39% indicated that it had been bad. Yet there is concern about NAFTA, largely driven by perceived problems with Mexico. Only 50% of Americans believe Mexico practices fair trade with the United States, while 67% say the U.S. practices fair trade with Mexico. This compares with 81% of Americans saying the U.S. practices fair trade with Canada and 74% believing that Canada practices fair trade with the United States. Overall, the bilateral U.S.–Canada trade relationship is seen as more mutually beneficial.

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**IMPACT OF NAFTA**

Percentage who say NAFTA is good or bad for the following.

![Figure 4-9](chart.png)
NAFTA is also seen as benefiting Mexico more than the United States and providing fewer advantages to the United States than international trade overall. Sixty-nine percent of the American public believe that NAFTA is good for both the Mexican economy and creating jobs in Mexico (see Figure 4-9). Only 42% believe that NAFTA is good for the U.S. economy (compared to 57% who say this about international trade). Only 31% percent think NAFTA is good for creating jobs in the United States (7 points lower than for international trade), and even fewer (25%) believe it to be good for job security for American workers (6 points lower than for international trade). A plurality of 50% percent say NAFTA is good for American companies (19 points lower than for international trade). Nevertheless, majorities still say that NAFTA is good for consumers like themselves (55%) and their own standard of living (51%), although these percentages are 18 and 14 percentage points lower, respectively, than for international trade.

American leaders look at NAFTA far more positively, seeing it as benefiting both Mexico and the United States. Seventy-eight percent think it is good for the Mexican economy, (32 points more than the public), and 74% believe it is good for the U.S. economy. An overwhelming 84% say it is good for American companies (34 points more than the public). Seventy-nine percent say NAFTA is good for consumers like themselves (24 points more than the public), and 65% see it as good for their own standard of living (14 points more than the public). One imbalance is apparent in the minds of leaders. While 79% say NAFTA is good for creating jobs in Mexico (10 points more than the public), many fewer leaders (49%, a dramatic 30 percentage points less) think it is good for creating jobs in the United States, compared to 31% of the public. The public and leaders are more closely aligned on NAFTA’s impact on job security for American workers and the environment, with only 34% of leaders and 25% of the public seeing it as good for job security and 32% of leaders and 34% of the public viewing it as good for the environment.

**Migration**

The concern about the impact of trade agreements, especially NAFTA, on jobs is linked to attitudes on immigration. While the United States has been built on a foundation of immigration and has a historic commitment to accepting immigrants from around the world, immigration has long been a concern among many Americans, mostly for the perceived threat it represents to American workers. In the post-9/11 environment, immigration has also been linked to security threats. Our survey results indicate that while there are still strong concerns over the threat of immigration for both economic and security reasons, there has been a softening in the forcefulness of these attitudes and a willingness to work with other countries on mutually beneficial migration policies.

The number of Americans who cite large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the United States as a critical threat is 52%, down from 2002 (see Figure 1-1). This percentage is the lowest level the Chicago Council has recorded since it began asking this question in 1994. Likewise, the percentage of the American public who believe controlling and reducing illegal immigration should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States has dropped to 59% in 2004 (by 10 points, see Figure 1-2). The decline in these numbers among the public despite the clear concern about jobs, suggests that the higher level two years ago was more linked to the problem of security than economic concerns. This is also in line with the lessen-
ing of perceived threats and the importance of goals overall, which appear to be linked to the subsiding of high emotion related to 9/11. However, while these numbers have clearly dropped, they still represent clear majorities who are concerned about this problem. Leaders are far less concerned about illegal immigration, with only 21% citing combating it as a very important U.S. foreign policy goal.

Despite this slight softening in their level of concern, Americans still see a link between immigration and terrorism, with 76% favoring restricting immigration into the United States as a means of combating international terrorism (virtually unchanged since 2002). Similarly, when asked whether legal immigration to the United States should be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased, a majority of the American public (54%) respond that it should be decreased. Thirty-one percent believe that legal immigration should be kept at its present level, and 11% say it should be increased (see Figure 4-10). Leaders, by contrast, overwhelmingly support either keeping immigration at its present level (50%) or increasing it (33%). Only 10% of leaders respond that immigration levels should be decreased.

While the American public wants to reduce legal immigration levels generally, there is strong backing for bilateral initiatives with Mexico that would increase legal immigration in exchange for the reduction of illegal immigration and drug trafficking, another big concern for Americans. When asked whether they would favor or oppose an agreement in which Mexico would make greater efforts to decrease illegal immigration and drug trafficking and the United States would provide greater opportunities for Mexicans to work and live legally in the United States, 64% of the American public indicate they would favor such an agreement, and only 30% say they would oppose it (see Figure 4-11). Leaders are even more supportive of such an agreement, with 89% favoring it and only 7% opposed.

Unilateral steps by the United States to provide undocumented residents similar opportunities to live and work legally in the United States garner much lower levels of support among the public, presumably because Americans think either that they will not be effective in stemming the tide of illegal immigrants or that they might actually encourage it. When told that officials in Washington have proposed a plan that would allow foreigners who have jobs but are staying illegally in the United States to apply for legal, temporary worker status, only 44% say they favor this plan, and 52% oppose it (see Figure 4-11). Leaders support for this measure, while a very solid majority of 71%, is still 18 percentage points lower than for a bilateral initiative with Mexico.
Attitudes toward policies and positions

As we have seen in the previous chapters, there is a fairly broad consensus between the public and leaders on issues and international norms regarding the use of force, multilateralism, and economic relations between countries. This convergence is particularly noticeable when examining policies, many of which the public and leaders either both support or both oppose. There is a strong endorsement of policies ranging from maintaining rules against torture and complying with unfavorable WTO rulings to using U.S. troops for peacekeeping in Afghanistan and maintaining a military presence in South Korea. There is significant disagreement by the public and leaders with many policies or positions taken by the present or previous U.S. administrations. Strong majorities of the public and leaders want the United States to participate in a range of treaties, favor strengthening international trade agreements to protect workers and the environment, oppose increasing defense spending, and reject countries on their own going to war to prevent another country from acquiring nuclear weapons (see Figure 5-1).

Leaders’ perceptions of the public

A key component of foreign policymaking is how policymakers and other leaders perceive public opinion. In this survey, CCFR for the first time asked leaders about their perceptions of public attitudes on eleven different questions. These questions were also asked of the general public and the leaders themselves, thus providing a rich opportunity to compare leaders’ assumptions about the public with actual opinion. For each question, respondents were asked to determine whether there would be a majority for a specific position or whether views would be evenly divided. If they specified that there would be a majority for a specific position or whether or not this would be a large majority, i.e. whether the majority would be over 60 percent.

One must be cautious about making broad generalizations based on these eleven questions. Nonetheless, the results are quite provocative. On most questions, leaders’ perceptions of the public’s views are clearly at odds with the actual attitudes of the general public.

What is equally striking is that in these same cases, the actual attitudes of the public and the leaders are very consonant, but leaders do not know this is the case. An especially prominent and recurring theme is that clear majorities of both the leaders and the public are supportive of policies and principles that involve stronger multilateral institutions or multilateral efforts for dealing with problems, but leaders are not aware of this public support. In some other areas, leaders are better at estimating the public, but in only one case do most leaders get it right (see Figure 5-2).
Policies/positions leaders oppose and do not know the public also opposes

There are some current policies that both the public and leaders oppose but leaders are unaware of the public’s opposition. For example, 76% of the public and 70% of leaders support the United States participating in the International Criminal Court (68% of administration officials also take this position, as do 74% of Democratic staffers, but just 15% of Republican staffer). However, only 30% of leaders estimate that a majority of the public would feel this way, and only 20% estimate that this is a large majority. Only 32% of administration officials, 18% of Democratic staffers, and 9% of Republican staffers judge the right direction of the majority.
Similarly, 71% of the public and 72% of the leaders favor the United States participating in the Kyoto agreement on global warming. Strikingly, 68% of administration officials and 94% of Democratic staffers agree, but just 21% of Republican staffers think the United States should participate in this treaty. Despite this support, just 38% of leaders overall estimate that a majority of the public also supports U.S. participation in the Kyoto agreement, and only 28% correctly estimate that this is a large majority. Forty-one percent of administration officials correctly estimate the direction of the majority, as do 43% of Democratic staffers and just 15% of Republican staffers.

Only 17% of the public and 15% of leaders favor taking Israel’s side in the Israel-Palestine conflict, with 10% of administration officials, 21% of Democratic staffers and 44% of Republican staffers taking this position. Instead, 74% of the public and 77% of the leaders favor taking neither side. But here again, leaders’ estimates of the public are far off. Only 32% of leaders correctly guess that a majority of Americans favor not taking either side, and only 13% assume that this would be a large majority. Administration officials do slightly better, with 42% correctly estimating the view of the majority, though only 10% correctly estimate the magnitude. Among Congressional staffers, 21% of Republican staffers and 30% of Democratic staffers correctly assess majority sentiment.

Policies leaders oppose and incorrectly believe the public also opposes

One of the most dramatic misperceptions on giving the UN the power to fund its activities by imposing a small tax on such things as the international sale of arms or oil. A slight plurality of the public (49%) favors the idea, while a slight plurality of leaders is opposed (46% in favor, 49% opposed). However, among government leaders there is clear opposition, with 73% of administration officials, 91% of Republican staffers, and 59% of
Democratic staffers opposed. Thirty-one percent of leaders overall give a roughly correct estimation of views being evenly divided or a majority in favor. Fifty-seven percent say that a majority is opposed. Among administration officials, 61% think a large majority is opposed, as do 62% of Republican and 49% of Democratic staffers.

A modest majority of the public (54%) favors using U.S. troops to ensure the supply of oil. Leader attitudes differ, with only 36% in favor of doing this and 52% opposed. Among leader categories, only Republican staffers show strong support for this measure, with 68% favoring it. When asked to estimate public attitudes, the plurality in every category estimates that public views are evenly divided.

**Policies leaders oppose and correctly believe the public also opposes**

On defense spending, only 29% of the public and 15% of leaders overall favor increasing defense spending. This includes 10% of administration officials and 4% of Democratic staffers. More Republican staffers, though not a majority, also do not favor spending increases on defense, with 47% in favor. On this question, leaders correctly estimate that a majority of the public does not support expanded spending. Only 13% of leaders think that a majority of the public favors increases, with 10% of administration officials, 18% of Republican staffers, and 8% of Democratic staffers thinking this. The dominant view among the public is that defense spending should be kept the same (44%), with 25% wanting to cut. Overall, a clear majority of leaders (71%) had the public at least approximately right, with 44% assuming that most want spending kept the same, and 27% saying that views are evenly divided.

**Principles leaders support and correctly believe the also public supports**

Eighty-six percent of leaders overall and 75% of the public favor using U.S. troops to stop a government from committing genocide and killing large numbers of its own people. When the leaders were asked to think about the public’s views, 55% are broadly right, thinking that a majority of the public is in favor. Only 40%, however, think that more than 60% of Americans are in favor. Fifty-six percent of administration officials estimate a majority is supportive (44% a large majority). Democratic staffers are especially good at estimating public perceptions on this question, with 73% estimating a majority. Republican staffers are reasonably accurate, with 53% estimating a majority (41% large).

**Policies leaders support and correctly believe the public does not support**

Fifty percent of leaders prefer keeping legal levels of immigration into the United States the same, 33% want to increase them, and only 10% want to decrease them. Among all government samples, support for decreases never exceeds 18%, and support for maintaining the present level ranges from 46% among administration officials to 73% among Democratic staffers. Among the public, 54% say the level of legal immigration should be decreased, 31% want to keep it the same, and only 11% want to increase it. When the leaders were asked what the public thinks about this, 50% say that a majority of the public wants to decrease immigration and another 22% assume that views are evenly divided. For every category of government leaders, the plurality assumes that most Americans want decreases.

**Positions leaders support and incorrectly believe the public opposes**

Leaders continually underestimate how much the public shares their support for empowering international institutions. Seventy-eight percent of leaders and 66% of the public agree that the United States should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations even if this means that the United States will have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice. However, when leaders are asked to estimate the distribution of attitudes among the general public, only 26% correctly estimate the direction of the majority, and only 16% estimate that it is a large majority. Among administration officials,
25% correctly estimate the direction of the majority, as do 24% of Republican and 18% of Democratic staffers.

Misperceptions are similar on the issue of compliance with WTO rulings. Sixty-nine percent of the public and 85% of the leaders, including majorities in all government categories, say the United States should comply with unfavorable WTO rulings. When asked to estimate what the public would say, only 29% of leaders correctly estimate the direction of majority opinion and only 19% estimate that it is a large majority. Thirty-six percent of administration officials guess the right direction, as do 35% of Republican and 24% Democratic staffers.

A resounding 78% of the public and 84% of leaders (71% of administration officials, 68% of Republican staffs, and 94% of Democratic staffs) say that the United States should participate when asked to be part of a UN international peacekeeping force in a troubled part of the world. When asked to estimate public attitudes, only 39% correctly estimate that a majority supports this, and only 24% estimate that it is a large majority. Twenty-nine percent of administration officials guess the right direction of the majority, as do 21% of Republican and 45% of Democratic staffs.
General Public Survey

In 2004, for the first time, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations has conducted its opinion survey of the general public through the Internet. Knowledge Networks, Inc. (KN) administered the survey between July 6 and July 12 to 1,195 American adults who had been randomly selected from KN’s respondent panel and answered questions on screens in their own homes. The margin of sampling error is approximately 3 percentage points. At the time of the last CCFR study in 2002, KN also conducted a special survey of selected CCFR items. The results of this survey were not released and were used by CCFR to compare mode differences between Internet, telephone, and face-to-face polling.

The KN panel is carefully constructed to ensure that it is representative of the noninstitutionalized adult population of the United States. In contrast to some early Internet surveys, the sample is not self-selected (which can lead to over-representation of computer owners and the affluent, while neglecting technophobes and lower-income people). Instead, a random sample of Americans is selected independently of computer ownership and is given free hardware and Internet access in return for participation in the KN panel.

The evidence indicates that KN samples are equal or superior in representativeness to most survey samples interviewed face-to-face (which is extremely expensive) or by telephone (which faces increasing problems due to refusals, call screening technology, and cell phone use) and that the quality of data produced is also equal or superior. Indeed, there are indications that Internet respondents, who can see all response alternatives at once on their screens and can take as much time as they want to answer questions, may tend to answer more deliberately and thoughtfully than is typical of face-to-face or (especially) telephone interviews.

Many questions in the 2004 survey are new and are not affected by mode differences. However, in comparing the data gathered in previous CCFR surveys, conducted face-to-face in all surveys from 1974 to 1998 (by Gallup in six surveys from 1978 to 1998 and once by Harris 1974) and conducted by telephone in 2002 (by Harris Interactive), some “mode effects,” or patterns of differences in these responses, have been detected. The following section summarizes these differences.

INFERENCES ABOUT OPINION CHANGE

In 2002, when CCFR shifted from face-to-face interviewing to primarily telephone interviewing, CCFR conducted a small (n=400) 2002 face-to-face survey done as a “splice” to compare mode differences. Comparison of the 2002 telephone responses with the face-to-face responses indicated that there were some
mode effects. In particular, telephone respondents more frequently chose “first box” response alternatives (e.g., more often saying that various possible foreign policy goals should be “very important”). Fortunately, the 2002 face-to-face survey, which included many core questions repeated from 1998, can be used to assess the extent of opinion change using a single survey mode.

The analysis of opinion change between 2002 and 2004 is less problematic, because mode differences between telephone and Internet data are generally smaller than those between telephone and face-to-face. (On a continuum of differences, face-to-face and telephone lie at the extremes and Internet generally falls in the middle.) One difference appears to be that telephone respondents, who are talking to a human interviewer, tend to give more “socially desirable” responses; they may be less likely, for example, to express approval of assassinations or torture. Another difference is that, for some questions with multiple alternatives, telephone respondents may tend to give more quick, “first choice” responses. Again, many or most CCFR questions are unaffected by these tendencies. Still, inferences about opinion change between the 2002 and 2004 CCFR surveys require some caution.

For those questions that have been previously asked, we have taken the following approach to reporting the data and discussing change:

- All 2004 percentages listed in the report are from the 2004 KN Internet survey.
- There are 17 questions or batteries (including six types of foreign aid, feeling thermometers on 14 countries, 20 possible foreign policy goals, four treaties, and six policies related to combating terrorism) for which we have data from a 2002 KN Internet survey (n=1091) conducted for CCFR that can be used for direct, single-mode comparisons between 2002 and 2004. These 2002 data are listed in the topline report as 2002 Internet (available at www.ccfr.org). Change figures on these questions use the Internet to Internet comparisons.
- For a different set of questions (attention to international news, six domestic and foreign federal government programs, and 12 possible threats to the vital interest of the United States), we have data from a special 2004 CCI telephone survey done for CCFR, which can be used for direct, single-mode comparison with the 2002 telephone data. These are listed in the topline report as 2004 telephone. Change figures on these questions use the telephone to telephone comparisons.
- In a few cases not included above, we have confidence that opinion changed because the observed changes in responses between the 2002 telephone and 2004 Internet data are so large and because the general body of research on mode effects as well as analysis of possible mode effects in the 2002 face-to-face/telephone comparisons confirms it. In these cases, however, we will not generally report a precise percentage point change, only the direction of the change. A similar procedure applies to inferences about changes between 1998 (with face-to-face data) and 2004.
- In all other cases we will refrain from commenting on opinion change.

Leadership Survey

The CCFR leadership study is designed to measure attitudes of a select group of opinion leaders on matters relating to foreign policy. The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations has commissioned this important research quadrennially since 1974, and this year marks the first-ever biennial study. IPSOS-Public Affairs was commissioned to conduct the research for 2004. The design of the questionnaires was developed by The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and a group of professional consultants working together with IPSOS.

Similar to all eight previous Chicago Council studies starting in 1974, the 2004 survey includes a simultaneous survey of the general public and foreign policy leaders. The 2004 leaders survey, which uses many of the same survey questions asked of the general public, was conducted for the first time by IPSOS-Public Affairs. However, the sample design and the survey method (telephone interviews) are essentially the same as in past surveys conducted by Harris (1974, 2002)
and Gallup (1978-1998), so that inferences concerning opinion changes between one survey and other are straightforward and nonproblematic. Comparisons between leaders’ opinions and those of the public also remain valid.

IPSOS interviewed 450 leaders with foreign policy power, specialization, and expertise. These included 100 Congressional members or their senior staff, 31 from the Senate and 69 from the House; 75 university administrators and academics who teach in the area of international relations; 59 journalists and editorial staff who handle international news; 41 administration officials such assistant secretaries and other senior staff in various agencies and offices dealing with foreign policy; 50 religious leaders; 38 senior business executives from Fortune 1000 corporations; 32 labor presidents of the largest labor unions; 29 presidents of major private foreign policy organizations; and 25 presidents of major special interest groups relevant to foreign policy. For purposes of analysis, data for each of the individual groups were also reviewed separately for comparisons among them and with the leader sample as a whole as well as with the public.

The individuals interviewed (or their immediate superiors) hold key leadership positions. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the inner circle of foreign policy decision makers in the White House or the Department of Defense. However, many of the interviewees exercise direct authority over U.S. foreign policy, while others may affect policy indirectly, through lobbying, expert writing and testimony, and contributions to public debate.