The United States and the Rise of China and India

Results of a 2006 Multination Survey of Public Opinion

Global Views 2006

In partnership with
East Asia Institute and Lowy Institute for International Policy
The United States and the Rise of China and India

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One of the great long-term challenges facing the United States is how it responds to the emergence of China and India as potential great powers in the twenty-first century. These two nations account for nearly 40 percent of the world’s population, and within twenty years will almost certainly be two of the world’s four largest economies. Their rapid, broad-based growth is altering trade and geopolitical relations in Asia and internationally.

China has become a global manufacturing power and is already displacing the United States as the primary trading partner for many nations. It is utilizing increased East Asian economic interdependence and skillful diplomacy to co-opt the interests of its neighbors and assert its influence throughout Asia. China’s economic and political clout is also increasingly felt well beyond Asia, especially in countries and regions that China regards as important for its growing energy needs. Its military spending has aroused concern in the region and the United States. In the United States there is a far-reaching debate as to whether there is a “China threat” and whether cooperation or containment is the right long-term approach toward China.

India has leveraged its highly educated workforce to position itself as a leader in global technology and services. The country is pursuing a strategic partnership with the United States and new prominence in global affairs. While the Indian government resists being a party to containment of China, many in the United States regard India as a critical player in the long-term Asian balance of power. The current U.S. administration clearly shares this view and has gone so far as to offer to reestablish the civilian nuclear relationship with India even though some claim this may undermine U.S. non-proliferation policies. At the same time, China and India acknowledge each other’s emerging power, have developed healthy two-way trade, and have worked hard to manage border disputes.

The rise of China and India could eventually result in a realignment of the international order by creating multiple poles of power and influence. The United States will face increased challenges to its military, economic, political, and cultural hegemony. In particular, the United States will be constrained in the policy tools it can employ unilaterally and will need to incorporate into its policy process the greater influence that China and India will have with other nations and within international institutions.

These challenges to the United States come at a time when the country is preoccupied internationally with military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan and concerns about Iranian and North Korean nuclear developments. Over the longer term, substantial budget and current account deficits will force the United States to make important choices about how it responds to the emergence of China and India as major players in regional and global economic and security affairs. Many analysts believe that it will be unwise, if not impos-
sible, to contain China. Instead, it is argued, the United States will need to become actively engaged in facilitating sustained economic development in China and India and cooperative relationships in the international community. Close cooperation between the three nations will be crucial in responding to a host of mutual concerns such as failing states, nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, climate change, energy and resource competition, transnational health threats, and open global trade.

One of the key factors influencing policymaking in these countries will be public opinion. It is critical to develop a better understanding of how the publics in the United States, China, India, and other key Asian countries view the rise of China and India and how the United States should respond. Should the United States help China and India to develop? Will their rise pose a challenge to U.S. leadership and, if so, is this a good thing? What are perceptions of the U.S. military presence in Asia? How will the U.S. strategic relationship with key Asian countries be influenced by the rise of China? What are Chinese and Indian perceptions of their nations’ international challenges and opportunities and their respective roles as emerging great powers? Are there areas of potential collaboration between the United States, China, and India to address transnational problems?

The understanding of attitudes toward and within China and India need to be framed by a broad grasp of American public perceptions of world affairs, the challenges facing the United States today, and U.S. policy options. What role do Americans want their nation to play in the world? Are Americans moving in the direction of neo-isolationism, as some fear in view of the Iraq experience? What foreign policy tools do Americans want the United States to employ in responding to emerging challenges?

In order to shed light on attitudes in these important areas, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, working in partnership with the Asia Society, has focused its 2006 study of U.S. and international public opinion on the rise of China and India and its implications for the international order and U.S. foreign policy. The survey includes polling undertaken by The Chicago Council in the United States, China, and India, with parallel surveys carried out by the East Asia Institute in South Korea and the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Australia. The comparative analysis of American, Chinese, Indian, South Korean, and Australian public attitudes on a wide range of issues comprises the major part of this report. In a departure from previous Chicago Council studies, there is no separate report that focuses exclusively on the U.S. data. The U.S. findings have been integrated into this report in both the first chapter, which assesses the overall American outlook on the world and in the subsequent chapters, which address issues related to the rise of China and India.

The Chicago Council has additionally undertaken a separate collaborative project with the Japan Economic Foundation that includes a parallel Japanese survey. The results of the Japan survey will be released in November 2006 in a report that highlights the comparison of American and Japanese opinion with special reference to China and India.

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In undertaking this study, it has been The Chicago Council’s practice to assemble a proj-
ect team that possessed expertise and a willingness to dedicate a substantial amount of their time and work in a highly collaborative environment. The Chicago Council is very fortunate once again to have the participation of such a distinguished project team that contributed at every phase of the study’s development. This year’s project team included Catherine Hug, president of Hug Communications; Steven Kull, director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA); Mike Kulma, associate director, Policy and National Programs, Asia Society; Benjamin I. Page, Gordon Scott Fulcher Professor of Decision Making in the Department of Political Science at Northwestern University; Ambassador Teresita C. Schaffer, director, South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Dali Yang, professor and chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago.

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The data from this survey will be placed on deposit with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, the Roper Center for Public Opinion in Storrs, Connecticut, and NORC (National Opinion Research Center) at the University of Chicago. It will be available to scholars and other interested professionals. The report will also be available on the Internet at www.thechicagocouncil.org.

Marshall M. Bouton
President
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Part I:
The U.S. Worldview

The Global U.S. Position

More than three years after the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, raging violence in the country continues to dominate the headlines. Despite the controversy surrounding U.S. engagement in Iraq, Americans overall are not turning away from their broad internationalist stance, but remain committed to an active international role. They continue to be most concerned about terrorism and nuclear proliferation as well as job security. Concern about global warming and energy supplies is on the rise. They see the United States as the world’s most influential country by far and prefer it to remain that way. They recognize the rising influence of India and, especially, China. While slightly more Americans think the United States and China are mostly rivals than partners, most favor friendly cooperation and engagement with China, and most say they want to work together with China and India on solving a number of specific problems.

- Strong majorities of Americans think the Iraq war has not reduced the threat of terrorism and will not lead to the spread of democracy in the Middle East. Two-thirds agree that the war has worsened America’s relations with the Muslim world.

- Americans continue to support an active role for the United States in world affairs but do not want to play the role of world policeman. They prefer that the United States do its share to solve international problems together with other countries.

- Americans place their country significantly ahead of all others in terms of influence in the world today and prefer that other countries have significantly less influence. A slight majority thinks maintaining superior military power worldwide is a very important foreign policy goal.

- In ten years, Americans see China’s influence as rising to second behind the United States. In fifty years, they predict that another nation will either become as powerful as the United States or surpass it.

- International terrorism, the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers, and disruption in energy supply are the top three threats that the most Americans consider critical to the country’s vital interests among a list of thirteen asked about. There is much less concern about economic competition from other countries or about possible conflicts in Asia, including conflicts on the Korean Peninsula, between China and Taiwan, or between India and Pakistan.

Executive Summary
• Protecting the jobs of American workers is the top-ranking foreign policy goal, considered very important by more Americans than any other.

International Engagement

Most Americans want to pursue their foreign policy goals chiefly through cooperative and multilateral means, with a large role for the United Nations. Even so, they continue to support a strong military presence around the world and appear willing to take unilateral action if necessary in cases where they believe the stakes are high.

• A solid majority of Americans support joint decision making within the United Nations and nearly three-quarters support compliance with an adverse WTO rulings. Large majorities favor steps to strengthen the United Nations, including giving it the authority to go into countries to investigate human rights violations and to regulate the international arms trade. They also support expanding the UN Security Council to include membership by Japan, Germany, India, and Brazil.

• Support is strong for participating in international treaties and agreements, including the Kyoto agreement to reduce global warming, the International Criminal Court, and the agreement on inspections under the treaty banning biological weapons.

• Americans support keeping the number of military bases around the world the same as it is now and having bases in South Korea, Germany, Japan, Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Turkey. They do not, however, support having a base in Pakistan.

• Support for using U.S. troops abroad is strongest for humanitarian operations and to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Americans do not favor using troops in potential conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians, North and South Korea, India and Pakistan, or China and Taiwan. They are strongly against using troops to install democratic governments in states where dictators rule.

• Americans believe nuclear weapons should only be used in response to a nuclear attack. They are not in favor of the deal to sell civilian nuclear technology to India. They believe the United Nations should have the right to authorize force to prevent countries from acquiring nuclear weapons and that countries should have the right to go to war if they believe another country is acquiring weapons of mass destruction that could be used against them in the future.

• Americans overwhelmingly believe Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons. Three-quarters prefer nonmilitary means to stop Iran’s weapons program, including economic sanctions and diplomacy. A majority thinks the United States should undertake a military strike only if the United Nations authorizes it and other allies participate.

Economics and Trade

Americans put a very high priority on protecting the jobs of American workers. They support globalization overall, but their feelings about international trade are somewhat mixed, and they believe that some countries are practicing unfair trade. They support agreements to lower trade barriers as long as there are protections for workers who lose their jobs, but are generally opposed to free trade agreements with specific countries.

• A majority of Americans believe globalization is mostly good for the United States. They judge international trade as good for U.S. consumers, the U.S. economy, and American companies, but bad for job creation and job security in the United States. A majority believes outsourcing is mostly bad because of job losses in the United States.

• Americans think Mexico, India, and especially China practice unfair trade with the United States. While only approximately one-third of Americans oppose agreements to lower trade barriers generally, majorities oppose free trade agreements with China, India, and South Korea.
• Americans believe they are the world’s leader in developing new products and technologies, but see China, India, and South Korea as rising in this area within ten years.

• A plurality of Americans want legal immigration to be decreased, though this number has dropped from 2004, while the number for keeping the level of immigration the same has increased.

Global Challenges

Americans are concerned about and support action to address global problems such as environmental degradation and human rights violations.

• A plurality of Americans say global warming is a serious enough problem that steps should be undertaken now to combat it even if they are costly. Majorities also say improving the global environmental is a very important foreign policy goal and that China, India, and the United States should work together to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. An overwhelming majority thinks that trade agreements should have minimum standards for protection of the environment.

• Large majorities of Americans think the United Nations has not only the right but the responsibility to authorize the use of military force to protect people from severe human rights violations such as genocide. Americans are also willing to use U.S. troops to stop genocide and deal with humanitarian crises, including in the Darfur region of the Sudan. Two-thirds are against weakening the rules on torture of prisoners.

Part II:
China and India in a Rising Asia

The Rise of China

The Chinese believe their country is a significant and growing power in the world and show strong support for its economic and military rise. They do not appear to be particularly alarmed by potential threats to vital interests except for the spread of epidemic disease, and they consider foreign policy goals related to economic security to be the most important. While people in other countries are more modest in their assessment of China’s power and influence, they recognize its growing status and appear to be mostly comfortable with China’s economic ascent, though Americans show some wariness. While there is some nervousness about China converting its growing economic power into military power, relations with China are viewed positively, and other countries want to work together with China to solve regional and world problems.

• Chinese see their influence in the world today as second only to the United States and believe they will pull even with the United States in terms of influence within ten years. They prefer their country to have more influence than any other and highly favor China taking an active part in world affairs. They overwhelmingly view the prospect of China becoming more powerful economically and militarily as positive.

• Chinese view their country fourth behind the United States, Japan, and Germany as a leader in developing new products and technologies and see China rising to second place but not surpassing the United States in ten years in this area. One-half of the Chinese public thinks China’s economy will someday grow to be as large as the U.S. economy.

• The threat of epidemics such as AIDS and avian flu is considered a critical threat by more Chinese than any other assessed threat. Disruption in energy supply is the only other threat considered critical by a majority.

• People in the United States, India, and South Korea rate China’s influence in the world today lower than do the Chinese themselves. While they see it rising in ten years, all countries see the influence of the United States remaining well ahead.

• Americans are divided about whether China becoming significantly more powerful eco-
nomically would be mainly positive or negative. Indians are also somewhat divided, but view it mostly positively. South Koreans clearly think this would be positive. However, majorities in the United States and South Korea and a plurality in India view the growth of Chinese military power as mainly negative.

- The Asian countries surveyed all have warm feelings toward China, though Americans give it a cool rating. Only Australians trust China to act responsibly in the world, and more Americans, South Koreans, and Indians think China practices unfair trade than think the opposite.

- Asian countries surveyed have a positive view of China’s role in resolving key problems facing Asia, while a plurality of Americans have a negative view. Overall, China’s relations with other countries are seen as at least staying the same if not improving. The U.S.-China relationship is seen as more of a rivalry than a partnership on both sides, while the China-India relationship is seen as more of a partnership than a rivalry on both sides. A majority of Americans think China and India are rivals.

The Rise of India

Indians are bullish on their country’s role in Asia and the world and on its prospects for the future, but still look to the United States as the world’s leader. While their self-assessment is more modest than that of the Chinese, Indians already see themselves as more influential in the world than China and as gaining on the United States. India is in many respects well regarded by people in the United States and in Asia and is recognized as a country on the rise. India is, however, still in the shadow of China and to a lesser extent Japan.

- In ten years they see themselves as gaining on the United States in terms of influence in the world and innovation, but do not believe they will equal or surpass the United States.

- Indians favor an active role for India in world affairs and see the prospect of becoming more powerful economically and militarily as mainly positive. Three-quarters favor gaining a seat in the UN Security Council.

- Like the Chinese, Indians feel quite threatened by potential epidemic diseases, but also show significant concern about international terrorism, unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers, tensions with neighboring Pakistan, and Islamic fundamentalism.

- The highest foreign policy priorities according to the Indian public are combating international terrorism and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons along with economic concerns: protecting jobs, promoting economic growth, and securing adequate energy supplies. Combating world hunger also places high.

- Among the publics in China, the United States, and South Korea, India places at the bottom of the list of nine countries asked about in terms of world influence today. In ten years, India’s influence is seen as rising, but not by much, placing last again in almost all cases.

- India is also not recognized as a leading source of innovation today, and while it is seen as rising in ten years more than other countries, it still places low compared to other countries.

- Feelings toward India are rather warm, except in the United States, where they are slightly cool. Chinese, Americans, and South Koreans view India’s economic rise as mainly positive. India is also recognized as a fair trader by the Chinese and South Koreans, but not by Americans.

- A majority of Chinese also see India’s growing military power as mainly positive, though strong
majorities in the United States and South Korea say the opposite.

- Trust of India is generally low, though the Chinese mistrust the United States more. Roughly one-half of people in the United States, China, and South Korea think India is playing a positive role in resolving problems facing Asia.

- Americans, Australians, and South Koreans all see their relations with India as staying the same, with more saying they are improving than worsening. A plurality of Chinese say they are improving. Chinese and Americans both view their relationships with India as partnerships.

**Japan, South Korea, and Australia**

**Japan**

The view of Japan differs widely among the surveyed countries. While historical legacy casts a shadow on Japan's relations with China and South Korea, views among Americans, Indians, and Australians are much more positive.

- Chinese and South Koreans show very cool feelings toward Japan, have little trust in its actions, and think relations with Japan are worsening. Nevertheless, a plurality of Chinese think Japan is playing a positive role in resolving problems in Asia and only a very small number of Chinese think differences between China and Japan cannot be resolved.

- Australians, Americans, and Indians all have warm feelings toward Japan and a favorable impression of its trade practices. All three see relations with Japan as the same or improving and view it as a responsible and reliable actor in the world. Three-quarters of Americans say the United States and Japan are partners rather than rivals and support Japan becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council. However, a plurality of Americans now thinks China is more important than Japan.

**South Korea**

Attitudes toward South Korea among surveyed nations are somewhat mixed, though tend toward the positive.

- Chinese have by far the warmest regard for South Korea. A majority of Chinese think relations with South Korea are improving and see it as playing a positive role in resolving key problems facing Asia.

- Americans have somewhat cool feelings toward South Korea. They see relations overall as staying the same, though more say relations are worsening than improving.

- Feelings among Indians are more neutral, and the view of relations with South Korea is generally that they are improving.

**Australia**

Australia is viewed positively by all countries surveyed, with the warmest feelings from Americans. The country is not viewed as very influential in Asia, though Australians believe they have more influence than others believe they have.

**The United States: The View from Asia**

The countries surveyed regard the United States as the most important player in the world and in Asia today and for the next ten years. However, they are concerned about the reliability and responsibility of the United States and do not believe that U.S. power will remain dominant over the longer term. Many, especially the Chinese, are uncomfortable with the U.S. military presence in the region.

- Chinese, Indians, and South Koreans all see U.S. influence today as substantially above any other country and do not predict much of a decline in influence over the next ten years, even as others gain in influence. In fifty years, a majority in all countries (China, India, South Korea, and the
United States) believes another nation will become as powerful or surpass the United States in power.

- Feelings toward the United States overall are warm, though Chinese feelings are much more neutral and the United States ranks next to last of fifteen countries asked about in China.

- Chinese, Indians, and Australians want the United States to have less influence in the world than it does now, but most think it would be mainly negative if the United States became significantly less powerful economically and militarily than it is now (a plurality of Indians think it would be mostly positive if the United States became significantly less powerful militarily).

- Asians agree with Americans that the Iraq war has not reduced the threat of terrorism, will not lead to the spread of democracy in the Middle East, and has worsened relations with the Muslim world. Trust in the United States to act responsibly in the world is low and trade practices are viewed rather negatively. Nevertheless, relations overall are seen as staying the same or improving.

- The United States is also seen as having more influence in Asia than any other country and is viewed as playing a positive role in resolving key problems facing Asia.

- Nevertheless, Chinese are clearly against the U.S. military presence in Asia, preferring fewer U.S. bases and opposing bases in Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, and Afghanistan. They also think the U.S. military presence in East Asia decreases stability and want it decreased. Indians are more ambivalent on all accounts.

**Great Power Relations in Asia**

*(China, India, the United States, and Japan)*

The emergence of China and India as Asian powers does not, so far, appear to be raising great anxiety among Americans, Indians, and Chinese about peace and stability in the region. The greatest tensions exist in the China-Japan relationship, but there is not a feeling that the problems between the countries cannot be resolved. The role of the United States as an important player in the region is not in doubt, and while there is not a great deal of trust between countries, there is strong desire to work together to resolve regional and global challenges.

- While both Indians and Chinese favor taking an active role in world affairs and clearly view their countries as important and rising powers, they appear to be focused on threats and concerns closer to home than on traditional big-power concerns.

- Bilateral relations are seen as improving—China and India with the United States, India and China with each other, and India with Japan. Only in the case of China’s relations with Japan is the picture more negative.

- All countries view their relationships with the others as partnerships rather than rivalries except for the U.S.-China relationship, which is seen by small margins as a rivalry, and the unambiguous rivalry between China and Japan.

- Despite some tension between China and the United States, Chinese say relations with the United States are improving, and Americans say China is more important to the United States than Japan.

- Chinese and Indians both see the United States as more important than Japan (in China’s case) and China (in India’s case) to their respective countries.

- Trust is low between these countries in terms of acting responsibly in the world, keeping commitments, and taking into account other’s interests. However, all nations favor working together to reduce competition for energy resources, stop the spread of nuclear weapons to countries in Asia, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, among others.
Regional Troublespots

Potential conflicts between China and Taiwan, India and Pakistan, and North and South Korea do not generate great concern among most respondents in this study.

- Relatively small numbers of Americans, Indians, South Koreans, and Australians view the China-Taiwan conflict as a critical threat. A solid majority of Americans oppose using U.S. troops to defend Taiwan.

- A slim majority of Indians do consider tensions between India and Pakistan to be a critical threat, though no other country surveyed does. Americans do not favor the use of U.S. troops as part of an international force to keep peace between the two countries.

- The threat on the Korean Peninsula is also not seen by large numbers of people as a critical threat or potential source of conflict in the future, even among South Koreans themselves. In fact, concern among South Koreans about the threat from North Korea has declined from 2004. Nearly three-quarters of South Koreans believe the conflict can be resolved through diplomatic pressure on North Korea.

Part III: Addressing Global Challenges

Nuclear Proliferation

- Majorities in the United States, Australia, and India consider the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers as a critical threat. One-half of South Koreans and less than one-third of Chinese are of the same opinion. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is considered a very important foreign policy goal by a majority in all these countries.

- Americans, Chinese, South Koreans, and Indians support participation in the treaty that prohibits nuclear weapon test explosions worldwide and in the agreement on inspections under the treaty banning biological weapons.

- Americans and Chinese are against the deal to sell civilian nuclear technology to India, while a plurality of Indians are for it.

- Americans and Indians believe a country should have the right to go to war with another country if it has strong evidence the country is acquiring weapons of mass destruction that might be used against it in the future. South Koreans do not believe countries should have this right and Chinese are divided. However, respondents in all these countries agree that the United Nations has the right to authorize force to prevent a country from acquiring nuclear weapons.

- Americans, Chinese, and Indians also agree that nuclear weapons should only be used in response to a nuclear attack.

The Case of Iran

- All countries surveyed believe Iran is trying to produce nuclear weapons.

- Americans, Chinese, and Indians say they would support a U.S. military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities only if the United Nations authorizes it and other allies participate. However, majorities in all three countries prefer nonmilitary approaches, including economic sanctions (Americans) and diplomatic efforts (Chinese, Indians).

Environment and Epidemic Diseases

- Global warming is a big concern in all countries surveyed, with South Koreans and Australians showing the greatest sense of alarm. Only small percentages believe the evidence for global warming is so weak that no action with economic costs should be taken. Americans, Australians, and Chinese agree that action should be taken now even if it involves substantial economic costs. Indians prefer to take a lower-cost, more gradual approach.
• Concern about the threat of AIDS, avian flu, and other potential epidemics is very high in Asian countries surveyed, especially China, where it is the top threat. Americans are the least concerned, with less than one-half seeing this as a critical threat.

Energy

• Disruption in energy supply ranks near the top of the list of critical threats in all countries surveyed except India. Securing adequate supplies of energy is also considered a very important foreign policy goal by majorities in all these countries.

• Americans, South Koreans, Chinese, and Indians say competition over vital energy resources like oil and gas will be a somewhat or very likely source of conflict between major powers in Asia in the future. Large majorities in the United States, China, and India also say it is somewhat or very important that their countries work together to reduce competition over energy resources.

• Nevertheless, Chinese and Indians think countries should have the right to go to war with another country to preserve access to vital resources such as energy. Americans are split on the issue.

Economic Security, Globalization, and Trade

• Protecting jobs is a very high concern in all countries surveyed.

• Globalization is seen as mostly good by majorities in all countries surveyed. Majorities saying this in China and South Korea are extremely high, while the majority in India is small. Americans and Australians fall in between.

• Majorities in all countries surveyed think international trade is good for their countries’ economies, consumers, companies, and their own standards of living. While Chinese, Indians, and South Koreans also think international trade is good for creating jobs in their countries and for job security for their countries’ workers, Americans clearly think trade is bad for both.

• Very strong majorities of Americans and Chinese favor including minimum standards for working conditions as part of international trade agreements, as does a smaller majority of Indians.

• The trading practices of China and the United States are generally seen as unfair. India is generally seen as practicing fair trade.

• Americans, Chinese, and Indians (to a lesser extent) favor complying with adverse WTO rulings. South Koreans are against compliance.

• Support is generally high in Asia for free trade agreements with other countries. Chinese, South Koreans, and Indians all support agreements with the United States and each other (where asked) as well as Japan. Americans, however, oppose free trade agreements with all except Japan, where a plurality are in favor.

• Strong majorities of Chinese and South Koreans support an East Asian free trade area including China, Japan, and South Korea.

• Majorities of Chinese and Indians think there will be greater economic integration among Asian countries in the future. Pluralities in both countries also think there will be political integration similar to what is occurring among European countries.

Human Rights

• Americans, Chinese, Indians, and South Koreans think the UN Security Council should have the right to authorize force to prevent severe human rights violations such as genocide. All agree further that the UN Security Council has the responsibility to intervene in countries where severe human rights violations such as genocide may be occurring and that it has at least the right if not the responsibility to intervene in the Darfur region of the Sudan (not asked in South Korea).
Chinese and Americans believe rules against torture should be maintained, while a plurality of Indians think governments should now be allowed to use torture if it may gain information that saves innocent lives.

Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations is the lowest-ranking foreign policy goal in all countries where the question was asked (the United States, India, South Korea, and Australia).

**Multilateralism and the Use of Force**

All countries except South Korea, where opinion is split, think their countries should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations even if they have to go along with a policy that is not their first choice. Majorities in all countries also favor steps to strengthen the United Nations, including giving it the power to regulate the international arms trade, having a standing UN peacekeeping force, giving it authority to go into countries to investigate human rights violations, and creating an international marshals service that could arrest leaders responsible for genocide.

Asian nations surveyed all have generally warm feelings toward the international organizations asked about. However, India’s feelings toward ASEAN and APEC are on the cool side, as are American feelings toward the World Bank, multinational corporations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Court. Chinese have the warmest feelings toward international organizations overall.

Support among countries for participation in international agreements is strong. In every case in which an agreement is asked about, respondents favor participation.

Support is also strong for multilateral uses of force through the United Nations. In addition to the case of genocide discussed above, there is support for the UN Security Council authorizing force to stop a country from supporting terrorist groups, to defend a country that has been attacked, and to prevent a country from acquiring nuclear weapons. All but South Koreans support the UN Security Council having the right to authorize the use of force to prevent a country that does not have nuclear weapons from producing nuclear fuel that could be used to produce nuclear weapons.

All countries surveyed also support the right of a country right to go to war if another country attacks it first, to maintain territorial integrity, and if it has evidence that it is in imminent danger of being attacked. All but South Koreans support the right to go to war to stop a neighboring country from supporting an insurgency within their own country.
The United States today faces many foreign policy challenges, including international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, conflict in the Middle East, the rising economic and political power of Asia, economic competition from abroad, and threats to energy supplies and the environment. Yet with 142,000 troops committed on the ground in Iraq and almost daily news stories of raging violence, the Iraq war has been the dominant foreign affairs story since The Chicago Council’s last study in 2004. The controversy surrounding the war, the most significant U.S. international military engagement since the Vietnam War, continues to heat up.

Some observers have expected the U.S. experience in Iraq, including the growing number of U.S. casualties, to weaken Americans’ willingness to remain engaged internationally, causing them to turn inward in a new isolationism. Others have expected that the continuing threat of terrorist attacks might make the public ready to lash out, adopting an aggressive posture toward the world based on the unilateral use of military force. Our study shows that neither is the case. Despite such negative judgments about U.S. engagement in Iraq, Americans’ general foreign policy attitudes, including their views of critical threats, foreign policy goals, and other policy preferences, have not been much impacted.

This is confirmed most broadly on the time-honored barometer of internationalism: the question of whether Americans believe it would be best for the future of the country if we take an “active part” in world affairs rather than “stay out” of world affairs. Since World War II about two-thirds of the public has generally said the United States should take an active part in world affairs, except for a drop in the 1970s and early 1980s following the Vietnam War.

A majority of Americans react quite negatively to questions about the Iraq experience (see Figure I-1). When asked whether they agree or disagree that the threat of terrorism has been reduced by the war, 61% disagree (35% agree). Sixty-four percent also disagree that the war will lead to the spread of democracy in the Middle East (32% agree). Sixty-six percent of the public agree that the war has worsened America’s relations with the Muslim world and that the experience of the Iraq war should make nations more cautious about using military force to deal with rogue states.

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**The U.S. Global Role**

**Steady Internationalism**

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**Part I: The U.S. Worldview**

The United States today faces many foreign policy challenges, including international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, conflict in the Middle East, the rising economic and political power of Asia, economic competition from abroad, and threats to energy supplies and the environment. Yet with 142,000 troops committed on the ground in Iraq and almost daily news stories of raging violence, the Iraq war has been the dominant foreign affairs story since The Chicago Council’s last study in 2004. The controversy surrounding the war, the most significant U.S. international military engagement since the Vietnam War, continues to heat up.

Some observers have expected the U.S. experience in Iraq, including the growing number of U.S. casualties, to weaken Americans’ willingness to remain engaged internationally, causing them to turn inward in a new isolationism. Others have expected that the continuing threat of terrorist attacks might make the public ready to lash out, adopting an aggressive posture toward the world based on the unilateral use of military force. Our study shows that neither is the case. Despite the dominance of the Iraq war in the headlines, Americans have not wavered from their long-held commitment to international engagement on a range of important issues, nor have they abandoned their sense of restraint on the use of U.S. power and influence, favoring cooperative and multilateral rather than unilateral foreign policies.
war, when support for an active role reached a low point of 54% in 1982 (see Figure I-2). In 2006, 69% of Americans say we should take an active part in world affairs rather than stay out of world affairs, statistically the same as the 67% who said so in 2004.

While Americans remain committed to international engagement, 75% of Americans say the United States does not have the responsibility to play the role of world policeman, that is, to fight violations of international law and aggression wherever they occur (only 22% favor such a role). This is also statistically indistinguishable from opinion in 2004, when 76% were against the United States being the world’s policeman and 20% were for it.

Today, 76% agree that the United States is playing the role of world policeman more than it should be. In 2004, before much of the bad news from Iraq, an even higher 80% said that the United States was playing the policeman more than it should.

Similarly, the American public’s general preference for a multilateral approach to foreign policy has not been at all affected by the Iraq war. Seventy-five percent say the United States should do its share to solve international problems together with other countries, rejecting the idea that the United States, as the sole remaining superpower, should continue to be the preeminent world leader in solving international problems (just 10% favor this view) or that the United States should withdraw from most efforts to solve international problems (only 12% favor this). In 2004 a very similar 78% preferred to solve problems with other countries, and 79% said this in 2002, before the invasion of Iraq.

Perceptions of World Influence and the Rise of Asia

While few Americans want to be the preeminent leader in solving world problems, they still see themselves as the world’s leading power and prefer it to stay that way. Asked to rate how much influence various countries have in the world on a scale of zero to ten, they give the United States an average rating of 8.5, well above the 6.7 rating for Great Britain, the next highest rating given (see Figure I-3). China and Japan are seen as having the next
highest level of global influence, both at an average of 6.4, with the European Union next at 6.0. Russia, Germany, France, and India are seen as having relatively less influence.

When asked how much influence Americans want countries to have on the same ten-point scale, they put the United States clearly on top, giving it an 8.2 average rating (see Figure I-3). This time, however, Japan and the European Union are next in line (Britain was not asked about), though well below the United States, at 5.8 and 5.7, respectively. Americans want China to have significantly less influence (4.6) than they think it has now (6.4).

This desire for the United States to maintain its leading world position is reflected in the 55% of Americans who see maintaining superior military power worldwide as a very important foreign policy goal. About one-half (49% to 46%) even say that the United States should make “active efforts” to ensure that no other country becomes a superpower. This is similar to results in 2004 (52% in favor of active efforts and 41% against), though it does show a slight move against making active efforts to ensure no other country becomes a superpower.

Looking forward, however, Americans are well aware that the world balance of power is changing. Average ratings on the ten-point scale of how much world influence various countries will have ten years from now indicate that Americans expect drops in U.S. and British power and rises in the influence of China and India. They see China as overtaking both Britain and Japan to occupy second place in world influence after the United States (see Figure I-3).

In fact, 60% of Americans believe that China’s economy will grow to be as large as the U.S. economy within two decades or so. With China presumably in mind, only 40% of Americans foresee that in the next fifty years the United States will continue to be the world’s leading power; most say that either another nation will become as powerful as the United States (39%) or that the United States will be surpassed in power by another nation (16%).

Most Americans’ reactions to the rise of China are restrained and nuanced. Americans distinguish clearly between rising Chinese economic power, with which they are generally comfortable, and increased military or geopolitical power, about which many are uneasy or alarmed. Americans’ overall feelings toward China are rather cool, averaging just 40 degrees on a 100-degree “feeling thermometer,” where 50 is neutral. This is down 4 degrees since 2004, though not too different from their feelings toward Indonesia (a 41-degree average rating), South Korea (44 degrees), or India (46 degrees). While slightly more Americans think the United States and China are mostly rivals than mostly partners, most favor friendly cooperation and engagement with China, and most say they want to work together with China and India on solving a number of specific problems (see Part II, The Rise of China, for a further discussion of views toward China).

**Threats to U.S. Interests**

While there is clearly some concern among Americans about China, the threat of China’s rise as a world power ranks low compared to concern about other threats facing the United States. When Americans are asked about a list of possible threats
to the vital interests of the United States in the next ten years, the threats of international terrorism and of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers continue to be viewed as the most “critical” threats (see Figure I-4). Fully 97% and 96% of the public, respectively, see those threats as at least “important,” if not critical, with only 2% and 3% saying they are “not important” threats at all. International terrorism has topped the list of critical threats in each Council survey since 1998, even before 9/11, while the threat of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers has been at or near the top since it was first asked in 1984 and is up 5 percentage points since the 2004 survey. Overall, the level of alarm about these issues has remained relatively stable since 2004, after having risen in 2002 in the aftermath of 9/11 and then dropping back dramatically in 2004.

New to the list and also generating relatively high concern is disruption in energy supplies, with 59% considering this a critical threat. The only other threat that a majority of Americans consider critical is large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the United States (51%).

The biggest changes from the Chicago Council’s last study in 2004 are the nine-point drop in concern about the threat of AIDS, avian flu, and other potential epidemics (from 58% to 49% critical) and the nine-point rise in concern about global warming (from 37% to 46% critical). The latter reflects increasing concern about the environment evident across the study (see The Environment, page 28). Concern about Islamic fundamentalism is also on the rise, up 5 percentage points to 43%, though nowhere near its 2002 high in the aftermath of 9/11.

By contrast, the rise of China as a world power is viewed as a critical threat by only 36% of Americans, only slightly higher than concern about the threat of economic competition from “low-wage countries” (32% critical), which is low and dropping. Americans are even less concerned about the threat of economic competition specifically from Asian countries, with only 24% viewing this as critical. Strikingly, the other possible threats asked about, all emanating from Asia, also do not greatly alarm Americans. Instability and conflict on the Korean Peninsula is viewed as a critical threat

### Figure I-4 – Critical Threats to U.S. Vital Interests

*Percentage who see each of the following as a critical threat to U.S. vital interests in the next ten years.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International terrorism</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disruption in energy supply</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the U.S.</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS, avian flu, and other potential epidemics</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global warming</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic fundamentalism</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instability and conflict on the Korean Peninsula</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The development of China as a world power</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic competition from low-wage countries</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic competition from Asian countries</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A confrontation between mainland China and Taiwan</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tensions between India and Pakistan</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
by 38% of Americans, generating the most concern. But a confrontation between mainland China and Taiwan is seen as a critical threat by just 18% of Americans, and tensions between India and Pakistan, two of the world’s newest nuclear powers, is seen as a critical threat by only 17%.

Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy

Given the continued concern about threats from around the world, Americans show no sign of turning away from international engagement by downgrading foreign policy goals. Instead, higher proportions of the public now attribute great importance to ten of the twelve goals that were included in the 2004 survey (see Figure I-5). The biggest changes in those goals considered “very important” are for maintaining superior military power worldwide (up 5 percentage points), combating world hunger (up 5 points), and, especially, improving the global environment (up 7 points.) Some of the other changes are small and would not be statistically significant on their own, but the overall pattern is unmistakable.

Consistent with the perceptions of threats to U.S. interests, two of the top-ranked goals are preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (called a very important goal by 74%) and combating international terrorism (called very important by 72%). These goals have placed at or near the top of the list in every Chicago Council survey in which they were included. Securing adequate supplies of energy is also called very important by 72%, up 3 points since 2004 and consistent with concerns about disruption of energy supplies.

Topping all of these, however, is the goal of protecting the jobs of American workers (76% call this very important), despite the relatively low placement of economic competition from low-wage countries and from Asian countries on the list of perceived threats to U.S. vital interests. Job protection for American workers has long been a hot-button issue, appearing at or near the top of this list in every Council survey for more than two decades.

Figure I-5 – U.S. Foreign Policy Goals

Percentage who think the following should be a very important foreign policy goal of United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Change from 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protecting the jobs of American workers</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combating international terrorism</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securing adequate supplies of energy</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting economic growth</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling and reducing illegal immigration</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining superior military power worldwide</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving the global environment</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combating world hunger</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the United Nations</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting and defending human rights in other countries</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The fact that it again outranks combating terrorism as a goal of U.S. foreign policy highlights concern about economic security. Indeed, not far behind are promoting economic growth (62% very important) and controlling and reducing illegal immigration (58% very important). Concerns about job security are also evident in responses to questions about international trade (see *International Trade*, pages 23-24).

The other two goals deemed very important by a majority of Americans are maintaining superior military power worldwide (55%) and improving the global environment (54%), both of which, as mentioned, have moved up since 2004. Strengthening the United Nations is a very important goal for 40% of Americans, up 2 points from 2004, but still relatively low historically in these surveys.

Humanitarian goals have never had the highest priority among Americans, with the possible exception of combating world hunger, which is called very important by a substantial 48%. But the goals of promoting and defending human rights in other countries, protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression, and helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries are considered very important goals by only 28%, 22%, and 22%, respectively. At the very bottom of the list, despite much official rhetoric about spreading democracy abroad, comes the goal of helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations, which a bare 17% of Americans call very important. Ratings of democracy promotion as a very important goal dropped sharply (by 10 percentage points) between 2002 and 2004 after the invasion of Iraq; they may now have rebounded a bit but remain near the 2004 floor of just 14% saying very important.

Still, a focus on “very important” responses should not obscure the fact that large majorities of Americans see all these humanitarian goals as at least “somewhat important.” Fully 87% consider protecting weaker nations against aggression to be at least somewhat important; 86% say the same thing about protecting human rights; 82% about improving standards of living; and 74% call even democracy promotion at least a somewhat important goal.

**International Engagement**

**Multilateralism and the United Nations**

Most Americans want to pursue their foreign policy goals chiefly through cooperative and multilateral means, with a large role for the United Nations. Most apparently believe that the advantages of multilateralism—burden sharing, increased legitimacy and effectiveness—generally outweigh the disadvantages of diminished sovereignty. Even so, Americans appear willing to take unilateral action if necessary in cases where they believe the stakes are high.

A solid majority of Americans (60%) agree that when dealing with international problems, the United States should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations even if this means that the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice. Only 36% disagree. This willingness to accept constraints
on U.S. action also extends to other arenas. An even larger majority (73%) says that if another country files a complaint with the World Trade Organization and it rules against the United States, as a general rule, the United States should comply with that decision. Just 22% say the United States should not comply with the decision (see Figure I-6).

Substantial majorities of Americans favor U.S. participation in a broad range of international treaties and agreements (see Figure I-7), including several that have been rejected by U.S. decision makers. Public support for these treaties, which demonstrate commitment to international cooperation, has generally remained steady since the 2002
and 2004 surveys, except for a 6 percentage point dip in support for the International Criminal Court that still leaves 71% in favor of it.

As noted, 40% of Americans say that strengthening the United Nations should be a very important goal of U.S. foreign policy, and a total of 79% say this should be at least a somewhat important goal. Very large majorities favor specific steps to strengthen the United Nations (see Figure I-10): giving the United Nations authority to go into countries in order to investigate violations of human rights (75%); creating an international marshals service that could arrest leaders responsible for genocide (75%); and having a standing UN peacekeeping force selected, trained, and commanded by the United Nations (72%).

A lower but solid majority of Americans (60%) favor giving the United Nations the power to regulate the international arms trade. A substantial number—though no longer a plurality—even favors the dramatic step of giving the United Nations the power to fund its activities by imposing a small tax on such things as the international sale of arms or oil (45%). U.S. officials have a long history of opposing the United Nations having direct taxing power, regulatory power over the arms trade, or a standing peacekeeping force, despite the provisions pointing in that direction in Articles 43, 45, and 47 of the UN Charter.

Majorities of Americans favor expanding the permanent membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to include new world powers and developing countries, even though such expansion would dilute U.S. influence at the United Nations. A solid
66% favor Security Council membership for Japan (29% oppose); 62% favor adding Germany (32% oppose); 53% are for India (42% oppose); and 52% favor adding Brazil. Of the countries asked about, only South Africa (45% pro, 48% con) fails to win majority support for membership in the UNSC. Other countries are generally less enthusiastic about such expansion, except that India wants to include itself on the Security Council (see Figure II-17).

Controversies over the United Nations’ performance and disagreements within the organization over U.S. policy on Iraq appear to have dampened some aspects of support for the United Nations. Between 2004 and 2006 the average thermometer rating for the United Nations dipped by 2 degrees, support for more joint decision making within the organization fell by 6 percentage points, and support for strengthening the United Nations by having a standing peacekeeping force went down 4 percentage points. On the other hand, the proportions of Americans calling the goal of strengthening the United Nations very important and favoring UN power to regulate the international arms trade rose by 2 and 3 points, respectively. Overall, the study shows that support for the UN remains solid.

Military Capability and the Use of Force

Just as Americans have maintained a broad commitment to international engagement in the face of frustration in Iraq, the Iraq war has not altered their commitment to a strong military presence around the world and the willingness to use force—multilaterally where possible, but unilaterally when necessary. They are most supportive of using U.S. troops for humanitarian purposes and to defend themselves against what they consider the biggest threats: nuclear proliferation and terrorism.1 As in the past, Americans are considerably more reluctant to use troops in most other situations.

In keeping with the 55% of Americans who say that maintaining superior military power worldwide should be a very important goal of U.S. foreign policy, most Americans (53%) believe the United States should continue to have about as many long-term military bases overseas as it has now. Twenty-seven percent want fewer bases and only 15% want more bases. More specifically, majorities or pluralities of Americans favor having bases in eight of nine locations asked about, including Saudi Arabia, where we do not presently have a base (see Figure I-11). Only in the case of Pakistan does a plurality of Americans oppose having long-term U.S. bases.

Support for bases in several locations has risen since 2004, including Iraq (up 7 percentage points), Japan (up 5), Afghanistan (up 5), and Pakistan (up 4). Only in the case of Guantanamo Bay, where controversy over the treatment of suspected terrorist prisoners has led to calls for closing the base, has there been a drop in support—by a modest 4 percentage points.

While the majority of Americans generally want the number of military bases to stay the same, there is a slight “tilt” of opinion toward fewer rather than more bases. As mentioned, a mere 15% favor more, while 27% want fewer. Moreover, when reminded that the United States currently has about 30,000

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1. The willingness to use U.S. troops against terrorist threats is based on past Chicago Council surveys.
troops in South Korea, 42% of Americans say this is too many troops rather than too few (10%), with 42% saying this is about right. Similarly, while 57% say they want the U.S. military presence in Asia maintained at its present level, more want it to be decreased (30%) than increased (8%). On balance, few Americans want an increased military presence abroad, but most favor maintaining a substantial presence.

Majorities of Americans also continue to support the use of U.S. troops abroad in various circumstances (see Figure I-12). The highest proportions of the public favor troop use for humanitarian operations: to stop a government from committing genocide and killing large numbers of its own people (71%), to deal with humanitarian crises (66%), and to be part of an international peacekeeping force to stop the killing in Darfur (65%, see also Justice and Human Rights, page 29).

The public may assume, however, that these humanitarian operations are likely to cost little and involve few U.S. casualties. When it comes to more intensive and risky uses of force, only nuclear threats from unfriendly powers and threats from international terrorism\(^2\) generally win substantial public support for unilateral—or at least not explicitly multilateral—action. As Figure I-12 indicates, a remarkable 62% of Americans express a readiness to consider using U.S. troops to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. But as discussed later (see page 28 in Nuclear Proliferation), this appears to be conditional on getting UN approval and on the participation of allies.

In more traditional security situations, a majority of Americans favors using U.S. troops in only one situation they were asked about: if Iran attacked Israel. Even this only generates a rather narrow, 53%
to 42% majority in favor of troop use. Pluralities or majorities oppose troop use if North Korea invaded South Korea, to ensure the oil supply (this has dropped 9 points since 2004), or especially if China invaded Taiwan. The unpopularity of promoting democracy by force is indicated by the large, 66% to 29% majority of Americans who oppose using U.S. troops to install democratic governments in states where dictators rule.

Americans’ lack of support for troop use in many of these scenarios appears to be influenced by the implication of unilateral U.S. action in questions that do not explicitly mention the generally preferred multilateral approach. For example, in the scenario of North Korea attacking South Korea, the plurality opposition noted above to U.S. troop use switches to strong support—by 65% of the public, with just 30% opposed—if the action is clearly stated to be multilateral, i.e., if the United States contributes military forces, “together with other countries, to a UN-sponsored effort to reverse the aggression.” Past Chicago Council surveys have found a similar, roughly 20 percentage-point jump in public support for troop use in various invasion scenarios when the action is specified to be multilateral.

Americans are very reluctant to use nuclear weapons. When asked to choose one of three options for using them, only 20% embrace the official U.S. policy that in certain circumstances the United States should use nuclear weapons even if it has not suffered a nuclear attack. A solid majority of the public (58%) say that the United States should only use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack, and an additional 20% say that the United States should never use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

**Economics and Trade**

**International Trade**

Americans support globalization overall, but their feelings about international trade are somewhat mixed. They believe that several major trading partners practice unfair trade. They judge that trade is good for U.S. consumers and the U.S. economy, but bad for job creation and job security in the United States. Americans put a very high priority on the foreign policy goal of protecting the jobs of American workers. They favor agreements to lower trade barriers only when there are protections for U.S. workers.

As we have seen, neither economic competition from low-wage countries nor economic competition from Asian countries is viewed as much of a threat to U.S. interests. When asked about globalization, especially the increasing connections of our economy with others around the world, a solid 60% of the public say globalization is mostly good for the United States, while only 35% say it is mostly bad. Majorities say that, overall, international trade is good (rather than bad) for consumers like them (70%), their own standard of living (64%), the U.S. economy (54%), and American companies (52%, see Figure I-13). The latter two majorities are narrow, however, and that for American companies has dropped by 7 percentage points since 2004.

Trade, however, is seen as having disadvantages as well. About half of Americans (49%) say that, overall, international trade is bad for the environment; 46% say it is good. A solid 60% say trade is bad for creating jobs in the United States, with only

![Figure I-13 – International Trade](image-url)
37% saying it is good. An even larger 67% say trade is bad for the job security of American workers. Outsourcing, described as moving jobs to countries where wages are lower, arouses heavy opposition. When asked to choose one of two options as closer to their view about outsourcing, only 21% say outsourcing is mostly a good thing because it results in lower prices in the United States, which helps stimulate the economy and create new jobs. By contrast, 72% feel that outsourcing is mostly a bad thing because American workers lose their jobs to people in other countries.

While Americans have concerns about some aspects of trade and globalization, they do not find these concerns overwhelming. They do not favor protectionism through tariff barriers. Instead, most Americans favor measures to mitigate some of the negative effects of trade such as the loss of jobs. Asked to choose one of three arguments that comes closest to their view about lowering trade barriers such as tariffs, only 36% pick the protectionist response, opposing agreements to lower trade barriers. But an even lower 15% would lower trade barriers without government programs to help workers who lose their jobs. A plurality (43%, down 5 points from 2004), however, favors agreements to lower trade barriers provided the government has programs to help workers who lose their jobs.

An overwhelming majority of Americans also think that countries that are part of international trade agreements should (93%) rather than should not (5%) be required to maintain minimum standards for working conditions. This response probably represents a mix of both humanitarian and economic considerations, aimed at preventing the exploitation of foreign workers as well as unfair advantage from low-wage or exploited workers in other countries. An overwhelming majority also believes that trade agreements should have minimum standards for protection of the environment.

Historically, Americans have been very concerned about the trade practices of some of the United States’ most vigorous economic competitors. In both 1990 and 1994, for example, Chicago Council surveys found 71% of the public saying that Japan practiced unfair trade, with only 17% saying trade with Japan at the time was fair. As Japan’s economic potency has diminished, however, the proportion of Americans saying Japan practice unfair trade has dropped markedly to just 35% in 2004 and 2006.

At present, several vigorous, competitive exporters to the United States—Mexico, India, and especially China—are seen as practicing unfair trade by pluralities or majorities of Americans—by 49%, 47%, and 58%, respectively. Sentiment is evenly divided on South Korea. Solid and in some cases very large majorities believe that our traditional, developed-country trade partners are practicing fair trade: Canada (77%), Australia (73%), the EU (63%), and, as mentioned, now Japan (54%).

Perhaps because of these perceptions of unfair trade, the idea of signing free trade agreements that would lower barriers such as tariffs with certain countries does not generate much enthusiasm from the American public. Majorities oppose such an agreement with China (56% to 34%), India (54% to 36%), and South Korea (50% to 39%). A plurality, on the other hand, favors such a trade agreement in the case of Japan (47% to 43%).

There is also some unease about foreign investment in the United States. When asked whether companies from each of five different countries should or should not generally be allowed to purchase a controlling interest in American companies, majorities of the public in every case say they should not: China (71%), South Korea (67%), India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country as a leader in innovation</th>
<th>Now</th>
<th>In ten years</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>+0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>+0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>+0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>+0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>+0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Americans are evenly divided over whether American companies should generally be allowed to purchase a controlling interest in companies from China, South Korea, or India, while slim majorities say it is alright for American companies to purchase a controlling interest in companies from EU countries (55%) or Japan (51%).

Americans appear to recognize that other countries are gaining on the United States in product innovation (see Figure I-14). Asked to indicate how much of a leader various countries are at present in developing new products and technologies, the average respondent puts the United States firmly in the lead (with a 7.6 mean rating), ahead of Japan (6.9) and way ahead of China (5.5), Germany (5.3), India (3.8), and South Korea (3.8). Looking ahead ten years from now, the United States is still seen as in the lead (7.3 mean rating), but by a diminished margin over other countries. Japan moves up 0.1 to 7.0; China moves up a substantial 0.6 to 6.1; and India (4.6), Germany (5.6), and South Korea (4.5) are up 0.8, 0.3, and 0.7, respectively.

Immigration

Worries about immigration are a high priority for many Americans. The threat of large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the United States has in recent years been seen as “critical” (as opposed to important but not critical or not important at all) by a majority of Americans. In 2006 a majority (51%) views it as critical, enough to put immigration in fourth place on the threat list. The foreign policy goal of controlling and reducing illegal immigration, too, has regularly been called very important by many Americans—by 58% in 2006, placing it sixth among fourteen goals.

Research using past Chicago Council data has indicated that three distinct factors contribute to Americans’ concerns about immigration. One is a belief that immigration—particularly by low-wage workers—tends to drive down Americans’ wages and undermine their job security. A second factor involves cultural anxieties, or unease about the presence in American schools and neighborhoods of people from countries like Mexico who may act differently or speak a foreign language. The third factor, a new one, is the belief that immigration can allow terrorists like the 9/11 attackers to infiltrate the United States. Job worries, concerns about terrorism, and cultural anxieties each independently affect Americans’ attitudes about immigration, with the former two having the biggest effects.

Despite these worries, however, a majority of Americans (52%) do not want the level of legal immigration into the United States to be decreased, with 39% saying it should be kept at the same and 13% saying it should be increased (see Figure I-15). A substantial number, though not the majority, think legal immigration should be decreased (46%). Indeed, the number who want to keep it the same has increased by 8 percentage points since 2004, while the number of those who want to decrease it has dropped by the same amount. When responses are broken down by party, a majority of Republicans (52%)—substantially more than the 38% of Democrats—say that immigration should be decreased. Yet contrary to a good deal of conventional wisdom, the majority of Americans do not support a total cutoff or even a reduction in legal immigration into the United States.

Global Challenges

Nuclear Proliferation

Americans are very concerned about nuclear proliferation. A large majority (69%) call the threat of unfriendly nations becoming nuclear powers a critical threat to the vital interests of the United States, making it the second highest-ranking threat. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is called a very important goal of U.S. foreign policy by 74%, making it the second highest-ranking foreign policy goal. Americans are also willing to take action to prevent proliferation, including using military force.

A large majority of Americans oppose the U.S. agreement to authorize civilian nuclear cooperation with India in return for India allowing inspections of some of its nuclear power plants by the UN’s nuclear agency. When asked to choose one of two arguments about the merits of this agreement, 71% of Americans say that selling India civilian nuclear technology is a bad idea because it will suggest to other countries that they can develop nuclear weapons and get away with it. Only 24% endorse the argument that selling civilian nuclear technology to India is a good idea because it will strengthen U.S.-India relations and contribute to peace and stability in Asia.

In addition to limiting the sale of nuclear technology, Americans are also receptive to the new idea of regulating the development of nuclear fuel. When told about the proposal to not allow certain countries to develop nuclear fuel out of concern that they will use it to develop nuclear weapons (as opposed to giving all countries the right to produce nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes, as the international community has agreed to in the past), a solid 66% of Americans say this proposal is a good idea, with only 31% saying it is a bad idea.

Most significantly, Americans favor sweeping international authority to enforce nonproliferation. Sixty-two percent (with 33% opposed) say that the UN Security Council should have the right to authorize the use of military force to prevent a country that does not have nuclear weapons from acquiring them. This has dropped 8 percentage points since 2004, but still leaves a solid majority of Americans favoring the UNSC having this power.

Sixty percent of Americans (with 36% opposed) even say that countries, on their own, should have the right to go to war with another country they believe may pose a threat to them if they have strong evidence that the other country is acquiring weapons of mass destruction that could be used against them at some point in the future (see Figure I-16)—a belief that may be influenced
by the action against Iraq that was undertaken on this basis. Naturally, many more Americans (90% and 79%, respectively) favor the well-established right of a country to go to war if another country attacks it first, or if it has strong evidence that it is in imminent danger of being attacked by the other country.

To be sure, believing countries have the “right” to go to war does not necessarily imply support for acting on that right. But the solid majority that says countries should have the right to go to war without any imminent threat (simply because weapons could be used against them at some point in the future) indicates just how strongly Americans fear weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. Support for the right to go to war in those circumstances is substantially higher than for stopping neighboring countries from supporting an insurgency within their own country (50%) or to preserve access to vital resources such as energy (47%).

Americans’ anxieties about nuclear proliferation appear to focus on Iran and North Korea, both of which have been characterized in the media and by U.S. officials as rogue states with potential or actual nuclear weapons programs that could directly threaten the United States. Americans feel very cold toward both countries. Iran, with a frigid 21-degree average rating on the feeling thermometer, and North Korea at 23 degrees (down a substantial 5 degrees from the already cold 28-degree rating of 2004), are the countries most disliked by Americans among the fourteen countries in the survey (see Figure I-9).

Americans have little doubt that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program (see Figure I-17). When asked whether Iran, which announced that it has successfully enriched uranium, is producing
enriched uranium strictly to fuel its energy needs or to try to develop nuclear weapons, an overwhelming majority of Americans (80%) say they think Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons. Only 16% say the uranium is for Iran's energy needs. This perception arouses considerable worry. When asked how much, if at all, it would concern them if Iran were to develop nuclear weapons, 63% say “very much” and 24% say “somewhat,” with only 9% saying “a little” and 3% “not at all.”

Americans are ready to consider using military force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Presented a number of different circumstances that might justify troop use, 62% said they would favor the use of U.S. troops to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

But it appears that, at least at this point, Americans are only ready to consider doing so as part of a multilateral effort. When asked to consider directly the possibility of the United States undertaking a military strike against Iran’s nuclear energy facilities, just 18% say the United States should undertake a military strike even if the U.S. has to act on its own. Fifty-eight percent say the United States should undertake a military strike, but only if the United Nations authorizes the strike and other allies participate; 20% oppose a military strike altogether.

And it does not appear that even a multilateral military strike is Americans’ current preference. Told that the UN Security Council has asked Iran to stop enriching uranium and asked what the Security Council should do if Iran continues to enrich uranium, only 18% say it should authorize a military strike against Iran’s nuclear energy facilities, while 41% say the Security Council should impose economic sanctions on Iran and 35% say it should continue diplomatic efforts to get Iran to stop enriching uranium (3% say the Security Council should not pressure Iran at all).

The Environment

After a temporary dip in 2004, Americans’ concerns about the environment have rebounded. As we have seen, a large and sharply increased number of Americans (46%, up 9 percentage points since 2004) see global warming as a critical threat to the vital interests of the United States, raising it to the upper half of the list of international threats. Many Americans (54%, up 7 points since 2004) also say that improving the global environment should be a very important goal of U.S. foreign policy.

When asked to choose one of three arguments that comes closest to their view on what to do about global warming, only 17% of Americans say we should not take any steps that would have economic costs until we are sure that global warming is really a problem. Many more (43%) say that global warming is a serious and pressing problem and we should begin taking steps now even if this involves significant costs. Thirty-five percent agree that the problem of global warming should be addressed, but its effects will be gradual, so we can deal with the problem gradually by taking steps that are low in cost (see Figure I-18). Surveys conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) indicate that support for taking steps with “significant costs” has risen markedly, from 21% in 2004 to the current 43% found in this study. Similarly, a large majority of Americans (64%, with 32% opposed) say that the developed countries should provide substantial aid to less-developed countries if those countries make a commitment to limit their greenhouse gas emissions.

Americans’ general preference for multilateral solutions applies strongly to the environment, where “free-riding” countries could undermine efforts by individual nations. A total of 87% of the public say it is somewhat important (34%) or very important (53%) that the United States, China, and India work together on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Only 8% say it is not very important. Despite political controversy over the matter, a very large 70% of Americans—a proportion that has held almost exactly steady since 2002 and 2004—say the United States should participate in the Kyoto agreement to reduce global warming.

Americans concern for the environment is also reflected in attitudes about international trade. About half (49%) say that, overall, international trade is “bad” rather than “good” for the environment—
presumably because they have heard the argument that freer trade can prompt companies to move their manufacturing operations to countries with lower environmental standards—with 46% disagreeing. An overwhelming majority (91% to 5%) says that countries that are part of international trade agreements should be required to maintain minimum standards for protection of the environment.

Justice and Human Rights

Although promoting and defending human rights abroad does not rank anywhere near the top of Americans’ foreign policy goals (just 28% say it should be a very important goal), majorities of the public—often large majorities—favor a number of specific policies to advance human rights.

Many of these policies are multilateral. A very large majority of Americans (75%, with only 21% opposed) want to give the UN Security Council authority to go into countries in order to investigate violations of human rights. An overwhelming 83%, with only 13% opposed, say that the UNSC should have the right to authorize military force to prevent severe human rights violations such as genocide. Nearly as many, 72%, say that the UNSC should have not just the right but the responsibility to authorize the use of military force to protect people from severe human rights violations such as genocide, even against the will of their own government (just 22% disagree). When asked to choose between three options regarding the UNSC’s rights and responsibilities to authorize intervention in the Darfur region of Sudan, about one-half of Americans (48%) believe the UNSC has a responsibility to authorize intervention in the Darfur region of Sudan. Another 35% say the UNSC has the right but not the responsibility to authorize such an intervention.

Further, a substantial majority of Americans (71%, with just 25% opposed) favor the U.S. participating in the agreement on the International Criminal Court (ICC) that can try individuals for war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity if their own country won’t try them. Support for the ICC has dipped by 5 percentage points since 2004, but it remains at a high level among both Democrats and Republicans.

As mentioned, and contrary to conventional wisdom, large majorities of Americans favor the use of U.S. troops for several humanitarian purposes (see Figure I-12). Fully 71% favor (24% oppose) the use of U.S. troops to stop a government from committing genocide and killing large numbers of its own people. Nearly as many (66%, with 28% opposed) favor using U.S. troops to deal with humanitarian crises. Perhaps most significantly, 65% of Americans (with just 28% opposed) favor the use of U.S. troops to be part of an international peacekeeping force in Darfur.

Americans insist on observance of human rights by our own soldiers and by our legal system. Reminded that most countries have agreed to rules that prohibit torturing prisoners to extract information, but presented with an appealing argument for changing the rules—that terrorists pose such an extreme threat that governments should now be allowed to use torture if they may gain information that saves innocent lives—only 30% accept it. Two-thirds of the public (67%) say their view is
closer to the following argument: Rules against torture should be maintained because torture is morally wrong and weakening these rules may lead to the torture of U.S. soldiers who are held prisoner abroad.

Support for human rights at home and abroad does not, however, extend to spreading democracy abroad. Consistent with the very low priority given to the foreign policy goal of helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations, a decisive majority (66% to 29%) rejects using U.S. troops to install democratic governments in states where dictators rule. Although a moderate majority (57% to 38%) endorses the proposition that the UN Security Council should have the right to authorize the use of military force to restore by force a democratic government that has been overthrown, the level of support is lower than for any other type of UNSC authority that was asked about. Particularly after the Iraq experience, most Americans apparently prefer that countries evolve their own democratic political systems in their own time and in their own way (see the study “Americans on Promoting Democracy” by The Chicago Council and the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at www.thechicagocouncil.org).
### Red Versus Blue: Party Differences in the United States

On most foreign policy issues in this study, majorities of Americans from both the Republic and Democratic parties agree in their perspectives. Nevertheless, on some matters, large discrepancies in percentages are apparent between the two parties. While some of these differences represent fundamental disagreements over policy direction, in many cases there is still overall majority agreement.

#### The War in Iraq

While majorities from both parties agree that the Iraq war has worsened our relations with the Muslim world, this view is held by many more Democrats (77%) and Independents (69%) than Republicans (53%). Similarly, 75% of Democrats and 68% of Independents, compared to 55% of Republicans, agree that the war should make nations more cautious about using military force to deal with rogue states. Republicans are evenly divided on the idea that the war will lead to the spread of democracy in the Middle East (49% disagree, 48% agree), while Democrats strongly disagree (80%). A majority of Republicans agree that terrorism has been reduced by the war (55%), while 77% of Democrats and 60% of Independents (44% of Republicans) disagree.

#### Threats to U.S. Vital Interests

The same two threats to vital interests that receive the highest percentages as “critical” also receive the highest percentages among both Republicans and Democrats. The threat of international terrorism is seen as critical by 83% of Republicans and a lower, but still strong 74% of Democrats. Similarly, the threat of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers is seen as critical by 79% of Republicans and 68% of Democrats.

On immigration and global warming, however, partisan differences are substantial and have increased markedly since 2004. A significantly larger percentage of Republicans (63%) than Democrats (44%) see the threat of immigrants and refugees coming into the United States as critical. In contrast, 62% of Democrats compared to only 30% of Republicans see the threat of global warming as critical.

#### The United Nations

Some issues related to the United Nations evoke large differences in opinion between Republicans and Democrats. Seventy-one percent of Democrats but only 45% of Republicans say that the United States should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations. Many more Democrats (48%) than Republicans (28%) call the goal of strengthening the UN very important. Fifty-four percent of Democrats but only 35% of Republicans favor giving the UN power to fund its activities by imposing a small tax on the international sale of arms or oil. Nevertheless, majorities of Republicans and Democrats agree on many other issues despite some significant difference in numbers. Majorities of Republicans (64%) and Democrats (81%) favor the UN having a standing peacekeeping force, and a plurality of Republicans (50%) as well as a majority of Democrats (69%) favor UN regulation of the arms trade. Very large majorities of both Republicans (73%) and Democrats (77%) favor having a UN marshal service to arrest leaders responsible for genocide. And, 74% of Republicans and 78% of Democrats favor letting the UN go into countries to investigate violations of human rights.

#### The Military

The biggest partisan divisions on issues involving military capacity and troop use concern the goal of maintaining superior military power worldwide, which 73% of Republicans but only 45% of Democrats say should be “very important,” and the right of countries to go to war with another country if that country is acquiring weapons of mass destruction that could be used against them, which 72% of Republicans but just a bare majority of 53% of Democrats favor. Sixty-eight percent of Republicans but only 47% of Democrats support having long-term military bases in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Seventy-four percent of Republicans and 60% of Democrats support bases in South Korea. There are smaller differences on decreasing the U.S. military presence in East Asia, with 38% of Democrats but only 21% of Republicans in favor of decreasing it. On the issue of using U.S. troops if North Korea invaded South Korea, narrow majorities of Republicans and Democrats take opposite sides: 55% of Republicans favor using U.S. troops in this situation, while 53% of Democrats oppose it.

#### The Environment

More than any other type of foreign policy—even UN-related or military policies—environmental issues provoke large partisan differences in opinion. Global warming is perceived as a critical threat by a 32-percentage-point higher proportion of Democrats (62%) than Republicans (30%). This is the largest partisan difference in our data, and it has widened considerably since the 19-point difference of 2004. A similar split appears on how pressing the global warming problem is, with 56% of Democrats but only 30% of Republicans seeing it as a pressing problem that should be addressed even if it involves significant costs (a 26-point difference). Improving the global environment is seen as a very important foreign policy goal by 66% of Democrats but only 39% of Republicans, a 27-percentage point difference. U.S. participation in the Kyoto agreement on global warming is favored by 79% of Democrats but only 59% of Republicans, for a 20-point difference (though still a majority in favor for both). A majority of both Republicans (55%) and Democrats (72%) also favor aiding less-developed countries that limit their greenhouse gas emissions. There are, on the other hand, areas where there is closer agreement. An overwhelming majority of Republicans (90%) and Democrats (94%) say that countries that are part of trade agreements should be required to maintain standards for protection of the environment.
The emergence of China and India over the last two decades as centers of economic dynamism, growing military power, and geopolitical weight is the driving force in a changing Asia and the world balance of power. Together these two nations are home to nearly 40% of the world’s population. They are the world’s fastest growing major economies and play central roles in the global labor market, China increasingly as factory to the world, India as service provider. In the process they have dramatically reduced poverty at home and are adding rapidly to the global stock of middle-class consumers. At the same time, China and India both still must deal with large numbers of poor citizens and high rates of unemployment and underemployment, even as they face the challenges of rapid growth: demand for energy resources, rising inequality, and environmental degradation.

China and India have begun in the last ten years to pursue more confident, active foreign policies, in line with their widening economic and military capabilities. China has been particularly effective in its diplomacy in Asia, acquiring new influence in Southeast and Central Asia through initiatives such as high-level visits and trade agreements. India has also become active in East Asia, improving dramatically its relations with the United States and Japan and mounting a long-term effort to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Relations between the two Asian giants have also much improved, with diminished border tensions, vastly increased trade, and a steady pace of high-level exchanges.

Given the rapid pace of change in China, India, and the region as a whole, The Chicago Council conducted a survey in these two countries to understand how the Chinese and Indian publics view their shifting roles in the world and the priorities in their foreign policy. Publics in South Korea and Australia were also surveyed to provide insight into how the changes are being viewed by China’s and India’s regional neighbors. Many of the questions parallel those asked in the U.S. study, allowing further comparisons of views about the new dynamics in Asia and the global balance of power. A large majority of questions were asked of all three publics in the United States, China, and India, though some questions were unique to one or two of the countries. The South Korean and, especially, the Australian studies were much smaller in scope. In the following chapters, comparisons have been made where data exist to provide the broadest insights possible. This is the largest parallel study of its kind ever conducted in these countries simultaneously. (The results of a parallel Japan survey are treated in a separate report.)

The Rise of China

From a Cold War rival with the West in the global divide between communism and democracy, China has evolved into a new kind of power, unleashing
its economic potential through privatization—one-half of its economy is now privately owned—while maintaining the one-party system. With significant foreign investment from the West flowing into China and massive exports and loans from China flowing in the opposite direction, the fates of China and the world’s other economic powers are now inextricably linked. Our study shows that the Chinese are well aware of their rising position and welcome it with open arms. It also shows that other countries do not consider China’s influence to be as high as do the Chinese themselves, but do recognize its growing status and appear to be comfortable with China rising as an economic power. While there is some nervousness about China converting its growing economic clout into military power, relations with China are viewed positively, and other countries want to work together with China to solve regional and world problems.

The Chinese Worldview

The Chinese public views China’s current position in the world very positively and expresses a high level of support for its rise both as an economic and military power. They are confident that in the near future China will match the United States’ level of world influence, and most, though certainly not all, think China will catch up with the United States economically.

The Chinese express unreserved enthusiasm for China playing an active role in the world and increasing its power and influence. Eighty-seven percent favor China taking an active part in world affairs, with just 7% saying it should stay out of world affairs.

Asked about China’s level of influence in the world today on a scale of zero to ten (see Figure II-1), the Chinese see their country as quite influential, with a mean rating of 7.8, second only to the United States (8.6). They view Russia as next most influential (7.4), followed by the EU (7.1). Japan (6.7) ranks lower than both Britain (6.9) and France (6.8), with India at the bottom (6.1). The Chinese see their level of influence in Asia as even higher (8.0)—tied with the United States as the most influential. Russia again comes next (7.1), this time followed by Japan (6.8, see Appendix B).

The Chinese also believe they can match U.S. global influence. Asked what levels of world influence they would like countries to have on a scale of zero to ten, on average they would like China to rise from 8.0 to 8.9 and for the United States to drift down from 8.6 to 7.1, on par with the level they desire for the European Union (7.2). They would like to see India’s influence in the world to rise to 6.5 and Japan’s to decline to 5.6 on this scale.

When asked about the prospect of China becoming significantly more powerful economically than it is today, an overwhelming 91% of Chinese see this as mostly positive. Likewise when asked about the prospect of China becoming more powerful militarily, an overwhelming majority (90%) of Chinese think this would be mainly positive. There is enthusiasm for Chinese culture to spread around the world: 91% see it as a good thing.

The Chinese also believe they can match U.S. global influence. Asked what they think will occur in the next ten years, they predict that China’s influence will rise, on average, to 8.3—matching the level of influence they predict for the United States

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**Figure II-1 – Influence of Countries in the World: The Chinese View**

*Ratings by Chinese of how much influence in the world the following countries have now, should have, and will have ten years from now (see also Appendix A). Mean levels on a ten-point scale, with 0 meaning not influential at all and 10 meaning extremely influential.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Has now</th>
<th>Should have</th>
<th>Will have ten years from now</th>
<th>Difference between has now and will have</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>+0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>+0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>+0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>+0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>+0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>+0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6.7</td>
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<td>India</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>+0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(see Figure II-1). Asked what will be the case in fifty years, only 23% of the Chinese believe that the United States will continue to be the world’s leading power (the lowest percentage among the publics of all countries surveyed). Rather, 60% believe that another nation will become as powerful as the United States (33%) or that the United States will be surpassed by another nation (27%).

The Chinese public is not, however, as confident that they will catch up with the U.S. as a technology leader (see Figure II-2). Asked to rate themselves today in terms of how much they are leaders in developing new products and technology, the Chinese give themselves a 7.2 on average, behind the United States (8.5), Japan (7.5), and Germany (7.4). Ten years from now they see themselves rising, on average, to 7.9—overtaking the Japanese (7.7) and the Germans (7.6), but still lagging behind the level they forecast for the United States (8.6).

In the long run, most Chinese, though not quite a majority, believe China will catch up economically. Asked if they think it is more likely that someday China’s economy will grow to be as large as the U.S. economy or that the U.S. economy will always stay larger than China’s, 50% of the Chinese public say that China will catch up with the United States, while 38% think that it will not (12% are unsure).

Those that say they believe that China will catch up were also asked to estimate how many years this would take. The median response among those respondents is more than twenty years. This relatively modest perception of China’s economic position is also reflected in the fact that most Chinese are unaware that China is loaning the United States much more money than the United States is loaning China. Only 14% of Chinese know that China loans more to the United States. Thirty percent assume that the United States loans more to China, 15% assume the amounts are about equal, and 41% are unsure. Incidentally, most Americans aren’t aware of this either, with 42% believing that the United States loans more to China rather than the other way around (24%).

There is strong confidence in the Chinese system of government as a driver of economic change. Asked, “When it comes to economic development, do you think the way that the Chinese government manages its economy and its political system is more of an advantage or more of a disadvantage for China,” 78% see it as an advantage.

Chinese Foreign Policy Priorities

Though the Chinese see their country as on the rise as a world power and express enthusiasm for this development, it is striking that when asked about what Chinese foreign policy priorities should be—in terms of goals and threats—concerns related to world power status do not come out on top. Rather, there is much more concern about issues related to economic security and quality of life, probably reflecting both the emphasis of Chinese leaders over almost thirty years on economic improvement and the more recent concern of the Chinese public with some of the unintended consequences and limitations of economic growth such as a worsening environment.

When presented a list of eleven foreign policy goals, economic concerns are seen as “very important” by many more Chinese than other types of concerns (see Figure II-3). Protecting the jobs of Chinese workers places highest, seen as very important by 71 percent of Chinese. This is followed by promoting economic growth (64% very important) and securing adequate energy supplies (61%). At the bottom of the list—seen as very important by just 40%—is the goal of building superior military
power in Asia, the step most often associated with a nation seeking world power status.

Some “global power” goals do still receive majority support as very important. Combating international terrorism places fourth (55% very important), and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons places seventh (52% very important). However, this does not necessarily imply an enthusiasm for China playing a prominent unilateral role, as close behind is strengthening the United Nations, which 51% see as very important.

Asked to rate a list of threats to the vital interests of China, only two are considered critical by a majority of Chinese. Chinese again cite quality-of-life
issues as paramount (see Figure II-4). In first place, with 65% calling the threat critical, is AIDS, avian flu, and other potential epidemics, followed by disruption in energy supply, with 54% calling it critical. Another environmental issue—global warming—is in third place, with 47% calling it critical. Only in fourth place does a traditional great power issue appear—international terrorism, with 42% calling it critical. It is followed by another—the U.S. military presence in Asia—with 38% seeing it as critical.

China’s Strategic Position:
The View from Outside

Just as the Chinese view themselves as a power on the rise, so, too, do other Asian nations we surveyed and the United States—though in more modest terms. While the Chinese already rank themselves second behind the United States on the ten-point scale of world influence today (at 7.8 on average to the United States’ 8.6), Americans rank China third behind their country and Great Britain (and even with Japan at 6.4). South Koreans also rank China third (at 6.7) behind the United States and the European Union. Indians rank it fifth (at 6.0) behind the United States, their own country, Japan, and Russia (see Appendix A and Figure II-5).

In terms of influence within Asia, China ranks its own influence today even with the United States, while India ranks it fourth. Interestingly, Australians rank China first in influence within Asia (above the United States and Japan, see Appendix B).

Looking to the future, no country sees China in ten years as overtaking the United States in terms of world influence. While the Chinese see themselves as pulling even with the United States (rising from 7.8 to 8.3), the other nations surveyed see China’s influence rising more modestly, with the United States staying clearly ahead. Americans see China’s influence rising from 6.4 to 6.8 (putting China second behind the United States’ 8.0), and Indians see China rising from 6.0 to 6.2, moving it ahead of Russia, even with Japan, but still behind the United States and India.

Looking further ahead, fifty years from now, however, a majority in every country surveyed believes either that “another nation”—presumably China or India—will become as powerful as the United States or that the United States will be surpassed in power by another nation (as opposed to the United States continuing to be the world’s leading power, see Figure II-26). While relatively small numbers predict that the United States will be surpassed (from a low of 16% among Americans to 27% among Chinese), a total of 68% of South Koreans, 60% of Chinese, 55% of Americans, and 53% of Indians believes another nation will be at least as powerful.

When it comes to the specific question of whether China will catch up with the United States economically, Americans and South Koreans are more confident that China will catch up than the Chinese themselves. Sixty percent of Americans and 61% of South Koreans say it is more likely that someday China’s economy will grow to be as large as the U.S. economy than that the U.S. economy will always stay larger than China’s. Only one-half (50%) of the Chinese are as confident. The Indians are quite uncertain: Only 22% believe that China will catch up, and 36% say the United States will remain larger, while a large 42% say they do not know.
Among those who believe that China will catch up, the median estimate of how long this will take is twenty years among both Americans and South Koreans. The median respondent in India believes that it will never occur.

In terms of China’s leadership in developing new products and technologies, all countries surveyed believe China is improving, though none see China overtaking the United States in the next ten years. While the Chinese are the most optimistic, seeing themselves rise from a mean 7.2 to 7.9 on the ten-point scale, the mean perception among Indians is that China will rise from 6.2 to 6.5 (moving ahead of Japan but still behind India and the United States), while Americans see it rising from 5.5 to 6.1 (behind the United States and Japan).

While the Chinese overwhelmingly see the way the Chinese government manages its economy and its political system as more of an advantage than a disadvantage for China (78% see it as an advantage), less than one-half, though still a plurality, of Americans (49% to 41%) and Indians (46% to 23%) see this as an advantage for China.

Responding to the Rise of China

People in other nations surveyed are not of the mind that their countries should actively work to try to prevent the rise of China. A large majority of Americans (65%) believe that in dealing with China’s power their country should undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China rather than actively work to limit the growth of China’s power. Among Indians, a plurality (40% to 23%) concurs.

Nonetheless, people have complex feelings about the rise of China. While there is largely a sanguine response about the economic rise of China, there is apparent anxiety about the potential for China to rise militarily. Few countries prefer to see China’s influence increase and some would prefer it to decrease.

When respondents were asked about the prospect of China becoming significantly more powerful economically than it is today, this produced a relatively unconcerned response (see Figure II-6). In the United States, views are evenly divided between those who see this as mainly positive (47%) and mainly negative (46%). But a majority of South Koreans (59%) see this as mainly positive (mainly negative 41%) and a plurality of Indians (46% to 39%) also see it as mainly positive (15% did not answer).

Americans and Indians were also asked how positive or negative it would be if China were to catch up with the United States economically. There are strikingly low levels of concern about this prospect. Only about one in three in both countries sees this as mostly negative (U.S. 33%, India 31%), but more Indians see this as mostly positive (28%) than do Americans (9%). A majority of Americans (54%) cluster around the view that this would be equally positive and negative, a view taken by 20% of Indians (see Figure II-7).

By contrast, the prospect of China becoming significantly more powerful militarily than it is
today elicits a much different response (see Figure II-6). Large majorities of Americans (75%) and South Koreans (68%) see this as mainly negative, as do a modest plurality (46%) of Indians (40% of Indians think it would be mainly positive).

There seems to be some concern that the rise of Chinese military power will be destabilizing in Asia. Asked how likely it is that the growth of Chinese military power will be a potential source of conflict between major powers in Asia, 88% of South Koreans say it is either very likely (40%) or somewhat likely (48%). Among Indians, 72% say it is likely (39% very, 33% somewhat). Interestingly, more Americans see this potential source of conflict in Asia as very likely (50%) than Asians themselves, with 38% seeing it as somewhat likely, for a total of 88% likely.

When other nations are asked to evaluate the development of China as a world power as a potential threat, large numbers, though not majorities, of China’s immediate neighbors perceive this as a critical threat. The highest level of concern is found in South Korea, where 49% of the public perceives it as a critical threat. It ranks fifth on a list of sixteen threats asked about in South Korea, below the threat of North Korea becoming a nuclear power but above the threats of international terrorism and the rise of Japan as a military power. Among Indians, 43% see the development of China as a world power as a critical threat to India, ranking seventh on a list of thirteen threats (even with the threat of disruption in the energy supply, below global warming, and above economic competition from the United States).

Fewer Americans and Australians perceive the rise of China as a critical threat to their vital interests. Among Americans, 36% perceive it as a critical threat, relatively unchanged from 2004, but substantially lower than it was in the 1990s through 2002. In the current survey it ranks ninth out of thirteen threats. Among Australians, only 25% perceive the rise of China as a critical threat, placing it at the very bottom of the Australian threat list (thirteenth out of thirteen).

When asked how much influence they would like China to have in the world on a ten-point scale, respondents in the countries surveyed other than China prefer China’s influence to remain below that of the United States, though mean levels vary. Interestingly, the Indians would prefer China’s influence to increase slightly from 6.0 to 6.2, though this places China third in influence behind their own country and the United States and even with Japan. But Americans would prefer to see China’s influence decrease significantly, from 6.4 to 4.6. Australians would prefer to see China’s influence at the 5.5 level, placing China fourth out of five countries behind the European Union (6.6), the United States (6.1), and Japan (5.7), but ahead of India (5.2).4

Indians and South Koreans seem to be divided about whether it is mainly a good thing or a bad thing for Chinese culture to spread around the world, with 43% of Indians and 48% of South Koreans saying it is a good thing and 40% of Indians and 50% of South Koreans saying it is a bad thing.

Attitudes about China

To understand the complexity of feelings about the rise of China, views of China and China’s external behavior may provide insight. While warmth of feelings toward China vary, trust in China’s foreign policy behavior is low, and China is widely perceived as unfair in trade. However, Asians tend to perceive China as a constructive player in Asia.

4. Australians were not asked to rate China’s current level of influence in the world.
Asked to rate their feelings toward China on the thermometer scale, where fifty is neutral, publics in Asia express fairly warm feelings (see Figure II-8). China receives a mean of 61 from Australians, 57 from South Koreans, and 54 from Indians. However, China receives a fairly cool 40 from Americans.

In keeping with the wariness about China’s rise, trust in China is not very high overall. Asked how much they trust China to act responsibly in the world, majorities in the United States (58%) and South Korea (61%) say they trust China not at all or not very much. Indians also lean in the direction of mistrust, with 49% saying they trust China not at all or not very much and 42% saying they trust China somewhat or a great deal. A majority of Australians (60%), though, say they do trust China somewhat or a great deal, with 38% showing low levels of trust.

Asked how much they trust China to take the interests of their country into account when making foreign policy decisions, 60% of Americans say not very much or not at all. Indians, though, are more divided, with 49% saying they trust the Chinese not very much or not at all, and 43% saying somewhat or a great deal.

Asked how much they trust China to keep its commitments, 58% of Americans say not very much or not at all. Once again, the Indians are divided, with 49% showing low levels of trust and 43% trusting China somewhat or a great deal.

China has quite a poor image in terms of its fairness in trade. Majorities in the United States (58%) and South Korea (54%) believe that it practices unfair trade. Indians are divided (34% fair, 36% unfair). It may be significant that China enjoys a trade surplus with all these countries.

Contrary to many of the negative views of China, Asian countries surveyed have a positive view of China’s role in resolving key problems in Asia (see Figure II-9). Sixty-two percent of Indians and 53% of South Koreans have a positive view. A plurality of Americans, though (47%), have a negative view.

Overall, the character of China’s relations with other countries is seen as at least staying the same, if not improving. Fifty-nine percent of Australians and a plurality of Indians (50%) say their relations with China are improving. Pluralities in South Korea and United States say they are staying about the same, though many more in both countries say relations with China are improving (38% and 30%, respectively) than worsening (15% and 17%, respectively).

Nevertheless, roughly equal percentages of Chinese and Americans (52% and 49%, respectively) view their two countries as mostly rivals, with 39% of Chinese and 41% of Americans viewing their countries as mostly partners. Indians are divided as to whether they think China and the United States are rivals or partners (42% rivals and 43% partners). On their own relationship with China, a plurality of Indians (46%) view their countries as mostly part-
ners (38% rivals). Chinese are even more positive, with 56% seeing the relationship with India as a partnership rather than a rivalry (30%). Interestingly, a large majority of Americans (66%) think that China and India are rivals (see Figure II-35).

**The Rise of India**

In the past decade, India’s economic growth has placed it among the fastest growing countries in the world. Its nuclear explosions have underlined its military presence, and its relations with the United States and with Asian countries beyond the immediate South Asian periphery have become much more active. Our study shows Indians see India as an influential, rising nation, but still look to the United States as the world’s leader. The study also shows that popular perceptions of India in the United States and in Asia only partially reflect the change that has taken place. India is in many respects well regarded and is seen as a country on the rise. However, it is also still in the shadow of China and to a lesser extent Japan.

**The Indian Worldview**

Like the Chinese, Indians are bullish on their country’s role in Asia and the world and on its prospects for the future. While their self-assessment is more modest than that of the Chinese, Indians already see themselves as more influential in the world than China and as gaining on the United States.

Indians have a high estimate of their role in the world today. When rating India’s influence in the world on a ten-point scale (see Figure II-10), the mean response is 6.3, placing India second only to the United States (7.3) and roughly on par with Japan (6.2) and slightly ahead of China (6.0).

Indians also believe their country has a large and positive influence in Asia today, rating India at an average of 6.3 on the ten-point scale, second only to the rating they give the United States (7.1) and ahead of their rating for China (5.9, see Appendix B). Asked to evaluate India’s role in solving problems in Asia, Indians rate themselves more positively than any other country, with 69% saying India plays a positive role (41% very positive, 28% somewhat positive).

Indians want to expand their international role, but this desire is not as unequivocal as it is for the Chinese. A majority (56%) favors India playing an active part in world affairs. Indians would like to see their influence in the world rise from 6.4 to 7.0 (ahead of both the United States, 6.7, and China, 6.2). Solid majorities welcome the prospect of a more militarily and economically powerful India, with 65% and 63% of Indians, respectively, saying these developments would be positive (but this is not as high as in China, at 90% and 91%, respectively). There is enthusiasm for Indian culture to spread around the world, with 71% seeing it as a good thing. Again, this is less than the 91% of Chinese who feel this way about the spread of their culture. A strong majority of Indians (75%) want India to obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

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5. It is important to bear in mind when interpreting the Indian results that even controlling for education, larger numbers of Indians answered that they “don’t know” or provide no answer on many questions than their counterparts elsewhere. It is therefore difficult to obtain majority opinions on some issues. The size and shape of pluralities may be more instructive.
Indians express optimism that their influence will grow, putting them in the top tier of nations on both fronts. Asked what they think will occur in the next ten years, they predict that India’s influence will rise, on average, from 6.3 to 6.6 on the ten-point scale (see Figure II-10). This is below the influence they project for the United States (7.2), but above where they anticipate China or Japan will be (6.2 for both).

Like the Chinese, Indians believe that another nation will eventually become as powerful as the United States. Asked what will become of U.S. power in fifty years, only 28% say the United States will continue to be world’s leading power (only slightly higher than the 23% who make this assumption in China). Rather, a majority of 53% say that either another nation will become as powerful as the United States (30%) or will surpass it (23%).

In light of the dramatic success of India’s information technology industry, it is not surprising that Indians give their country high marks as an innovator (see Figure II-11). Indian respondents rank India at 6.4 on a ten-point scale as a leader in developing new products and technologies. They put themselves behind the United States (6.8) and slightly ahead of China (6.2) and Japan (6.3). Ten years from now, Indians see their country as rising in this area, on average, from 6.4 to 6.9, remaining above where they think China (6.5) or Japan (6.4) will be and approaching the level they forecast for the United States (7.1).

Indian Foreign Policy Priorities

When looking at potential threats to vital interests, Indians appear to be more concerned about regional security threats than their Chinese counterparts, who are more preoccupied with quality of life and economic issues. Of the five issues that the largest share of Indians regard as critical threats to their country’s vital interests, four relate directly to regional security problems (see Figure II-12). International terrorism tops the list, with 65% seeing it as critical—presumably related to terrorist attacks that India itself has suffered. The others are linked to India’s long-standing, conflict-ridden relationship with its neighbor, Pakistan, including tensions between India and Pakistan (53% critical), the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers (55%), and Islamic fundamentalism (52%).

Nevertheless, Indians are concerned with quality of life issues as well. The threat of AIDS, avian influenza, and other potential epidemics ranks second as a critical threat (60%). Global warming is considered a critical threat by 51%. No other threat is considered critical by a majority of Indians, though significant numbers of Indians consider disruption in energy supply (43%), the development of China as a world power (43%), and the U.S. military presence in Asia (42%) as critical threats. There is less concern about economic competition, either from the United States or Asian countries, about a confrontation between mainland China and Taiwan, or about instability and conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

In line with their concerns about security threats, Indians consider foreign policy goals that address these threats to be very important, although economic and quality of life goals also loom large (see Figure II-13). The goals rated as very important by the largest percentages of Indian respondents are combating international terrorism (60%) and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (56%). While these are also among the top goals of Americans, relatively fewer Indians than Americans see them as critical, by 12 and 18 percentage points, respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country as a leader in innovation</th>
<th>Now</th>
<th>In ten years</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>+0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>+0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>+0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>+0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>+0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>+0.3</td>
</tr>
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</table>

When exercising foreign policy, Indians appear to be concerned about regional security threats, putting them in the top tier of nations on both fronts. Asked what will happen in the next ten years, Indians predict that India’s influence will rise, on average, from 6.3 to 6.6 on the ten-point scale (see Figure II-10). This is below the influence projected for the United States (7.2), but above where they anticipate China or Japan will be (6.2 for both).

Like the Chinese, Indians believe that another nation will eventually become as powerful as the United States. Asked what will become of U.S. power in fifty years, only 28% say the United States will continue to be the world’s leading power (only slightly higher than the 23% who make this assumption in China). Rather, a majority of 53% say that either another nation will become as powerful as the United States (30%) or will surpass it (23%).

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Five of the next six goals are related to economics and quality of life: promoting economic growth, combating world hunger, protecting Indian jobs, security adequate supplies of energy, and improving the global environment. In each case, a majority of Indians consider the goal very important. Interestingly, a higher proportion of Chinese (64%) than Indians (54%) believe that promoting economic growth should be a very important foreign policy goal, perhaps reflecting again the higher
overall level of confidence and expectation among Chinese about their rise as a new power. By contrast, more Indians than Chinese cite combating world hunger as a very important goal (54% versus 42%), likely reflecting the bigger problem of hunger in India than in China.

Although they appear at the bottom of the list, the goals of strengthening the United Nations and promoting and defending human rights in other countries are still considered very important by roughly half of Indians (49% and 48%, respectively).

**India’s Strategic Position: The View from Outside**

Despite Indians’ own view that their country is the second most influential power in the world behind the United States in the world today, other countries surveyed do not view India that way. In fact, publics in China, the United States, and South Korea all rank India at the bottom of a list of nine countries in terms of world influence, a list that includes countries normally regarded as highly influential in the world—the United States, China, Japan, Russia, the European Union, France, Great Britain, and Germany. The Chinese rate India’s influence just below Japan (which may, in turn, be unusually low given bad China-Japan relations); South Korea rates it just below Russia; and Americans rate it just below France. In ten years, other countries expect India’s influence to rise, but not by much. The Chinese see it rising from an average of 6.1 to 6.5, still placing it last on the list of nine countries asked about, while the Americans see it rising from 4.8 to 5.4, surpassing only France. This contrasts with Indians’ own view that their country will rise from 6.3 to 6.6, though remaining second behind the United States (see Figure II-14 and Appendix A).

Within Asia, India’s influence rates seventh out of nine countries among Chinese, above Australia and Indonesia, but behind the United States, China, Russia, Japan, the European Union, and South Korea. Australians, however, rate India fourth in influence in Asia, behind China, the United States, and Japan (see Appendix B).

Assessments of India’s role as a leader in developing new products and technologies show the same pattern: India is not seen as a top source of innovation among the six countries asked about, all of them looked on as significant innovators: the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, Germany, and India. However, it is becoming more important. India’s current role as an innovator comes at the bottom of the list among Chinese, South Koreans, and Americans (tied with South Korea among Americans). Looking ten years into the future, mean ratings of India’s expected role as an innovator go from 5.8 to 6.4 among Chinese (up 0.6) and from 3.8 to 4.6 among Americans (up 0.8). In both cases this rise is larger than for any of the other countries on the list. Nevertheless, India still does not move up relative to other countries according to the Chinese and only edges out South Korea slightly according to Americans. Again, this contrasts with India’s own view that it is currently second behind the United States as a leader in innovation and will close in on but not yet surpass it in ten years.

**Reactions to India’s Changing Role**

Feelings about India in the surveyed countries in Asia are rather warm. When asked to record their
views of India on the thermometer scale, Australians and Chinese give India an average of 62, and South Koreans give it a 56. Feelings among Americans are more reserved, on the slightly cool side at 46.

In the United States and elsewhere in Asia, modest majorities see the expansion of Indian economic power as a mainly positive development (see Figure II-15). A majority welcomes it in China (56% mainly positive) and in the United States and South Korea (53% mainly positive). Smaller percentages see India’s economic rise as mainly negative, with China the least worried (26% mainly negative), followed by the United States (39%), and South Korea, where a significant number (44%) think an economically more powerful India would be mainly negative. By comparison, the economic rise of China is seen as mainly positive by smaller margins in the United States and India. The South Koreans, however, are more comfortable with the economic rise of China than India.

The positive view of India’s economic power is also evident on the question of India’s trade practices. Unlike China, India is generally perceived as practicing fair trade. Majorities in China and South Korea regard India as a fair trader (58% and 57%, respectively). Only in the United States is India regarded primarily as an unfair trader (47% unfair, 39% fair). Interestingly, the United States is the only country among those surveyed that imports more from India than it exports. This contrasts with the much more negative view of the trade practices of China, which enjoys a trade surplus with all these countries (see page 39 in *Attitudes about China*).

Opinions are mixed, however, about the prospect of growing Indian military power (see Figure II-15). In China 56% see it as a plus, a surprising finding considering the long-standing India-China rivalry. (The reverse is not true. Indians, by 46% to 40%, regard a more militarily powerful China as mainly negative.) This contrasts with the 69% and 71% in the United States and South Korea, respectively, who regard India’s military buildup negatively.

The level of trust that countries have toward India is generally low, though somewhat divided. When asked whether they trust India to act responsibly in the world, only in Australia do respondents give an overall positive response (68%). In the United States and South Korea, fewer than 50% trust India either somewhat or a great deal, and in China 68% say they do not trust India either at all or very much. In most cases, this places India above China in perceived responsibility in the world.

Respondents in the United States have similarly low expectations that India will take their country’s interests into account in making foreign policy decisions, with 53% saying they do not trust India either at all or very much. The Chinese are divided, with 46% saying they trust India somewhat or a great deal and 45% saying not at all or not very much. In light of the longstanding rivalry between India and China, it is noteworthy that the Chinese mistrust the United States (58% not at all or not very much) and Japan (67% not at all or not very much) more than India to take Chinese interests into account.

Americans and Chinese are essentially divided about whether they trust India to keep its commit-
ments, though a plurality of both (49% in the United States, 47% in China) lean toward the negative, saying they trust India not at all or not very much.

On the question of how much influence they want India to have in the world, the Chinese want India to have more influence than it does now (growing from 6.1 to 6.5), more than Japan, but less than China, the European Union, and the United States. Americans and Australians want India to have the least amount of influence among the five countries, with Americans preferring India’s current level of influence to decrease (4.8 to 4.6, see Figure II-14).

Feelings about whether India is playing a positive role in resolving the key problems facing Asia are also somewhat divided, though leaning toward the positive. Plurals of Americans (50%), South Koreans (50%), and Chinese (48%) say India’s role is either somewhat or very positive (see Figure II-16).

Attitudes toward the possibility of India becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council are generally positive, if still somewhat divided (see Figure II-17). Compared to the 75% of Indians who want a seat on the Security Council, a much smaller majority (53%) in the United States favors a permanent Indian seat. In China and South Korea only pluralities are in favor (37% and 46%, respectively), but in each of these cases a substantial number of respondents says “it depends.”

When evaluating their relations with India, very few people in any country surveyed believe relations with India are worsening. Most (a bare majority of 51% of Australians and South Koreans as well as a plurality of 48% of Americans) say their relationship with India is staying about the same. Further, in all three countries, many more people say relations are improving (36%, 37%, and 30%, respectively) than say they are worsening (5%, 7%, and 16%, respectively). A plurality of Chinese say relations with India are improving.

Overall, Americans and Chinese view their relationship with India as one of partnership rather than rivalry, and Indians themselves concur. Sixty-one percent of Americans and 55% of Indians view the United States and India as mostly partners. Fifty-six percent of Chinese and 46% (a plurality) of Indians view China and India as partners. Contrary to the positive Chinese and Indian views of their own relationship, a large majority of Americans (66%) think that China and India are rivals (see Figure II-35).

Japan, South Korea, and Australia

Japan

Strained Relations with Some East Asian Neighbors

Japan’s relations with some of its East Asian neighbors are still strongly colored by the legacy of World War II. Prime Minister Koizumi’s repeated visits
to Yasukuni Shrine, which honors modern Japan’s war dead, including those convicted of war crimes, is a source of particular resentment in China and South Korea. In addition, disputes over the portrayal of the war in textbooks, disagreements over territorial boundaries, and concern over potential Japanese remilitarization continue. The depth of these emotions were evident in the March 2005 Chinese demonstrations against Japan—triggered by the Japanese government’s reauthorization of a textbook that downplayed wartime atrocities—resulting in attacks against Japanese businesses and government offices in China.

It is thus no surprise that Japan receives the lowest thermometer ratings (see Figure II-18) of all countries asked about from South Koreans (39) and Chinese (36). Eighty-one percent of South Koreans have no or very little trust in Japan acting responsibly in the world. A majority of South Koreans (61%) think relations between South Korea and Japan are worsening, compared to only 6% who see relations as improving. Forty-five percent of South Koreans believe the rise of Japan as a military power is a critical threat to the vital interests of South Korea in the next ten years, and 66% think Japan is playing a very negative (20%) or somewhat negative (46%) role in resolving the key problems facing Asia. Three-quarters of Chinese and nearly the same number of South Koreans oppose Japan becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council (see Figure II-19).

The Chinese thermometer rating for Japan (36) is 15 degrees cooler than the next lowest score of 51 degrees, given to the United States. Seventy-nine percent of Chinese have no or very little trust in Japan acting responsibly in the world. Eighty percent have no or very little trust in Japan keeping its commitments. Sixty-seven percent of Chinese believe that Japan generally does not take the interests of China into account when making foreign policy decisions. A plurality of Chinese (49%) thinks that relations between China and Japan are worsening, compared to 25% who see relations as improving (see Figure II-20). Sixty-five percent of Chinese believe China and Japan are mostly rivals, with 26% considering the two countries to be mostly partners.

Surprisingly, however, a plurality of Chinese (48%) think Japan is playing a very positive (22%) or somewhat positive (26%) role in resolving key problems in Asia, compared to only 39% who believe Japan is playing a very or somewhat negative role. Further, only 12% of Chinese believe the differences between China and Japan cannot be resolved. This compares to 84% who think that tensions can be resolved if one or both countries would compromise (53% think that Japan needs to change its policies to resolve tensions, 28% believe both sides need to compromise more, and 3% say China needs to change its policies. It is pos-
sible that Chinese perceptions have been positively impacted by the large degree of economic interdependence between China and Japan, seen most visibly through Japan’s substantial trade with and foreign direct investment in China and elsewhere in Asia. Continued economic integration could thus potentially facilitate improved relations.

More Positive Attitudes among Americans, Indians, and Australians

Australians, Americans, and Indians all assign relatively warm ratings to Japan, rating it at 64, 58, and 54 degrees, respectively, on the thermometer scale (see Figure II-18). Americans, Australians, and Indians all perceive their relations with Japan as stable and view Japan as a responsible and reliable partner in the international order. Eight-five percent of Americans and Australians and 70% of Indians think their respective country’s relations with Japan are staying about the same or improving. Similarly, 73% of Australians and 71% of Americans have either some or a great deal of trust in Japan to act responsibly in the world. Indian attitudes are more divided, with a plurality of 46% of Indians sharing this belief, and 41% having no or not much trust in Japan acting responsibly in the world. Sixty-four percent of Americans and 59% of Indians think Japan is playing a positive role in resolving the key problems facing Asia. Fifty-eight percent of Americans and 46% of Indians also think that Japan takes the interests of their respective countries in account when making foreign policy decisions.

Perceptions of Japan’s trading practices are also seen as positive. A majority of Americans (54%) think Japan practices fair trade. As mentioned in Part I, this is the highest level yet since the question was first asked of Americans in 1990, when only 17% thought Japan was a fair trader. The relative weakening of the Japanese economy through the 1990s has clearly softened Americans concerns about Japan: In 1994, 62% of Americans saw economic competition from Japan as a critical threat, but by 2002 the number was only 29%. Indians, who do not share the historical animosity toward Japan felt by Chinese and South Koreans, also lean toward perceiving Japan as a fair trading partner. A plurality of 45% thinks that Japan practices fair trade, while 28% disagree. This, together with Japan’s role as a major regional aid donor, may be positively influencing Indian perceptions of Japan.

As perceptions of Japan as an economic threat have diminished, American attitudes towards the U.S.-Japan relationship have focused on its friendly and mutually supportive nature. This has likely been reinforced by the role Japan has played in assisting the United States in Iraq, in the war on terror, and as the principal U.S. ally in East Asia. Seventy-three percent of Americans think the United States and Japan are mostly partners, compared to only 17% who believe they are mostly rivals. Interestingly, Chinese and Indians are less convinced that the U.S.–Japan relationship is primarily one of partnership, with only pluralities of Chinese (49%) and Indians (40%) thinking the United States and Japan are mostly partners.

Americans are also highly supportive of Japan becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council (see Figure II-19). A plurality of Indians, though not a majority, also support this. A plurality of the American public (49%) now believes China is more important to the United States than Japan, compared to 44% who indicate the opposite. This is up from the 2002 survey, when Americans were evenly split at 43% on this question.
Varying Perceptions of Influence

Attitudes towards Japan and perceptions of its influence in Asia and the world run parallel for many of the publics in the surveyed countries. Americans and Indians, who share relatively warm perceptions of Japan, both see it as a significant international player. Indians give it the third highest mean ranking for influence in Asia and influence in the world, after the United States and India but ahead of China, Russia, and the EU in both Asia and the world. Americans similarly rank Japan third for influence in the world (though tied with China) after the United States and Great Britain (see Appendixes A and B and Figure II-21).

The rather low opinion of Japan among Chinese is reflected in their perceptions of its influence. While the Chinese give Japan a mean score of 6.7 for its influence in the world, this score is the second lowest of the nine nations they evaluated. For influence in Asia, Chinese give Japan a mean score of 6.8, placing it behind China, the United States, and Russia but ahead of India. It is interesting that both Chinese and Indians perceive Japan as being less influential in Asia than their own country but more influential than the other. South Koreans rank Japan fifth out of nine nations for influence in the world, behind the United States, the EU, China, and Great Britain.

Looking forward, Americans and Indians see Japan's global influence as remaining roughly equal to current levels. When asked how much influence Japan will have in the world in ten years, Americans see its influence rising from 6.4 to 6.6, though China's influence overtakes it, rising from 6.4 to 6.8. Indians and Chinese see no significant change in Japan's level of influence or in its ranking.

Both Americans and Indians are generally comfortable with the level of influence they assign Japan. When asked how much influence they would want Japan to have in the world, Americans give a mean score of 5.8 and Indians give the same score of 6.2 that they assign to Japan for its present level of influence. While the American score is 0.6 lower than their perceptions of actual influence, it still positions Japan as number two after the United States (8.2), ahead of the EU (5.7), and far ahead of China (4.6) and India (4.4). Chinese would like to see Japan have less power, giving it a mean score of 5.6 for desired influence in the world, 1.1 lower than the score they assign for actual influence and the lowest score they give any evaluated country, including India (see Appendixes A and B).

South Korea

Attitudes toward South Korea among surveyed nations tend toward the positive. The Chinese by far have the warmest regard for South Korea (see Figure II-22). They give it a thermometer rating of 73 degrees, which is the warmest rating they assign to any country asked about (and tied with the rating they give for North Korea). Australians also have warm feelings (56 degrees), while Indians (48 degrees) and Americans (44 degrees) tend to give cooler ratings. Majorities of South Koreans (74%), Chinese (59%), and Americans (51%) and a plurality of Indians (50%) think that South Korea is playing a very or somewhat positive role in resolving the key problems facing Asia.
A very strong majority of Chinese (87%) see relations between their country and South Korea as either improving (56%) or staying the same (31%). Indians, on balance, see India’s relationship with South Korea as improving, with 36% stating this and 24% saying relations are staying about the same. Americans see relations with South Korea as staying the same (53%), with 15% saying relations are improving, compared to 25% who see them as worsening (see Figure II-23).

South Korea is seen as possessing a moderate level of influence in Asia (see Appendix B). The Chinese see it as having the most influence, giving it a mean score of 6.7 out of 10, which is only slightly lower than the 6.8 they assign to Japan. Australians and Indians assign lower levels of influence in Asia to South Korea (5.5 and 5.2, respectively).

Australia

Australia is viewed warmly by all the countries surveyed. The United States gives Australia its warmest rating on the thermometer scale—an average of 69 degrees. The only other country receiving a more favorable rating from Americans is Great Britain, with an average of 71 degrees. South Koreans give Australia their warmest rating (65 degrees) as compared to the fifteen other countries they were asked about. Chinese (65 degrees) also have warm feelings towards Australia, while Indians are cooler but still positive in their attitudes (52 degrees).

Australia is not seen as a very influential country in Asia. Asked to rank Australia’s influence in Asia, respondents in China and India give it an average rating of 6.2 and 5.2, respectively, placing it only above Indonesia and in the case of India, on par with South Korea. Australians, however, see their role a little more positively and rank their influence in fifth place out of nine countries.

The United States: The View from Asia

The rise of China and India is altering Asia’s economic and geopolitical landscape, but the United States still dominates. The United States is the region’s main export market (and thus engine of growth), leading investor, primary source of technology, and dominant military power. Since World War II, the United States has been the de facto balancing power in Asia. The study suggests that at present, the countries surveyed still regard it as the most important player today and for the next ten years. However, they are concerned about the reliability and responsibility of the United States and do not believe that U.S. power will remain unequalled over the longer term. While they have bones of contention with the United States and are especially uncomfortable with the U.S. military presence, Asians want the United States to be engaged and to work together with them to address critical challenges.
Most Asians surveyed see the United States as highly influential—indeed, as the most influential power in the world today. On the ten-point scale of influence in the world, all countries put the United States ahead of other countries by a fairly significant margin. Chinese give the United States a mean level of 8.6, followed by their own country at 7.8. Indians give it a 7.3, followed by their own country at 6.3, and South Koreans give it an 8.5, followed by the European Union at 7.2 (see Appendix A and Figure II-24).

Asian perceptions of the U.S. role in the international arena are mirrored in their thinking about the U.S. role in the Asian region. Most Asians see the United States as highly and quite positively influential in the region. Chinese and Indians rate U.S. influence in Asia virtually as high as they do U.S. influence globally, at 8.0 and 7.1, respectively. This places the United States at the top among the nine nations asked about, including Russia, the European Union, and Japan (see Appendix B).

Over the past ten years, most Asians surveyed think U.S. power in the region has either remained the same or increased (see Figure II-25). In no country among those surveyed does more than 20% think U.S. influence in Asia has decreased. In China and India, pluralities (43% and 46%, respectively) think U.S. influence in Asia has increased over ten years. Among South Koreans, as among Americans themselves, a plurality (47% and 48%, respectively) thinks it has remained the same.

Looking ahead ten years, U.S. global influence is seen as staying quite high, if declining slightly in some cases, while the influence of others increases. In ten years Chinese see the United States’ world influence declining only slightly, from an average 8.6 to 8.3, while Indians see it remaining virtually unchanged, from 7.3 to 7.2. Americans themselves see their influence dropping a bit more in ten years, from 8.5 to 8.0. All three countries still place the United States on top of other countries in terms of world influence in ten years (though the Chinese believe they will match U.S. influence by then).

Looking farther into the future, however, the assessments of U.S. power in the world begin to shift. As mentioned in previous sections, only a minority believes that the United States will continue to be an unequaled world power. A majority...
in every country surveyed believes another nation will become as powerful or surpass the power of the United States over the next fifty years (see Figure II-26). In each case, more people believe another nation will become as powerful as the United States than believe that a nation will surpass the United States, but the majorities are clear—the United States will not continue to be the world’s one leading power. Even among Americans, only 40% believe the United States will remain unequalled in half a century.

The nation that appears to be the clearest candidate for catching up to the United States is China (though Indians appear to feel it may be their country). Majorities in South Korean (61%) and the United States (60%) and a plurality of the Chinese (50%) believe that someday China’s economy will grow as large as the U.S. economy (rather than that the U.S. economy will always stay larger than China’s). A large number of Indians (42%) say they don’t know whether China’s economy will catch up. However, more Indians (36%) say the U.S. economy will always remain larger than China’s than say China’s economy will catch up (22%). This is perhaps because Indians see their own country as both more influential and more innovative than China (see The Indian Worldview, pages 40-41).

**Wariness of the United States**

While the view from Asia is that U.S. influence will remain quite high, even if others begin catching up, publics in the Asian countries surveyed would prefer that the United States have less influence in the world than it has now (see Figure II-24). (This is not unlike the American opinion that other countries should have less influence than them.) The Chinese want the United States to have an average of 7.1 instead of 8.6, less than both China (8.9) and the European Union (7.2), but more than Japan (5.6). Indians also want the United States to have less influence (6.7 instead of 7.3), but less than only India (7.0). Australians want the United States (at 6.1) to only have less influence than the European Union (6.6).

Along with this preference for the United States to have somewhat less influence, strong majorities of Chinese (61%), South Koreans (60%), and Australians (69%) all agree that the United States does not have the responsibility to play the role
of world policemen, a role they also think the United States has been playing more than it should (77%, 73%, 79%, respectively, see Figure II-27). Interestingly, a slight majority of Indians (53%) do think the United States has the responsibility to play the role of world policeman. The same percentage of Indians, however, believe the United States is playing that role more than it should.

These views are reflected in the generally negative view among most Asians—and shared by most Americans—of the Iraq war. In every country surveyed, majorities believe that the war has not reduced the threat of terrorism, has worsened America’s relations with the Muslim world, and should make nations more cautious about using military force to deal with rogue states (see Figure II-28).

The prevailing negative Asian perceptions of the Iraq war and of the United States acting as “policeman” in the world more than it should be may also be reflected in their general views on U.S. behavior. On the question of whether the United States can be trusted to act responsibly in the world, in no country do more than 19% of respondents say the United States can be trusted a great deal. Majorities of Chinese (59%) and to a lesser extent, South Koreans (53%) and Indians (52%) say the United States cannot be trusted either very much or at all to act responsibly. Only a majority of Australians (60%) agree that the United States can be trusted somewhat or a great deal to act responsibly.

In addition, majorities in China (58% and 69%, respectively) and slight pluralities in India (46% and 47%, respectively) think the United States does not take the interests of their country into account when making foreign policy decisions and cannot be trusted to keep its commitments.

Perhaps because of views such as these, Asian publics in the countries surveyed are not strong supporters of the U.S. military presence in the region. When asked generally about U.S. military bases overseas, a majority of Chinese (63%) and a plurality of Indians (39%) would like to see fewer U.S. bases (26% of Indians favor more bases, 14% want as many as there are now, and 22% are not sure).

When asked whether the United States should or should not have bases in several specific locations in Asia, Chinese are clearly against them, while Indians are more divided (see Figure II-29). Strong majorities of Chinese oppose U.S. bases in Japan (60%), Pakistan (66%), South Korea (71%),

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure II-28 – Views on the Iraq War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage who agree with each statement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The threat of terrorism has been reduced by the Iraq war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure II-29 – U.S. Military Bases Overseas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage who think the United States should have more bases overseas, fewer bases overseas, or about as many as it has now.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- More bases
- About as many as now
- Fewer bases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>More bases</th>
<th>About as many as now</th>
<th>Fewer bases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and Afghanistan (65%). Indians are somewhat more favorably disposed to bases in their own region, with pluralities supporting U.S. bases in Pakistan (46%) and Afghanistan (46%), but opposed to U.S. bases in Japan (51%) and South Korea (a plurality of 45%).

Chinese and Indians were also asked whether the U.S. military presence in East Asia increases or decreases regional stability. A majority of Chinese (56%) say it decreases stability. Indians are again divided, with a 33% saying it decreases stability, 31% saying it increases stability, 16% saying neither, and 20% saying they are not sure.

In line with these views, a clear majority of Chinese (64%) want the U.S. military presence in East Asia decreased, as does a weak plurality (38%) of Indians (30% of Indians want it increased, 13% want it maintained at its present level, and 19% are not sure). South Koreans, on the other hand, want it increased (59%). South Koreans also believe that most people in East Asia want the U.S. military presence there to be maintained at its present level (53%) instead of increased or decreased. Most Americans (58%) correctly perceive that most East Asians want the U.S. presence decreased, and even though a similar number of Americans (57%) prefer that it be maintained, 55% of Americans think the United States should reduce its presence if that is what most East Asians want (see Figure II-30). Additionally, U.S. trade practices are also viewed rather negatively. Seventy-five percent of South Koreans and 53% of Chinese think the United States practices unfair trade. While a plurality of 40% of Indians think the United States practices fair trade, 30% say U.S. trade is unfair, and another 30% are not sure.

### Desire for Cooperation

Despite these clear irritations with the United States, the overall U.S. role in Asia is seen as a positive. Asked whether the U.S. role in resolving key problems facing Asia is very or somewhat positive or very or somewhat negative, strong majorities in China (59%), India (66%), and South Korea (58%) say the United States is playing either a somewhat or very positive role (see Figure II-31). In China and India, more people (35% for both) say the U.S. role is very positive than say it is only somewhat positive (24% and 31%, respectively), while a majority of South Koreans (51%) say the U.S. role is only somewhat positive, with very few (7%) saying it is very positive.

This view of the U.S. role in Asia is accompanied by generally positive feelings toward the United States among respondents in the Asian countries surveyed, though in most cases feelings toward many other countries are higher. On the thermometer scale, Australians have the warm-
est feelings toward the United States, giving it an average of 62. South Koreans and Indians give the United States warm ratings of 58 and 57, respectively. While Indians feel more warmly toward the United States than any other country they were asked about, the United States is ranked fifth out of fifteen countries asked about in Australia (behind Great Britain, Singapore, Japan, and Papua New Guinea), and fifth out of sixteen in South Korea (behind Australia, Great Britain, Germany, and France). Chinese give the United States a rather neutral 51, though it places fourteenth out of fifteen countries asked about in China, above only Japan, which receives China’s only cool rating at 36.

As will be discussed in next section, relations overall with the United States are also seen generally as positive (see Improving Relations, pages 56-57 and Figure II-34). Majorities of Chinese (53%), Indians (58%), and Australians (51%) see relations as improving. A majority of South Koreans (56%) say they are staying the same, though more say they are worsening (34%) than improving (10%).

Further, while there is an overall desire for the United States to have somewhat less influence than it does today, Chinese and Indians do not think it would be a good thing if the United States became significantly less powerful militarily and, especially, economically (see Figure II-32). A majority of Chinese think it would be mainly negative if the United States became significantly less powerful either militarily (52%) or economically (54%). Indians are more ambivalent about the impact of a decline in U.S. power, with a very slight plurality (42%) agreeing that economic decline would be mainly negative, but a very slight plurality (43%) agreeing military decline would be mainly positive. Indeed, most Chinese, Indians, and South Koreans prefer that the United States remain constructively and cooperatively engaged in the world. No more than 14% of respondents in any country want the United States to withdraw from efforts to solve the world’s problems. Instead, a strong majority of South Koreans (79%), Chinese (68%), and a plurality of Indians (42%) want the United States to do its share in efforts to solve international problems by working together with other countries. Only in India do a notable number of people (34%—compared to only 10% in the United States itself) think the United States should continue to be the preeminent leader in solving international problems.

Overall, it seems clear that the Asian publics we surveyed expect and prefer that the United States will play a leadership role in world affairs, even as they are wary of how responsibly that role will be played.

### Great Power Relations in Asia

One possible consequence of the rise of China and India is new fluidity in relations among great powers in Asia. How the emergence of these new powers will affect the relations and balance of power among them, Japan, and the United States will be a vital question in the years to come.

This section looks more closely at the inter-relationships of the four Asian powers—China, India, the United States, and Japan—as they are viewed by the Chinese, Indian, and U.S. publics. American views are included in this analysis because of the
important role the United States plays in the region, as shown in the previous section. While much of the data discussed below has been presented earlier, the focus here is on the patterns of perceived relations between the four nations.

The study reveals that the emergence of China and India as Asian powers is not, so far, accompanied by deep public concern about relations, peace, and stability in the region. The one major exception to this pattern is the apparent tensions in the Sino-Japanese relationship, as evidenced in the strongly negative Chinese attitudes toward Japan. While there is some wariness among Chinese and Americans about the relationship between their two countries (more so on the American side), desires for cooperation in solving regional and world problems bode well for the future of relations.

Emerging Powers

As we have seen in previous sections, both Chinese and Indians believe their countries are robust and rising powers, with the Chinese generally much more convinced of their strong current and future role in both Asia and the world. Responses to the question of whether their countries should take an active part in or stay out of world affairs reflect this, with majorities of both favoring an active role (87% and 56%, respectively). The Chinese public clearly subscribes confidently to strong international engagement, while the substantially lower number among Indians perhaps reflects the somewhat greater sense of vulnerability they show compared to the Chinese, thus tempering somewhat the overall picture of enthusiasm.

Nevertheless, there is a striking contrast between the generally expansive views of both the Chinese and Indian publics about their countries’ emerging roles and the kinds of critical threats and foreign policy goals that preoccupy them (see Figures II-3, II-4, II-12, and II-13). The publics in both countries are less concerned with building up their military power and warding off great-power competition than with jobs, epidemics, and global warming. In India, the public focuses on security threats from the immediate neighborhood. Broader geopolitical issues

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### Figure II-33 – Temperature Ratings

Average rating given to each other’s countries by respondents in the United States, China, and India. One hundred-point scale, with 100 meaning a very warm, favorable feeling, 0 meaning a very cold, unfavorable feeling, and 50 meaning not particularly warm or cold.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Feelings toward U.S.</th>
<th>Feelings toward China</th>
<th>Feelings toward India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese public</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian public</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. public</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Figure II-34 – Bilateral Relations among Great Powers in Asia

Percentage in each country who say relations with the following countries are improving, worsening, or staying about the same.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Relations with U.S.</th>
<th>Relations with China</th>
<th>Relations with India</th>
<th>Relations with Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Worsening</td>
<td>Remaining about the same</td>
<td>Improving</td>
<td>Worsening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
involving the power of the United States and China come further down the list. While the study shows that there is some discomfort with the U.S. military presence in Asia (see pages 52-53 in Wariness of the United States), the degree of concern about this is relatively low and certainly not central. Overall, the way Chinese and Indians view their countries’ goals and threats is a significant departure from the conventional view of emerging regional or global powers.

Improving Relations

While one might expect to see increasing animosities or deteriorating relations signaling a great power shift, the study shows an overall positive picture. Feelings among Chinese and Indians toward the United States and each other are all on the warm side (see Figure II-33). Only the Americans show some coolness, though these feelings toward India and China have shown up fairly consistently in Chicago Council surveys since these thermometer ratings were first included in 1978.

In terms of bilateral relations among the four countries, in no case are relations seen as worsening by a majority of respondents (see Figure II-34). In fact, there is a prevailing perception among Asians of improving bilateral relations—China and India with the United States, India and China with each other, and India with Japan. Only in the case of China’s relations with Japan does a somewhat negative picture emerge: A plurality of Chinese see their relations with Japan as worsening. Americans do not see much change at all in their relations with China, India, and Japan, with a majority or plurality in each case saying relations are staying about the same.

When looking at whether respondents view their bilateral relationships as rivalries or partnerships, the U.S.-Japan, U.S.-India, and China-India relationships are all viewed as partnerships among their respective publics in the countries surveyed. The U.S.-China relationship comes out as a rivalry, but by relatively small margins. Not surprisingly, the China-Japan relationship is seen unambiguously as a rivalry (see Figure II-35). As mentioned previ-
ously, a strong majority of Americans view China and India as mostly rivals, despite those countries’ views of each other as mostly partners.

While the data points to some tension in the U.S.-China relationship, the potential for confrontation between China and the United States does not appear to be highly salient. As mentioned, a majority of Chinese (53%) say relations with the United States are improving, and a plurality of Americans (49%) say China is more important to the United States than Japan (this is up from 2002 when Americans were evenly divided on this question).

Importance of U.S. Role

Further, the importance of the United States in the region overall is not in doubt: The United States is seen as more important by both the Chinese and Indians than any other nation (see Figure II-36). A strong majority of Chinese (63%) say the United States is more important to China than Japan, and a plurality of Indians (45%), by a two-to-one margin, see the United States as more important to India than China (23% China more important). These findings reinforce the view of the United States as the dominant power in the region and as a balancer in the Sino-Japanese relationship, where the greatest tensions exist.

Figure II-36 – Which Country More Important?
Percentage in each country that says one of the following two countries is more important to their country.

Figure II-37 – Trust of Countries to Act Responsibly in the World
Percentage in each country who say the following countries can be trusted somewhat or a great deal, or not much or not at all to act responsibly in the world.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>63%</td>
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<table>
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<td>53%</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>52%</td>
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<td>37%</td>
<td>61%</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>61%</td>
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<th>South Korea</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>46%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>68%</td>
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<table>
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<th>South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>24%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>14%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Trust

Despite these largely positive assessments of great power relations, the U.S., Chinese, and Indian publics do not take for granted that other countries can be relied upon. On the questions of whether each country can be trusted to act responsibly in the world, to take the interests of another country into account when making foreign policy decisions, and to keep its commitments, most respondents do not express confidence that other countries can be so trusted (see Figure II-37). Chinese and Indians do not trust the United States in any case, and Americans and Indians do not trust China in any case. India is trusted only by a plurality of Americans to act responsibly in the world and by a plurality of Chinese to take its interests into account. Otherwise, India is not trusted. Japan, on the other hand, is trusted by Americans and Indians in every case, but never by the Chinese. Most strikingly, and reinforcing again the finding of tension in the Sino-Japanese relationship, the strongest majorities on each question (as high as 80%) are for China’s distrust of Japan.

Support for Cooperation

Despite this perhaps surprising degree of distrust among each other, all nations still favor working

Figure III-38 – U.S., China, and India Working Together
Percentage in each country who say it is very important that the United States, China, and India work together on the following.
together to solve many of the region’s and the world’s problems. The publics in China, India, and the United States view all four countries as playing a positive role in resolving the key problems facing Asia. When asked how important it is that the United States, China, and India work together to address several common problems, more than three-quarters of Chinese, Indians, and Americans agree in every case that working together is important. Some of the highest numbers are for reducing competition over vital energy resources like oil and gas. Pluralities or majorities in all three countries also consider working together to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to countries in Asia and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as very important. Large numbers of Chinese and Indians consider collaboration on expanding trade, raising the standard of living in Asian countries, and resolving conflicts in Asia as very important, while most Americans view these as only “somewhat” important (see Figure II-38 for percentages considering these items “very” important).

The desire to work together to expand trade by Chinese and Indians is reflected in the desire of both countries to have free trade agreements with the United States and Japan and well as with each other. (Americans, however, are not interested in free trade agreements with China or India.) Majorities of Chinese (75%) and Indians (57%) also think that in the future there will be greater economic integration among Asian countries. Pluralities of Chinese (48%) and Indians (47%) think there will be political integration among Asian countries similar to what is occurring among the European countries.

In summary, there is an overall pattern of largely positive perceptions of great power relations in Asia, even as China and India become more influential. While both Chinese and Indians tend to see their relationships with the United States as more important to their interests, there is little evidence of a zero-sum power game developing in the region. Both Chinese and Indians see their relations with each other in quite positive terms despite American perceptions to the contrary. There are, however, clear strains in the Sino-Japanese relationship.

Asia’s emerging powers clearly desire cooperative engagement and want to work together with the United States to resolve current challenges and prevent future problems. Even in regard to the thorny China-Japan relationship, only 12% of Chinese believe that the differences between China and Japan cannot be resolved. Nevertheless, the general mistrust of other nations to behave favorably suggests that the perceptions of the great power game in Asia remain grounded in an appreciation for the maxim that nations have no permanent friends, only permanent interests.

Regional Troublespots

As this study reflects, many of the important regional relationships in Asia have improved in recent years. Relations between India and China have become friendlier, and bilateral trade has skyrocketed. China has shown increased and positive interaction in relations with Southeast Asia, as has Japan. Economic interaction is on the rise, as is cooperation on transnational issues such as public health, trafficking, and other human security issues.

However, there are a number of potential hotspots throughout the region: China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan, and the Korean Peninsula. These are all long-standing disputes. Our survey sheds new light on Asian and U.S. attitudes on these issues, adding depth to a continued conversation and better understanding of the issues involved. While these specific hotspots are addressed in the following sections, respondents to this study also identified possible future sources of conflict in the region, including competition over vital energy resources, the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries in Asia, and others. These issues are covered in Part III of the report.

China-Taiwan

Since 1949 and the defeat of the Nationalists at the hands of the Communists, there has existed a great deal of tension and sometimes outright hostility between mainland China and Taiwan. In recent years, while the status quo has largely prevailed, there have been flare-ups in the relationship as a result of activities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
With China as a growing economic, political, and military power in the region, the concern for stability by regional players is not without merit. However, respondents in most countries surveyed did not regard this dispute as critical to their national interests. Only 8% of South Koreans, 18% of Americans, 32% of Indians, and 33% of Australians think a confrontation between China and Taiwan is a critical threat to the vital interests of their countries in the next ten years (see Figure II-39). Similarly, only 13% of South Koreans, 31% of Americans, and 36% of Indians think that China-Taiwan relations are very likely to be a potential source of future conflict between major powers in Asia. However, a plurality of Chinese (45%) think China’s relations with Taiwan are a very likely potential source of conflict in the future (74% likely overall, including those who say somewhat likely and very likely).

There is a long-running debate in think tank and policy circles, particularly in the United States, as to whether, in the event of Chinese military action against Taiwan, the United States should or should not use U.S. military power to defend Taiwan. While there is general support in the government for such U.S. troop involvement (sans a Taiwanese declaration of independence), survey results of the U.S. public suggest a different story. A full 61% of those surveyed oppose the use of U.S. troops to defend Taiwan in a context that is not specified as multilateral.

**India-Pakistan**

The dispute between India and Pakistan goes back nearly sixty years, and the two countries have fought three wars and one near-war. While this study was not carried out in Pakistan, we can see that this history lives on in Indian views of their country’s international position. Some 53% of Indians think tensions between India and Pakistan are a critical threat to India in the next ten years (see Figure II-40), with a further 29% of Indians thinking the issue is important, but not critical. Perhaps representative of the Indian concerns about Pakistan, 61% of Indians favor the use of nuclear weapons, either in response to a nuclear attack (42%) or in certain circumstances even if it has not suffered a nuclear attack (19%). (This is still less, however, than the numbers of Americans (78%) and Chinese (83%) that find it acceptable to use nuclear weapons under one or the other of these circumstances.) Similarly, and possibly related to the belief that Pakistan has sponsored violence and insurgency in Kashmir and in a number of unrelated parts of India, 53% of Indians believe that India should have the right to go to war to stop neighboring countries from supporting an insurgency within India. Finally, in thinking about the potential sources of conflict between Asian powers in the future, a plurality of 45% of Indians believe that relations between India and Pakistan are very likely to be a source of conflict.

Beyond India, the long-standing dispute between India and its nuclear neighbor draws a surprisingly low degree of concern. Despite its relatively high ranking among Indians as potential source of conflict (third of seven), it ranks last everywhere else (United States, China, and South Korea). This may in part reflect the view that countries other than India and Pakistan believe they are unlikely to get involved in an India-Pakistan conflict. Similarly, on the question of threats to vital interests, few people in the United States or China consider tensions between India and Pakistan to be a critical threat (United States 17%, China 15%, see Figure II-40). Furthermore, a majority of Americans (54%) oppose the use of U.S. troops as part of an

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**Figure II-39 – Confrontation between China and Taiwan as a Critical Threat**

*Percentage in each country who consider a confrontation between China and Taiwan to be a critical threat to their country’s vital interests in the next ten years.*

- Australia: 18%
- India: 33%
- U.S.: 32%
- South Korea: 8%

---
international force to help keep the peace between India and Pakistan. Most Americans (48%) think that the United States should not have long-term military bases in Pakistan. Respondents in China (66%) also feel the United States should not have such bases. Interestingly, a modest plurality of Indians (46% versus 42%) favor long-term U.S. military bases in Pakistan, perhaps reflecting the view that they could serve as a stabilizer in relations between India and Pakistan.

The Korean Peninsula

The situation on the Korean Peninsula is one of the most volatile and complicated in the region. Again, a remnant of the Cold War–era and the splitting of Korea into North and South following World War II, the present condition is a delicate balance for these two countries on either side of the demilitarized zone. In recent years, the so-called Six-Party Talks (between the United States, South Korea, Japan, Russia, China, and North Korea) have been held in an effort to end the North’s nuclear aspirations, while bringing greater stability to the peninsula and the region more generally. So far, the talks have not been very successful. With differences abounding in the diplomatic sphere about how to solve the problem, it is not surprising that this study also finds varying views on the subject.

South Koreans clearly prefer peaceful means for settling the problem. When asked how the North Korean nuclear question can be resolved, 73% of South Koreans say it can be resolved through diplomatic pressure against North Korea (rather than through dialogue between the United States and North Korea, economic sanctions, or the use of military action). This is a dramatic shift from 2004 when

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**Figure II-40 – Tensions between India and Pakistan as a Critical Threat**

Percentage in each country who consider a tension between India and Pakistan to be a critical threat to their country’s vital interests in the next ten years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Too Many</th>
<th>About Right</th>
<th>Too Few</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Figure II-41 – U.S. Troops in South Korea**

Percentage in each country who say the 30,000 troops that the United States currently has in South Korea is too many, too few, or about right.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Too Many</th>
<th>About Right</th>
<th>Too Few</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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An overwhelming majority (81%) believes that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, up from 75% in 2004. While 79% feel at least “a bit” threatened by this prospect, only 30% say they are “very” threatened, and this is down nine points from 39% in 2004. In addition, on the question of threats to vital interests, the possibility of North Korea becoming a nuclear power is now seen as a critical threat by only one-half (50%) of South Koreans, also down nine points from 59% in 2004. When evaluating the impact of North Korea on South Korean security (with no explicit reference to nuclear weapons), 65% of respondents say North Korea is at least “a bit” threatening (38%), if not significantly (27%). In this case, the total is up 24 points from 41% in 2004 (with “a bit” jumping 13 points from 25% to 38% and “significantly” up 9 points from 16% to 27%). This may reflect the broader set of problems in North Korea that can affect South Korea’s security, including economic and political factors. Yet when asked if “the situation” on the Korean Peninsula is likely to be a potential source of conflict between major powers in Asia, only 30% of South Koreans say this is very likely, less than think so in either India or the United States.
more people (50%) thought dialogue between the United States and North Korea would resolve the issue, and only 26% said “diplomatic pressure.” The preference for diplomatic solutions is also reflected in the warm 60-degree thermometer rating given to the Six Party Talks.

In assessing the threat the Korean Peninsula poses to the vital interests of other countries, there is relatively little concern. In China only 23% of those surveyed think this is a critical threat, and only 29% in India see the threat as critical. An identically low 23% of Chinese see the situation on the Korean Peninsula as a “very likely” source of conflict between major powers in Asia in the future, as do only 32% of Indians. Interestingly, Americans are somewhat more concerned, with 38% seeing the problem as a threat to vital interests and 41% seeing it as a very likely source of conflict in the future.

Overall feelings toward North Korea are mixed, as one would expect, in the various Six-Party countries in the study. On the thermometer scale the United States has a very negative feeling toward North Korea (23 degrees). A conflicted South Korea falls right in the middle, essentially neutral at 49 degrees. Reflecting the historical friendship that exists between China and North Korea, Chinese respondents have a quite warm (73) feeling toward North Korea.

In the event of hostilities between North and South, Americans are split over the use of U.S. troops. Forty-five percent are in favor of using U.S. troops if North Korea invaded South Korea, while 49% are opposed. However, in a show of support for multilateral action, and as mentioned in Part I, 65% of Americans favor U.S. contributions to military forces, together with other countries, to a UN-sponsored effort to reverse the aggression if North Korea were to attack South Korea. Indeed, the American commitment to South Korea remains strong: 62% say they want the United States to have long-term military bases in South Korea. Nevertheless, American opinion tilts toward wanting to reduce the number of troops in South Korea (see Figure II-41). While 42% of Americans say the 30,000 troops the U.S. currently has in South Korea is about right, another 42% say it is too many, and only 10% say it is too few. The majority (54%) of South Koreans believe that the level of U.S. troops is about right, though 36% also think there are too many. Chinese respondents think that there are too many U.S. troops in South Korea (65%).
Part III: Addressing Global Challenges

This section of the report takes a closer look at public views on a number of issues that engage Asia and the world and that represent important challenges for the international system: nuclear proliferation, energy resources, trade, the environment, human rights, multilateral cooperation, and the use of force. While many of the findings have been discussed separately in previous sections as they relate to each country, this section brings many of the questions together to provide a more comprehensive picture of each of these challenges. The emergence of China and India as increasingly powerful players, and India’s effort to develop a larger role in international institutions, especially the UN Security Council, will affect how the world deals with them.

In principle, there is a remarkable consensus on the importance of some of the issues covered in this section. Except for China, the public in all countries surveyed attaches great importance to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Global warming, epidemic disease, energy shortages, and trade figure above the midpoint of most assessments of foreign policy priorities. Human rights draw a surprisingly strong response, including a widespread willingness to contemplate military action under UN auspices. There is strong support for strengthening the United Nations. Indeed, the apparent popular agreement across the region in all these areas stands in contrast to the sharp disagreements that have accompanied efforts to reach formal international agreement on them.

But one can also discern the seeds of a more complicated future. Several of the issues addressed in this section are also looked on as “likely” or even “very likely” sources of conflict in Asia. The clearest example is energy, which all countries surveyed placed at the top of their list of potential conflict areas. India and China are expected to be the two most rapidly growing energy markets in the next decade. They have concluded a cooperation agreement, but have also disagreed over energy deals. The competition between these two fast-growing economic powers and Japan and the United States for energy supplies is likely to intensify, further aggravating today’s tight supplies. In addition, as energy usage grows and development continues, addressing the environmental impact of China’s and India’s rise will become ever more critical.

As India and China become more internationally active, the international community will need to factor them into the way it deals with the economic and political issues discussed in this section. The way they deal with nuclear nonproliferation, for example, will have a major impact on the success of international efforts to prevent new countries from entering the nuclear weapons club. Their size makes them critical to the future of environmental efforts, trade negotiations, and epidemic prevention. The region’s strong expressed commitment to cooperation is reassuring, but it is likely to be tested in the years to come.
Nuclear Proliferation

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is viewed as one of the most pressing problems among the publics of most countries surveyed for this study and support for efforts to stop proliferation is strong, including the use of force. On the list of threats to vital interests, the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers is considered “critical” by majorities in Australia (70%), the United States (69%, up from 64% in 2004), and India (55%). In South Korea a plurality (50%) sees this as a critical threat (down from 59% in 2004), a surprising finding given the nuclear weapons program of North Korea. This may be because most believe North Korea already has nuclear weapons and therefore it cannot be prevented. It could also reflect the optimism South Koreans have that the problem can be resolved diplomatically (see Korean Peninsula, pages 61-62). Chinese are the least concerned, with just 28% calling the threat critical. Nevertheless, in all countries but China the threat is ranked high relative to other threats (see Figure III-1). For the United States and Australia it is the second-highest ranked threat, for India third, and for South Korea fourth.

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is also a top foreign policy goal for most countries. This goal is considered very important by majorities in Australia (82%), the United States (74%, 73% in 2004), India (56%), South Korea (56%), and China (52%). Again, it is surprising that the number for South Korea is not higher. In addition, only 48% of South Koreans see preventing North Korea from developing nuclear weapons as a very important goal (asked only in South Korea). But in the United States, Australia, and India, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons ranks high relative to other foreign policy goals.

Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries in Asia is seen as a very important area for cooperation between the United States, China, and India by 67% of Americans, 51% of Indians, and 48% of Chinese. From a list of six such areas for potential cooperation between these three countries, it ranks first for the United States, third for Indians, and fifth for Chinese.

This substantial level of concern for nuclear proliferation is also reflected in very high levels of support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Asked whether their country should participate in the treaty that would prohibit nuclear weapon test explosions worldwide, very large majorities in the United States (86%) South Korea (86%), and China (73%) say that it should. A majority in India also agree, though the majority is not as large (57%). Notably, of these four, only South Korea has signed and ratified the CTBT. The United States and China have both signed but not ratified it, and India has not signed it.

A key part of treaty-based efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation is international inspections of national facilities—something that some people find offensive to their sense of national sovereignty. However, on the question of inspections related to the biological weapons treaty, very large majorities generally show a readiness to accept such inspections (see Figure III-2). Asked whether their country should participate in an agreement under the treaty banning biological weapons that would allow international inspectors to examine biological research laboratories to ensure that countries are not producing biological weapons, participation is endorsed by 89% in the United States, 86% in South Korea, and 65% in China. Once again, Indian support is somewhat lower, with a plurality of 50% favoring participation and 32% opposing it. This may reflect that nation’s very recent experience in resisting international pressures to inspect its nuclear facilities.

Figure III-1 – Nuclear Proliferation as a Critical Threat
Percentage in each country calling the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers a critical threat and ranking of this threat among all threats asked about in that country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percent critical</th>
<th>Rank</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2 out of 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2 out of 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3 out of 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4 out of 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7 out of 11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Concern about nuclear proliferation is also evident in the response to a question about the U.S.-India nuclear deal, in which the United States has agreed to sell nuclear technology to India despite the U.S. prohibition of nuclear assistance to any country that does not accept international monitoring of all its nuclear facilities. Seventy-one percent of respondents in the United States and 64% in China agree with the argument that selling India civilian nuclear technology is a bad idea because it will suggest to other countries that they can develop nuclear weapons and get away with it. However, Indians themselves are divided on the issue. While 39% do not favor this deal, a plurality of 42% think it is a good idea because it will strengthen U.S.-India relations and contribute to peace and stability in Asia. The 39% of Indians who say it is a bad idea likely reflects opposition to the deal because of concern it would place limits on India’s military nuclear program.

Similarly, support is strong for the recent suggestion that certain countries not be allowed to develop nuclear fuel out of concern they will use it to develop nuclear weapons. In the past, the international community has agreed (under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) that all countries have the right to produce nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes. When asked if this proposal is a good idea or a bad idea, majorities in the United States (66%) and China (57%) say it is a good idea, as does a plurality in India (49% to 36%).

A substantial number of respondents feel that the prospect of a country acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a legitimate casus belli. As mentioned in Part I, 60% of Americans believe that countries, on their own, should have the right to go to war with another country they believe may pose a threat to them if they have strong evidence that the other country is acquiring weapons of mass destruction that could be used against them at some point in the future. A bare majority of Indians agree (51%). Views are evenly divided in China, while a majority of South Koreans (62%) say countries should not have such a right. This likely reflects South Koreans’ lower overall level of concern about the problem of proliferation, their proximity to a country that might be a candidate for war in this scenario as well as the historically more pacifist orientation of the public against the use of force in general.

A slightly greater consensus forms around the view that the UN Security Council should have the right to authorize the use of military force to prevent a country that does not have nuclear weapons from acquiring them (see Figure III-3). A majority in the United States (62%) and India (53%) say the UN Security Council should have this right. A plurality of the Chinese (47% to 40%) agree. A smaller majority of South Koreans (55%) oppose the UN Security Council having this right than oppose countries having this right on their own. The fact that 53% of Indians support the UN Security Council having this power is striking in light of India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons during a period when most UN members had signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that forbids new countries from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Support for the UN Security Council having the right to authorize force to prevent a country from producing nuclear fuel that could be used to produce nuclear weapons is at similar levels (see Figure III-3). A majority in the United States (57%) believe the UN Security Council should have this right. Pluralities in India (50%) and China (47%) also believe the Security Council should have this right. But, again, a majority in South Korea (56%) opposes this right.
Consistent with their desire to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, large majorities reject the idea that nuclear weapons should be used for any purpose beyond responding to a nuclear attack. When presented three options on possible uses of nuclear weapons, only small minorities support the view that in certain circumstances, their country should use nuclear weapons even if it has not suffered a nuclear attack (United States 20%, China 28%, India 19%). The numbers for using nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear attack are 58% for the United States, 55% for China, and 42% for India (a plurality). Only small minorities support the nuclear pacifist position that nuclear weapons should never be used under any circumstances (United States 20%, China 13%, India 22%).

The Case of Iran

All of the key issues surrounding nuclear proliferation arise in relation to Iran's capacity to produce nuclear fuel through enriching uranium. Competing factors, including fears about Iran gaining nuclear weapons, norms about the right to use force, and feelings about the United States and Iran, combine to produce a complex set of responses to a series of questions on this topic.

In no country does a majority or plurality accept Iran's position that it is producing enriched uranium strictly for its energy needs. Majorities in the United States (80%), Australia (59%), and India (51%) and a plurality in China (45%) believe instead that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons. Only small minorities believe that Iran is enriching uranium strictly to fuel its energy needs (India 29%, China 25%, Australia 22%, United States 16%). Significant numbers are “not sure” in China (30%), India (22%), and Australia (19%).

On the question of how concerned people would be if Iran were to develop nuclear weapons, responses are quite diverse (see Figure III-4). Americans and Australians show high levels of concern. Eighty-seven percent of Americans are very (63%) or somewhat (24%) concerned, as are 82% of Australians (55% very, 27% somewhat). On the other hand, the Chinese and Indians are divided. A plurality (48%) in India is concerned (22% very much, 26% somewhat), while 44% show little (22%) or no concern (22%). Chinese are divided, with 46%...
showing concern about Iran developing nuclear weapons (14% very much, 32% somewhat), and the same number showing little (35%) or no concern (11%).

Asked whether the use of U.S. troops would be justified to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, a majority of Americans (62%) respond affirmatively, while a clear majority in South Korea (59%) are opposed. (This question was not asked in China or India).

However, when asked to choose between three positions regarding a military strike against Iran’s nuclear energy facilities, a majority of Americans, in addition to majorities of Chinese and Indians, are only ready to support doing so as part of a multilateral operation (see Figure III-5). The most popular view in all three countries is for the United States to undertake a military strike only if the United Nations authorizes the strike and other allies participate (United States 58%, China 45%, and India 37%). Much smaller numbers of respondents—18% of Americans, 6% of Chinese, and 20% of Indians—are ready to support a strike even if the United States has to act on its own. Of all respondents, one in three in China, one in four in India, and one in five in the United States believe the United States should not undertake a military strike under any circumstances.

When given a fuller range of options, majorities in all three countries prefer nonmilitary approaches to dealing with Iran rather than a military strike (see Figure III-6). Asked to choose between four options on what the UN Security Council should do if Iran continues to enrich uranium (even though the Security Council has asked Iran to stop), the authorization of a military strike is endorsed by just 18% of Americans, 4% of Chinese, and 11% of Indians. Imposing economic sanctions is the most popular American position (41%), endorsed by 16% of Chinese and 26% of Indians. Simply continuing diplomatic efforts is the most popular position for the Chinese (50%) and the Indians (33%), but is also supported by a notable 35% of Americans. Not pressuring Iran at all is quite unpopular with Americans (3%), Chinese (10%), and Indians (17%).
Environment and Epidemic Disease

The effect of rapid economic growth in China and India that is being powered by fossils fuels, coupled with already high levels of emissions in the United States and other developed countries, is contributing to increased greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. Some project that this could lead to shifts in weather patterns could produce permanent shortfalls of precipitation in areas that are currently fertile, leading to destabilizing migration flows, political instability, and an increased risk of war.

As mentioned throughout this report, recognition of and concern about global warming is, indeed, growing. Global warming ranks high on the list of threats to vital interests among a large number of respondents in this study (see Figure III-7). In South Korea it tops the list of possible threats to the country’s vital interests, with 67% regarding it as a critical threat. In Australia it is third out of twelve threats, with 68% considering it critical, behind the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers and disruption in energy supply. In China, too, it comes in third, with 47% regarding it as critical. In India (51%) and the United States (47%), it comes in about the middle of the list of possible threats, in sixth out of thirteen in both cases. Substantial numbers also consider global warming an “important,” if not critical, threat.

The public in the countries surveyed are apparently quite prepared to take action on environmental issues. Only small percentages of the publics in the United States, China, India, and Australia believe the evidence for global warming is so weak that no action with economic costs need be taken (see Figure III-8). The largest percentage with this view is in India (24%), followed by the United States (17%), with the percentages in China and Australia in single digits. All agree that some action must be taken, though there is considerable variation in the respondents’ willingness to consider substantial economic costs. A strong majority of Australians and pluralities of Chinese and Americans prefer to begin taking action now even if this involves significant costs. Indians prefer to deal with the problem gradually by taking steps that are low in cost. In addition, Chinese and Indians favor less-developed countries making a commitment to limit their greenhouse gas emissions if developed countries are willing to provide substantial aid, by 79% to 8% in China, and by 48% to 29% in India. Relatedly, 64% of Americans think that developed countries should provide substantial aid to developing countries if they make a commitment to limit their greenhouse gas emissions.

In addition, many people are sensitive to the effect of economic activity on the environment, with a plurality (49%) in both South Korea and the United States calling global warming a critical threat and ranking of this threat among all threats asked about in that country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percent critical</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>3 out of 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1 out of 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>6 out of 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3 out of 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6 out of 13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
United States saying international trade is bad for the environment. In China and India small majorities (58% and 51%, respectively) think trade is good for the environment. This could reflect recognition that environmental improvement can result from trade in environmentally friendly technologies and that rising fortunes can make more funds available for addressing environmental issues.

The strong perception of the threat of global warming is further reflected in public views of foreign policy goals. For Australians, improving the global environment is the top foreign policy goal, with 87% considering it very important. In the other countries “improving the global environment” ranks about the middle of the list of foreign policy goals. In each case, however, a majority say it is very important, with 60% saying so in South Korea, 54% each in China and the United States, and 51% in India.

In the two countries surveyed about the Kyoto agreement to reduce global warming, large majorities favor having their country participate: 70% in the United States, and 88% in South Korea.

Overwhelming majorities in the United States (91%) and China (85%) favor incorporating minimum environmental standards into trade agreements. Even in India, a large majority (60%) favors such standards, with only 28% opposed.

The threat from AIDS, avian flu, and other potential epidemics is also taken very seriously across Asia (see Figure III-9). In China it tops the list of eleven threats, with 64% of respondents considering it critical. In India it is the second highest ranking threat at 60% critical, behind international terrorism and above India-Pakistan tensions and the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers. The high levels of public concern in both countries is remarkable and may reflect both countries’ recent experience with avian flu outbreaks as well as China’s experience with the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak. Epidemics are listed as the third or fifth most important threats in South Korea (59% critical) and Australia (58% critical). Only in the United States is the number considering it critical below half (49%).

### Energy

The issue of energy is quickly becoming one of the most critical challenges in the world today. In a little over a decade, China has changed from a net oil exporter to the second largest oil importer, behind only the United States. The growing demand for oil from Asian countries, especially China and India, has been one reason for the spike in oil prices. These high prices, however, have highlighted the costs of growth, raised concerns about energy dependence, and given rise to fears about “energy nationalism.”

The growing problem of access to energy resources is clearly being recognized by publics in Asia and the United States. On the question of critical threats to vital interests, respondents in all countries except India put disruption in energy supply near the top of the list. Fifty-three percent of Chinese respondents believe disruption in energy supply is a critical threat, second behind AIDS, avian flu, and other potential epidemics. Another 30% see the energy issue as “important.” For South Koreans, the energy issue ranks second behind global warming with even higher percentages (64% critical and 31% important but not critical). Interestingly, a majority of Australians, whose country is an energy exporter, see disruption in energy supply as a critical threat (51%). Indians are less concerned about
the energy issue, placing disruption in energy supply in the middle of the list of critical threats.

The preferred foreign policy goals reflect the same thinking. Securing adequate supplies of energy is considered a very important foreign policy goal by majorities in all countries surveyed. In China it is seen as very important by 61% of respondents, third on the list of very important foreign policy goals behind the two economic goals of protecting the jobs of Chinese workers and promoting economic growth. In India, securing adequate supplies of energy is again in the middle of the list of very important foreign policy goals.

Rising concern about energy security has prompted national and corporate leaders in Asian countries to make greater efforts to secure long-term oil deals. Sometimes these efforts have pitted Asian nations or corporations against each other in bidding for oil assets or access. Indeed, competition for access to energy is viewed as a potential source of conflict between major powers in Asia in the future (see Figure III-10). When judging a number of potential sources of conflict between major powers in Asia, more people in each country surveyed believe competition over vital energy resources like oil and gas will be a very or somewhat likely source of conflict than any other item asked about. Ninety percent of Americans, 94% of South Koreans, 84% of Chinese, and 79% of Indians say such competition is either somewhat or very likely.

Striking, majorities of Chinese (63%) and Indians (54%) think countries, on their own, should have the right to go to war with another country they believe may pose a threat to them in order to preserve access to vital resources such as energy (see Figure III-11). American are split on this issue, with 47% saying countries should have this right and 48% saying they should not.

When asked how important it is that the United States, China, and India work together on reducing competition over vital energy resources like oil and gas, 90% of Americans, 83% of Chinese, and 82% of Indians believe cooperation is either very important or somewhat important.

Economic Security, Globalization, and Trade

Not surprisingly, economic issues figure prominently as concerns among the publics of all countries, though there is substantial variation in views of how globalization and trade affect economic security at home. Chinese, especially, have embraced international economic integration and believe they are benefiting greatly from it. Americans, on the other hand, who are seeing the effects on jobs of growing manufacturing and service sectors in other countries as well as of high U.S. trade imbalances, especially with China, are substantially less enamored of globalization and trade.

The threat of direct economic competition persists does not appear to strike a chord among the publics surveyed in this study, at least when compared...
with the many other threats facing nations today. Economic competition from low-wage countries, economic competition from Asian countries, and economic competition from the United States do not rank high on the list of possible critical threats for the countries surveyed. Both Chinese and Indians seem relatively unconcerned about economic competition from the United States (29% and 39% critical, respectively) or from other Asian countries (25% and 33% critical, respectively), and Americans are even less concerned about competition from Asian countries (24% critical).

However, this does not mean that economics and the effects of global economic trends are being lost on the general public. The importance of economic issues can be seen perhaps most clearly on the list of foreign policy goals considered very important. As noted in Part I, for Americans, protecting the jobs of American workers tops the list of very important foreign policy goals. For the Chinese, protecting jobs (71%), promoting economic growth (63%), and securing energy supplies (61%) are the top three very important foreign policy goals. For South Koreans, economic growth (79%), protecting jobs (68%), protecting the interests of South Korean businesses abroad (65%), and securing energy supplies (63%) are the top four goals considered very important. While economic-related goals are not in either of the top two spots for Indians, they are in the next four spots: protecting jobs (54%), economic growth (54%), combating world hunger (54%), and securing energy supplies (52%).

**Trade and Development**

Such preoccupation with growth and jobs is reflected in our findings on globalization and international trade. In spite of the current impasse in the Doha Round of global trade talks, there is broad support for globalization (see Figure III-12). In China there is virtually a full embrace of globalization, with 87% believing globalization is “mostly good.” South Koreans feel the same way, with 86% saying it is mostly good. Sixty-four percent of Australians agree, as do 60% of Americans. Indians are perhaps the least sure, although a slight majority (54%) still agrees that globalization is mostly good. Interestingly, these findings seem to parallel the degree to which these countries are trade-dependent. The most trade-dependent countries (China and South Korea) embrace globalization almost wholeheartedly. The view is still positive but more guarded in countries where trade accounts for a smaller share of GDP (Australia, the United States, and India).

The broad support for globalization does not mean that survey respondents think globalization is an unalloyed benefit. In fact, survey respondents throughout the region make important distinctions about the differential impact of international trade. In China and South Korea there is an overwhelming sense that international trade is good for their countries’ economies (88% good in China, 80% good in South Korea), similar to their views about globalization more broadly. They feel almost as strongly that international trade is good for companies in their countries (78% good in both countries). On the question of whether international trade is good for “consumers like you,” responses are still positive but somewhat less (69% good in China, 68% good in South Korea).

In the United States, only 54% say international trade is good for the U.S. economy, and only 52% say it is good for U.S. companies, but 73% say it is good for consumers.

![Figure III-12 – Globalization: Good or Bad for Countries](image-url)
On the question of whether international trade is good or bad for one’s own standard of living, 73% of the Chinese, 64% of Americans, and 56% of South Koreans think it is good. International trade is viewed quite positively overall in India as well. Sixty-four percent of Indians say it is good for their economy, 61% say it is good for consumers, 59% say it is good for Indian companies, and 54% say it is good for their standard of living.

Trade and Jobs

Much more dramatic differences show up on views about the relationship between international trade and jobs. Chinese have the most favorable assessment, with 73% saying international trade is good for creating jobs in China. This compares with 60% in South Korea, and 56% in India. In contrast, 60% of Americans think international trade is bad for creating jobs in the United States. On the question of whether international trade is good or bad for job security, the numbers are somewhat less among Asians surveyed, though still positive, and Americans are even more negative (see Figure III-13). Chinese are still the most positive, with 65% saying international trade is good for job security for its workers. This compares with a slight majority of 51% in South Korea and a plurality of 49% in India. Only 30% in the United States feel the same way, while 67% say international trade is bad for job security.

The pervasive sense of job insecurity in developed economies such as the United States, and to some extent in newly emerging countries such as India, make it more challenging for political leaders to mobilize public support for further trade liberalization. A substantial majority of survey respondents in China, India, and the United States favor including minimum standards for working conditions as part of international trade agreements. While it is no surprise that 93% of the Americans surveyed support such conditions, what is remarkable is that 84% of the Chinese surveyed agree, as do 56% of the Indians surveyed.

Trade Practices

Respondents in the study are quite sensitive to the issue of fairness in trade. While China is the world’s fast-rising trading power, its trading partners apparently think it is achieving this unfairly. Indeed, a majority or plurality of the respondents in every survey country, 58% in the United States, 54% in South Korea, and 36% in India (versus 34% fair) believe China practices unfair trade.

American and Japanese trading behavior is not well received in East Asia: 75% of South Koreans and 53% of the Chinese think the United States practices unfair trade. The South Koreans (71%) and Chinese (55%) are equally unhappy with Japanese trading behavior. In both cases, Indians are less critical, with a plurality considering both Japan and the United States to be fair traders (45% and 40%, respectively).

In contrast, perceptions of India are more positive. A majority of Chinese and South Koreans (58% and 57%, respectively) think India is practicing fair trade. Perceptions of South Korea are mixed in the United States and India, though pluralities say its trade is fair (44% and 40%, respectively). A strong majority of 64% of Chinese think South Korea is practicing fair trade.

Among the countries surveyed in the Asia-Pacific, Australia has the best reputation for practicing fair trade: A majority or plurality of respondents in every survey country perceives Australia as practicing fair trade.

Working within the WTO

Although respondents throughout the region see trade as an important element in their national
lives, they have mixed feelings about using the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement mechanisms (see Figure III-14). As mentioned in Part I, when asked whether their country should comply with a WTO ruling even if it goes against their country, a robust 73% of Americans say “yes,” while 22% say “no.” By contrast, public support for compliance with negative WTO rulings is limited in South Korea and India. In South Korea a majority (52%) is against compliance, while only 37% are for it. In India a plurality (37%) favor compliance, but 29% oppose it, and 21% say it depends.

Even though China only joined the WTO at the end of 2001 and is still in the process of meeting the terms of its WTO membership, more Chinese are ready to accept WTO rulings. Fifty-eight percent of Chinese would comply with a negative ruling, and another 16% say it depends, compared with only 19% who do not favor compliance.

Promoting Free Trade Agreements

With talks in the Doha Round of the WTO’s trade negotiations suspended, many countries are pursuing trade agreements with other countries separately. Support is generally strong for such agreements, except in the United States. The United States stands out as every other country’s desirable free trade partner: A majority of the respondents in each Asian country included in the survey, ranging from 54% in South Korea and 55% in India to 66% in China, support signing a free trade agreement with the United States. Americans, however, think quite differently. More Americans oppose signing free trade agreements with China, India, or South Korea than favor them (see Figure III-15). Only in the case of Japan are more Americans in favor of an agreement, though not a majority. This is hardly surprising. Although the United States has implemented free trade agreements with several countries in the past, the concept of free trade areas has never had widespread popular support because of the perceived link to job losses.

Support for a free trade agreement with Japan among other Asian countries is much weaker than that for the United States. Again, China leads, with 53% in favor, followed by South Korea at 50%. India is somewhat reluctant, with 48 in favor (though 27% are not sure). This probably reflects these countries historical grievances with Japan (see Japan, pages 46-47).

While Americans are reluctant to sign free trade agreements with any of the countries in the survey except Japan, the Chinese are in favor of signing such agreements with every one of them (the United States, India, South Korea, and Japan). This study in contrast between American and Chinese public attitudes toward free trade agreements suggests strong Chinese confidence in their ability to benefit from trade and points to substantial public support for China’s leaders to take a proactive role in promoting free trade. This won’t happen easily, however. Apart from South Korea, where 66% of respondents would support signing a free trade agreement with China, only 34% of Americans and 44% of Indians are willing to do the same.

India gets a mixed reception in terms of free trade agreements. Sixty-five percent of South Koreans and 59% of Chinese support signing a free trade agreement with India, but as mentioned, Americans are against it (54%). A plurality of Indians (40%) support a free trade agreement with South Korea, though more than one-third (34%) in India are unsure (26% are against it).

Interestingly, the Chinese and South Koreans support region-wide free trade arrangements even though China and South Korea have lodged com-
plaints against Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Fully 80% of South Koreans and 69% of Chinese think there should be an East Asia free trade area including China, Japan, and South Korea. China and Japan are already racing to complete free trade agreements with ASEAN. In addition, majorities of Chinese (75%) and Indians (57%) also think that in the future there will be greater economic integration among Asian countries.

Support for regional free trade arrangements is reflected in the thermometer ratings toward ASEAN and APEC. Chinese have very favorable feelings toward both (68 degrees toward ASEAN and 73 toward APEC), as does South Korea (61 toward ASEAN and 64 toward APEC). Feelings in India, however, are slightly on the cool side (48 toward ASEAN and 46 toward APEC)—not surprising given that India wants to join both forums but has not been invited. Incidentally, feelings toward the World Trade Organization are in some cases even higher, especially among Indians. The WTO receives a rating of 79 from Chinese, 62 from South Koreans, and 67 from Indians. Only Americans are less enthusiastic, giving the WTO a neutral 50.
Human Rights

The rising importance of China and India as stakeholders in the international system may have ramifications for norms on human rights. It is thus particularly interesting that our findings indicate general agreement across survey countries on human rights goals and approaches to dealing with human rights violations.

The goal of promoting and defending human rights ranks in the bottom half of foreign policy goals for all the countries in which the question was asked. Twenty-eight percent of Americans (ranking it eleventh out of fourteen goals) say it is a very important foreign policy goal, though 48% in India (tenth out of eleven) and 68% in Australia (seventh out of thirteen) believe this is a very important goal.

While defending human rights is not seen as a high priority goal, there is majority support in these countries for having a multilateral framework for using force to accomplish certain humanitarian goals. On the question of whether the UN Security Council should or should not have the right to authorize the use of military force in each of six different cases, the highest level of support from the American public (83%) goes to preventing severe human rights violations such as genocide. This is equal to the percentage who support the UN authorizing force to defend a country that has been attacked (see Figure III-16). Remarkably, the Chinese public also strongly believes that the UN Security Council should have the right to authorize the use of force even against the will of a country’s government. Support among Indians is about 12 percentage points lower than in the previous scenario, which did not explicitly state this. It is possible that the issue may resonate with the Indian public’s fears of a possible UN intervention in Kashmir. Chinese support, on the other hand, is even higher on this question of the responsibility to authorize force even against the will of a country’s government.

Support for the use of force through the United Nations is also high in the case of Darfur, a region of the Sudan where violence against ethnic groups is raging. Many human rights groups have criticized the international community for the lack of effective response to this large-scale crisis. Despite Majorities in the United States, China, and India also agree that the UN Security Council has the responsibility to intervene in countries where severe human rights violations such as genocide may be occurring, even against the will of those countries’ governments. When asked whether they believe the Security Council does or does not have this responsibility, 72% in the United States, 76% in China, and 51% in India say it does. On this question, which explicitly states that the authorization of force may occur even against the will of a country’s own government (and which differentiates between the right to authorize force and the responsibility to authorize it), support among Indians is about 12 percentage points lower than in the previous scenario, which did not explicitly state this.
the minimal actions taken to stop the hostilities, the majority of respondents in the United States (83%), China (58%), and India (59%) indicate that the UN Security Council at least has the right, if not the responsibility to authorize intervention. Among Americans, the most people (48%) say the Security Council has the responsibility, not just the right (35%). In addition, as discussed in Part I, 65% of Americans favor the use of U.S. troops to be part of an international peacekeeping force to stop the killing in Darfur (asked only in the United States).

Beliefs about human rights were also tested on a question about changing the rules against torture in light of the fight against terrorism (see Figure III-17). Strong majorities in the United States and China do not believe the rules against torture should be altered. Only 30% of Americans and 18% of Chinese say that terrorists pose such an extreme threat that governments should now be allowed to use torture if it may gain information that saves innocent lives. Rather, 67% of Americans and 69% of Chinese say that rules against torture should be maintained because torture is morally wrong and weakening these rules may lead to the torture of its country’s soldiers who are held prisoners abroad. In India, though, the opposite is true: 46% say that governments should now be allowed to use torture rather than that the rules against torture should be maintained (38%). The views of the Indian public on this issue may have been strongly affected by the recent terrorist attacks on commuter trains in Mumbai, India. Polling was already under way in the country when these events occurred on July 11, 2006. India has suffered a number of similar terrorist attacks in its recent past.

Seeing that publics in all countries show wide support for protection of human rights, it is not at all unexpected that international human rights groups hold a favorable place in the public mind. On the thermometer scale of international organizations, feelings toward these groups in all countries are above 50 degrees (neutral), with South Koreans giving the highest mean rating of 69. Americans give international human rights groups an average rating of 56, which places them behind only the World Health Organization. The average rating given by Indians is 58.

The high level of support for human rights does not hold up in the case of spreading democracy to other nations. Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations ranks the lowest of all foreign policy goals in all countries where the question was presented. It is considered a very important goal by 41% in India, 38% in Australia, 21% in South Korea, and only 17% in the United States. Among Americans, using U.S. troops to install democratic governments in states where dictators rule drew the biggest opposition (66%) of the eleven scenarios presented for using U.S. troops. Opinion is more mixed on the question of the UN Security Council having the right to authorize military force to restore a democratic government that has been overthrown. Of the six situations asked about, this one draws the lowest level of support in China (37%) and South Korea (32%). Majorities in the United States (57%) and India (51%) support the United Nations having this right.6

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6. American respondents also give the same level of support (57%) for the right of the Security Council to authorize military force to prevent a country that does not have nuclear weapons from producing nuclear fuel that could be used to produce nuclear weapons.
still being played out around the globe. With U.S. efforts in Iraq and in the war against terrorism have come significant debates about multilateral versus unilateral action in the international arena. A rising Asia is at the heart of many of these debates. While these arguments will continue to be played out at the highest levels of government, this study of public attitudes in Asia and the United States reveals a major show of support for multilateral efforts.

At the heart of this multilateralism is the question of whether people support joint decision making within the United Nations (see Figure III-18). When asked whether their country should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations when dealing with international problems, even if this means that their country will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice, most people surveyed agree. Majorities agree in the United States (60%) and China (78%), while a plurality agrees in India (44%, with 35% disagreeing). In South Korea opinion is split, with 49% disagreeing and 48% agreeing.

Even more striking, majorities in all countries favor most of the steps to strengthen the United Nations that figured in our questionnaire. Sixty percent of Americans, 59% of Chinese, 57% of Indians, and 75% of South Koreans favor giving the United Nations the power to regulate the international arms trade. The numbers in favor of having a standing UN peacekeeping force are similar: 72% of Americans, 62% of Chinese, 58% of Indians, and 68% of South Koreans. Perhaps most striking are the numbers in favor of giving the UN authority to go into countries to investigate violations of human rights (75% of Americans, 57% of Chinese, 54% of Indians, and 74% of South Koreans) and to create an international marshals service that could arrest leaders responsible for genocide (75% of Americans, 57% of Chinese, 57% of Indians, and 77% of South Koreans). Only on the issue of giving the UN the power to fund its activities by imposing a small tax on such things as the international sale of arms or oil does some opposition creep into responses (50% opposed in the United States).

Support for cooperation through international institutions is also clear in the thermometer ratings toward these organizations (see Figure III-19), including the World Trade Organization, United Nations, World Bank, multinational corporations, International Monetary Fund, international human rights groups, the World Court, the World Health Organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Among Asian nations surveyed, feelings are generally warm in almost all cases. Only in the case of India’s feelings toward ASEAN and APEC, discussed previously, are temperatures on the cool side. India
feels neutral toward SAARC (a rating of 51). It is perhaps most interesting, however, to note that U.S. respondents generally have the most tepid feelings toward international organizations, showing somewhat cool feelings toward the World Bank, multinational corporations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Court, and showing neutral feelings toward the WTO. On the other hand, the Chinese had the overall warmest feelings toward all these international organizations.

Support for participation in international treaties and agreements is also strong. Besides the support already mentioned for participation in the Kyoto agreement to reduce global warming, the treaty that would prohibit nuclear weapon test explosions worldwide, and an agreement on inspections under the treaty banning biological weapons, there is tremendous support in South Korea (87%) and the United States (71%)—the only countries where this question was asked—for their countries to participate in the International Criminal Court.

When it comes to expanding the UN Security Council to include India or Japan, however, views diverge, reflecting the state of relations between countries in the region. All countries (the United States, China, India, and South Korea) favor a seat for India on the Security Council, but to widely divergent degrees (75% of Indians and a 37% plurality of Chinese). However, while support for adding Japan to the Security Council is strong in the United States and India, the Chinese (75%) and South Koreans (72%) are strongly opposed. As discussed in other areas of this report, this opposition is surely tied to the historical animosity that exists toward Japan as a result of World War II and other grievances.

Other countries also clearly support multilateral uses of force. As discussed in other sections of this report, there are high levels of support for the UN Security Council having the right to authorize the use of military force to prevent severe human right violations such as genocide. There is also strong support for UN action to stop a country from supporting terrorist groups (United States 76%, China 67%, India 60%, and South Korea 61%) and to defend a country that has been attacked (United States 83%, China 70%, India 67%, and South Korea 76%). As discussed in the Nuclear Proliferation section, levels of support for the UN Security Council having the right to authorize the use of military force to prevent a country that does not have nuclear weapons from acquiring them are slightly higher than for unilateral action in a similar scenario (United States 62%, China 47%, India 53%, and South Korea 44%). And all but South Korea support UN action to prevent a country that does not have nuclear weapons from producing nuclear fuel that could be used to produce nuclear weapons. These are again, striking findings in support of preventive uses of force. However, as discussed previously, there is very little support for a military strike on Iran to stop it from enriching uranium. Nonmilitary options are greatly preferred in this case.

The clear support for working cooperatively through international institutions does not, however, preclude people from supporting unilateral military operations when deemed necessary. There is, not surprisingly, strong support among the various publics for a country’s right to go to war if another country attacks them first (90% of Americans, 79% of Chinese, 61% of Indians, and 86% of South Koreans), or to maintain their territorial integrity (58% of Americans, 81% of Chinese, 55% of Indians, and 71% of South Koreans). There is also generally strong support for a country’s right to go to war if it has strong evidence that the country is in imminent danger of being attacked by another country: 79% of Americans, 60% of Chinese, 52% of Indians, and 57% of Koreans believe their countries should have the right to go to war in such a situation. Support for war to stop a neighboring country from supporting an insurgency within their own country ranges from a high of 56% (China) to a low of 42% (South Korea), with the range supporting war to preserve access to vital resources such as energy goes from 37% to 63% (see Energy section).

There is also support for countries having the right to go to war if they have strong evidence that the other country is acquiring weapons of mass destruction that could be used against them at some point in the future (plurality of 45% in China, 51% in India, and 60% in the United States). In South Korea 62% think countries should not have this right. This
is rather striking support for preventive war, which has traditionally not been a legitimate reason for war among nations. On the American side, as discussed in Part I, there is substantial support for the implied unilateral use of force in some situations. Nevertheless, support for the use of force is generally stronger in multilateral scenarios, together with other countries and/or through the United Nations.

Taken together, questions on the use of force show that while countries are willing to take unilateral action when necessary to defend themselves, they also support and in many cases require that actions be taken multilaterally.
Methodology

United States

The survey of the United States was conducted by Knowledge Networks, a polling, social science, and market research firm in Menlo Park, California. The survey was conducted between June 23 and July 9, 2006, with a sample of 1,227 American adults who had been randomly selected from KN’s respondent panel and answered questions on screens in their own homes. The margin of sampling error is approximately plus or minus 3 percentage points.

The survey was fielded using a randomly selected sample of KN’s large-scale, nationwide research panel. This panel is itself randomly selected from the national population of households having telephones and subsequently provided Internet access for the completion of surveys (and thus is not limited to those who already have Internet access). The distribution of the sample in the Web-enabled panel closely tracks the distribution of United States Census counts for the U.S. population on age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, geographical region, employment status, income, education, etc. The panel is recruited using stratified random-digit-dial (RDD) telephone sampling. RDD provides a nonzero probability of selection for every U.S. household having a telephone. Households that agree to participate in the panel are provided with free Web access and an Internet appliance, which uses a telephone line to connect to the Internet and uses the television as a monitor. For more information about the methodology, please go to www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp.

China

The survey of China was conducted by the international polling firm GlobeScan. The survey was conducted July 10-21, 2006, with a sample of 2,000 respondents, but was subsequently reduced to 1,964 after screening out respondents who were illiterate or who had no formal education whatsoever, giving the results a margin of error of plus or minus 2.3 percentage points. The sample was nationally representative of those eighteen years of age or older and was drawn by a stratified multistage sampling method. All thirty-one provinces were divided into three strata according to their geographical location and their HDI (Human Development Index). The sample was weighted to represent the 2005 census that indicated that 43% of people live in city or towns and 57% of people live in villages.

India

The survey of India was conducted by the international polling firm GlobeScan. The survey was conducted July 9-27, 2006. The original sample included 3,132 respondents, but was subsequently reduced to 2,458 after screening out respondents.
who were illiterate or who had no formal education whatsoever, giving the results a margin of error of approximately plus or minus 2 percent points. The sample was a representative stratified random sample of all adults, age eighteen years of age or older. The sample was a nationwide sample drawing from 97% of the population geographically and 98% demographically across 526 parliamentary areas of the country. Respondents in the northeastern part of the country, representing 2% of the population and 3% of parliamentary areas, were not polled due to the relatively inaccessible nature of these respondents and other factors.

**Australia**

The survey of Australia was conducted by Market Focus International for the Lowy Institute. The survey was conducted between June 19 and July 6, 2006, with a sample of 1,007 respondents providing a margin of error of plus or minus 3.1 percentage points. The sample is a nationally representative stratified random sample of all adults, age eighteen years of age or older, drawn using a RDD sampling method. Quotas were set for each state, age group, and sex. Interviews were conducted by telephone using a RDD sampling method until all sample quotas were filled.

**South Korea**

The survey of South Korea was conducted by Hankook Research Company for the East Asian Institute. The survey was conducted between June 16 and July 7, 2006, with a nationally representative sample of 1,024 adults nineteen years or older, providing a margin of error of plus or minus 3.1 percentage points. The interviews were conducted face-to-face. The sample was a drawn from fifteen of the sixteen administrative divisions of South Korea based on a multistage quota sampling method. The national population was categorized into sixteen groups by administrative divisions, five groups by age and two groups by sex. The quota of samples was then calculated by region, age, and sex based on the 2005 Korean Census. Households were randomly selected in every region according to the quota. In the final step, weights were applied to the dataset in order to match the sampling-quota by region, sex, age more precisely.
### Appendix A

**Perceived Influence of Countries in the World by Ranking**

*Average rating of the level of influence respondents from the following countries think each country has in the world today, how much they think it will have in ten years, and how much they want it to have. Ten-point scale, with 0 meaning not at all influential and 10 meaning extremely influential.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Today</th>
<th>In ten years</th>
<th>Desired influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. Public</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chinese Public</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
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<td>6.9</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>France</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.8</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>6.1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Indian Public</strong></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
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<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>6.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix B

### Perceived Influence of Countries in Asia by Ranking

*Average rating of the level of influence respondents from the following countries think each country has in Asia. Ten-point scale, with 0 meaning not at all influential and 10 meaning extremely influential.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese Public</th>
<th>Indian Public</th>
<th>Australian Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<tr>
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<td>China</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Australia</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Russia</td>
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The United States and the Rise of China and India
Results of a 2006 Multination Survey of Public Opinion